721 P.2d 110 (Cal. 1986)
Marsha M. had known the appellant for about four years as of May 1982.1 They were neighbors and acquaintances who had previously socialized and conducted a marijuana transaction.2 Around 10 p.m. on May 27, 1982, the appellant called Marsha to invite her over for drinks to celebrate his parents' financial windfall.3 After several calls over two hours, Marsha agreed to visit around 1 a.m. on May 28 to purchase marijuana, asking the appellant to meet her outside.4
Upon arrival, the appellant persuaded Marsha to enter the house despite her initial reluctance and desire to complete the transaction quickly and leave.5 They smoked marijuana in a room off the garage.6 After about 10 or 15 minutes, the appellant began making physical advances, which Marsha rebuffed by pushing him away.7 She left the room and went to the front gate, but the appellant followed, became angry, and prevented her from leaving by refusing to open the gate and making threatening gestures.8
The argument at the gate lasted about 20 minutes.9 Marsha followed the appellant back inside because she believed she could not exit alone.10 Back in the room, the appellant displayed his muscles, grabbed her collar, boasted about past sexual exploits, and warned her she was about to see his bad side.11 When she refused to remove her clothes, he gestured and warned her against upsetting him, leading to sexual intercourse lasting about one hour.12 Marsha later testified she complied out of fear of physical violence.13
Marsha awoke around 4 a.m., convinced the appellant to let her out, returned home, and contacted Kaiser Hospital for an examination at the sexual trauma center.14 She reported the incident to police the following day after discussing it with a coworker.15 The appellant was convicted after a jury trial of rape and false imprisonment.16 The Court of Appeal reversed the convictions, and the Supreme Court granted review.17
Whether the Court of Appeal was correct in relying on a rape complainant's lack of measurable resistance to overturn convictions of rape and false imprisonment as unsupported by sufficient evidence?18
Penal Code section 261, subdivision (2), as amended in 1980, defines rape as an act of sexual intercourse accomplished against a person's will by means of force or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person or another, without any requirement that the victim resist.19
No. The Court of Appeal incorrectly relied on the pre-amendment requirement of resistance when it reversed the convictions.20 The 1980 amendment eliminated any need to prove resistance, shifting the inquiry to whether the act occurred against the victim's will by force or fear.21
Marsha M. had known the appellant for about four years as of May 1982. They were neighbors and acquaintances who had previously socialized and conducted a marijuana transaction. Around 10 p.m. on May 27, 1982, the appellant called Marsha to invite her over for drinks to celebrate his parents' financial windfall. After several calls over two hours, Marsha agreed to visit around 1 a.m. on May 28 to purchase marijuana, asking the appellant to meet her outside.
Upon arrival, the appellant persuaded Marsha to enter the house despite her initial reluctance and desire to complete the transaction quickly and leave. They smoked marijuana in a room off the garage. After about 10 or 15 minutes, the appellant began making physical advances, which Marsha rebuffed by pushing him away. She left the room and went to the front gate, but the appellant followed, became angry, and prevented her from leaving by refusing to open the gate and making threatening gestures.
The argument at the gate lasted about 20 minutes. Marsha followed the appellant back inside because she believed she could not exit alone. Back in the room, the appellant displayed his muscles, grabbed her collar, boasted about past sexual exploits, and warned her she was about to see his bad side. When she refused to remove her clothes, he gestured and warned her against upsetting him, leading to sexual intercourse lasting about one hour. Marsha later testified she complied out of fear of physical violence.
Marsha awoke around 4 a.m., convinced the appellant to let her out, returned home, and contacted Kaiser Hospital for an examination at the sexual trauma center. She reported the incident to police the following day after discussing it with a coworker. The appellant was convicted after a jury trial of rape and false imprisonment. The Court of Appeal reversed the convictions, and the Supreme Court granted review. The appellant's threatening conduct, including rearing back as if to hit Marsha at the gate, displaying his muscles, grabbing her collar, boasting he could make her do anything he wanted, and warning she was about to see his bad side, created a genuine and reasonable fear of immediate bodily injury.22 Marsha's testimony established that she removed her clothes and submitted only because she feared physical violence if she refused.23 A rational trier of fact could conclude that the intercourse was accomplished against her will by fear.24 The absence of measurable resistance supplies no basis for finding the evidence insufficient under the amended statute.25
The Court of Appeal's decision must be reversed because the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions for rape and false imprisonment under the law in effect at the time of the offense.26