49 N.Y.2d 668, 427 N.Y.S.2d 769, 404 N.E.2d 1310
On February 28, 1977, Victoria Lo Consolo was brutally murdered by Victor Casassa.1 Casassa and Lo Consolo had met in August 1976 as residents of the same apartment complex and dated casually until November 1976, when Lo Consolo told Casassa she was not falling in love with him.2
Following that conversation, Casassa broke into the apartment below Lo Consolo's on several occasions to eavesdrop.3 On one occasion he broke into Lo Consolo's apartment while she was out, observed the rooms, disrobed and lay in her bed while carrying a knife.4
On February 28, 1977, Casassa brought several bottles of wine and liquor to Lo Consolo's apartment.5 After she rejected the offering, he stabbed her several times in the throat with a steak knife he had brought, dragged her body to the bathroom, and submerged it in a bathtub full of water.6
The next day Nassau County police began investigating the death.7 On the evening of March 1, 1977, Casassa approached officers at the apartment building, volunteered that he had been in Lo Consolo's apartment the night before, and agreed to accompany them to headquarters.8 After being advised of his rights, he was interrogated for nine and one-half hours and at 5:00 a.m. on March 2 gave oral and written confessions.9 During the night his mother telephoned several police stations seeking information about him and was eventually told he was being held as a suspect.10
Casassa was indicted on March 8, 1977, for murder in the second degree.11 After denial of his pretrial suppression motions, he waived a jury and proceeded to trial before the County Court.12 The defense called one psychiatrist; the People called several witnesses, including a psychiatrist in rebuttal.13 The trial court found Casassa guilty of murder in the second degree.14 The Appellate Division affirmed without opinion.15
Whether the defendant established the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance in a prosecution for murder in the second degree?16
Section 125.25 (subd 1, par [a]) of the Penal Law provides that it is an affirmative defense to the crime of murder in the second degree.17 It applies where the defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse.18 The reasonableness of the explanation or excuse is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be.19 The defense has two principal components.20 The first is wholly subjective and requires that the particular defendant did in fact act under extreme emotional disturbance.21 The second requires a reasonable explanation or excuse for the disturbance and contains both subjective and objective elements.22
No. The trial court accepted as a factual matter that Casassa killed Lo Consolo while under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance.23 The court found after considering the series of events that the excuse offered was so peculiar to him that it was unworthy of mitigation.24 The court examined the rejection in November 1976, the subsequent break-ins to eavesdrop on the apartment below, the break-in to observe Lo Consolo's apartment and lie in her bed while armed with a knife, and the final visit on February 28, 1977, when Casassa brought wine and liquor only to stab her in the throat after rejection, drag the body, and submerge it in the bathtub. The court concluded that the emotional reaction was the result of malevolence rather than an understandable human response deserving of mercy.25
Therefore the court found Casassa guilty of murder in the second degree.26 The Appellate Division affirmed without opinion.
The defendant did not establish the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance.27
Whether the reasonableness of the explanation or excuse for the defendant's extreme emotional disturbance must be evaluated under a wholly subjective standard?28
The reasonableness of the explanation or excuse is not tested under a wholly subjective standard.29 Instead the trier of fact must view the subjective internal situation in which the defendant found himself and the external circumstances as he perceived them at the time.30 The trier of fact must assess from that standpoint whether the explanation or excuse for his emotional disturbance was reasonable. This assessment determines whether he is entitled to a reduction from murder in the second degree to manslaughter in the first degree.31
No. The statute and the Comments to the Model Penal Code from which it was drawn establish that while the first component of the defense is wholly subjective the second component imposes an objective test of reasonableness.32 The viewpoint is that of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be.33 The trial court properly applied this mixed standard by accepting the existence of extreme emotional disturbance yet determining that the explanation was so peculiar to Casassa that mitigation was not warranted.34 The court considered the totality of the circumstances including the claimed mental disability but concluded that the murder resulted from malevolence rather than an understandable human response.35
The reasonableness of the explanation or excuse for the defendant's extreme emotional disturbance must not be evaluated under a wholly subjective standard.36
Whether the defendant's oral and written statements to police were given voluntarily?37
Yes. Casassa approached the officers voluntarily at the apartment building on March 1, 1977.40 He offered to cooperate in the investigation.41 He was advised of his constitutional rights.42
He indicated that he understood those rights and nevertheless chose to cooperate.43 He was then interrogated for nine and one-half hours before giving oral and written confessions at 5:00 a.m. on March 2.44 The trial court examined the totality of the circumstances surrounding the arrest and confession and found as a factual matter that the statements were given voluntarily.45 The Appellate Division affirmed that finding.46
Nothing in the record indicates that the confession was involuntarily obtained as a matter of law.47
The defendant's oral and written statements to police were given voluntarily.48
Whether police responses to the defendant's mother's inquiries about his whereabouts violated his right to counsel?49
A defendant's right to counsel is not infringed when a family member contacts police to report the defendant as a missing person and receives information about his status as a suspect.50 This is provided no attorney has attempted to intercede.51 The defendant has not requested counsel.52 The police have not intentionally deprived the defendant of access to family in an effort to obtain a confession.53
No. During the night of March 1 to March 2, Casassa's mother telephoned several police stations to report her son as a missing person.54 She was eventually informed that he was being held for questioning as a suspect in the Lo Consolo homicide.55 No attorney attempted to intercede on Casassa's behalf.56 There is no evidence that the police intentionally deprived him of access to his family.57
Casassa, a twenty-seven-year-old man who had been advised of his rights, consciously chose to confront his interrogators alone.58 He never asked to speak with counsel or any member of his family.59 Under these circumstances the right to counsel was not infringed.60
Police responses to the defendant's mother's inquiries about his whereabouts did not violate his right to counsel.61