61 Cal. 2d 529, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673 (1964)
The defendant and the prosecuting witness were not married but had been companions for several months prior to January 3, 1961, the date of the alleged offense.1 On that date the prosecutrix was seventeen years and nine months of age.2 She voluntarily engaged in an act of sexual intercourse with the defendant.3
The defendant was charged by information with statutory rape under Penal Code section 261, subdivision 1.4 Following his plea of not guilty, the matter was tried before the court sitting without a jury.5 The court convicted the defendant as charged and determined the offense to be a misdemeanor.6
During the trial the defendant attempted to present evidence going to his guilt for the purpose of showing that he had in good faith a reasonable belief that the prosecutrix was eighteen years or more of age.7 The trial court refused to permit such evidence.8 On appeal to the Supreme Court of California the defendant contended that this refusal constituted reversible error.9
Whether the trial court erred in refusing to permit the defendant to present evidence showing that he had a good faith reasonable belief that the prosecutrix was eighteen years or more of age?10
Penal Code section 20 requires a union of act and intent to constitute a crime.11 Section 26 provides that one is not capable of committing a crime who commits an act under an ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves any criminal intent.12 A charge of statutory rape is defensible where a criminal intent is lacking because the defendant entertained a good faith reasonable belief that the female had reached the age of consent.13
Yes. The established facts demonstrate that the defendant and the prosecuting witness had been companions for several months.14 She voluntarily engaged in sexual intercourse on the date in question when she was seventeen years and nine months old.15 The defendant attempted to introduce evidence of his reasonable belief that she was at least eighteen, yet the trial court excluded the evidence entirely.16 Under the rule, criminal intent is absent when the defendant has satisfied himself on reasonable grounds that the essential factual element of age does not exist.17 He therefore has not consciously taken any risk.18 The prosecutrix was only three months short of the statutory age.19 Nothing in the facts indicates that the policy of protecting young females would be undermined by allowing the defense to be presented to the trier of fact.20
The court further reasoned that the same legislative declarations in sections 20 and 26 that were applied to bigamy in prior decisions apply equally here.21 This makes it reversible error to foreclose the defense when the offer of proof was sufficient to permit a finding in the defendant's favor.22
The trial court erred in excluding the evidence of the defendant's good faith reasonable belief, and the judgment of conviction must be reversed.23