299 N.W.2d 304 (Mich. 1980)
On August 6, 1975, defendant Francis Aaron and his cousin Thomas St. Onge went to the home of Aaron's estranged wife Myra in Jackson, Michigan.1
Aaron was armed with a .22 caliber rifle and intended to frighten his wife into returning to him.2 When they arrived, Myra was not present, but her mother, brother, and two small children were there.3 Aaron and St. Onge waited for Myra to return.4 Upon her arrival an argument ensued between Aaron and his wife.5 Aaron's mother-in-law called the police.6 Aaron then shot and killed his wife and also shot and wounded his brother-in-law.7
Aaron was charged with first-degree murder contrary to MCL 750.316 and with assault with intent to commit murder contrary to MCL 750.83.8 The prosecutor proceeded on theories of premeditated murder and felony murder with arson as the underlying felony.9 At the preliminary examination the district judge bound Aaron over on the premeditated murder theory but refused to bind over on the felony-murder theory due to insufficient evidence of arson.10 The prosecutor appealed to the circuit court which reversed and held there was sufficient evidence of arson to bind over on the felony-murder theory.11
Aaron was tried before a jury in the Jackson Circuit Court on both theories.12 The jury returned a verdict of guilty of second-degree murder.13 Aaron appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the conviction.14 Aaron applied for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court.15 The court granted leave limited to the issue of the continuing validity of the felony-murder doctrine in the state.16
The consolidated opinion also addresses two other cases.17 In People v. Thompson the defendant was convicted of first-degree felony murder resulting from a death during an armed robbery after the jury was instructed that intent to rob was sufficient without proving malice.18 The Court of Appeals reversed due to the lack of a malice instruction.19 In People v. Wright the defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree felony murder for setting fire to a dwelling causing two deaths.20 The trial court instructed that proof the killings occurred during arson was sufficient and the Court of Appeals reversed for removing the malice element from the jury.21
Whether the felony-murder doctrine as it exists in Michigan should be abrogated?22
The felony-murder doctrine, which treats a homicide committed during the perpetration of a felony as murder by supplying malice from the intent to commit the underlying felony, is no longer part of the common law of Michigan.23
No. The doctrine originated in England when all felonies were capital and served to extend the death penalty, but that rationale no longer exists.2425
The assumption that intent to commit a felony always supplies malice is invalid because a person may commit a felony without intending to kill or injure anyone.26 Legal scholars have criticized the doctrine as anachronistic and it has been rejected or limited by many jurisdictions and the Model Penal Code.27 In Aaron's case the prosecutor relied on arson as the underlying felony after the shooting, yet the jury convicted only of second-degree murder, showing the instruction may have confused the jury without supporting evidence of arson at the preliminary stage.28
The court therefore abrogated the rule and held that malice must be proved independently as intent to kill, intent to do great bodily harm, or wanton and willful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of the behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm, with the underlying felony serving only as evidence of state of mind.29
The felony-murder doctrine is abrogated in Michigan.30
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Ryan concurred in the result of abrogating the doctrine but wrote separately to express disagreement with the reasoning employed in the majority opinion.31 He maintained that felony murder is not a species of common-law murder at all because it requires no mental state with respect to the killing and therefore has nothing to do with malice.32
Ryan emphasized that the offense is entirely parasitic on the underlying felony and that any fiction imputing malice from the felony only creates confusion in homicide law.33 He argued that the common-law felony-murder rule operates as a conclusive presumption relieving the prosecution of proving any mental state regarding the killing.34
Whether the intent to commit an underlying felony can supply the malice required for murder?35
Malice, defined as the intention to kill, the intention to do great bodily harm, or the wanton and willful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of the defendant's behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm, must be found independently and cannot be supplied as a matter of law by the intent to commit the underlying felony.36
No. The court rejected the notion that intent to commit a felony equates to any of the three forms of malice because the felony may be committed without any intent to harm a person.37 In the consolidated cases the trial courts instructed juries that proof of the underlying felony alone satisfied the malice element, which removed the issue from the jury's consideration.38
Applying the rule to the established facts, Aaron was bound over and tried on a felony-murder theory based on arson even though the district judge initially found insufficient evidence of that felony, and the jury ultimately convicted of second-degree murder only after receiving the erroneous instruction.39 The court held that the facts and circumstances of the felony may support an inference of malice but the conclusion must be left to the jury.40
The intent to commit an underlying felony cannot supply the malice required for murder.41
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Ryan stressed that the common-law felony-murder rule operates as a conclusive presumption relieving the prosecution of proving any mental state regarding the killing.42 He argued that because malice is the sine qua non of murder, treating the intent to commit a felony as a form of malice is a fiction that should be discarded entirely rather than recharacterized as a separate category of malice.43
Ryan maintained that the defendant's state of mind with respect to the killing is irrelevant under the rule.44
Whether Michigan's first-degree murder statute requires proof of malice independent of the intent to commit an enumerated felony?45
Michigan's first-degree murder statute, MCL 750.316, does not define murder but merely elevates the degree of an already established murder; therefore proof of malice independent of the intent to commit an enumerated felony is required before the statute may be applied.46
Yes. The statute uses the term 'murder' and therefore presupposes that a murder has already been proved under common-law definitions requiring malice.47 The court examined the history of the statute, adopted from Pennsylvania, and concluded it was intended only to graduate punishment among murders and not to create a new form of murder from the felony itself.48
In Aaron's case the prosecutor relied on the statute to elevate the homicide to first-degree murder on the felony-murder theory, but the jury convicted of second-degree murder, consistent with the requirement that malice be proved separately.49 The same principle applied in Thompson and Wright where the instructions removed malice from the jury.50
Michigan's first-degree murder statute requires proof of malice independent of the intent to commit an enumerated felony.51
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Williams concurred in the result and agreed that the statutory language of MCL 750.316 requires proof of malice for any murder elevated to first degree, including those committed during enumerated felonies.52 He stressed that the statute begins with the words 'All murder which' and therefore presupposes an already established murder requiring malice rather than creating a separate category of murder from the felony alone.53
Williams focused on the statutory text beginning with 'All murder which' and ending with 'shall be murder of the first degree.'54 He concluded that the language makes clear that only a murder, which already requires malice, can be elevated to first degree when committed during an enumerated felony, and that malice must therefore be proved in every case.55
Whether a defendant tried under both premeditated and felony-murder theories can have the conviction reviewed for error in the felony-murder instruction when the jury returned a second-degree murder verdict?56
When a jury is instructed on both premeditated murder and felony murder and returns a verdict of second-degree murder, the erroneous felony-murder instruction may still require reversal if it could have affected the jury's consideration of the evidence.57
Yes. Although the jury convicted Aaron of second-degree murder rather than first-degree felony murder, the court determined that the erroneous instruction on felony murder may have influenced the jury's deliberations and that the proper remedy was reversal and remand for a new trial under the rule that malice must be proved independently.58
The court applied this holding to the facts that the jury had been instructed on both theories and that the felony-murder instruction was given despite the initial district court finding of insufficient evidence of arson.59 In contrast to the initial view that the second-degree verdict showed no prejudice, the majority concluded that the instructional error warranted a new trial for Aaron while affirming the Court of Appeals reversals in Thompson and Wright.60
A defendant tried under both theories may obtain review and reversal of the second-degree murder conviction when the felony-murder instruction was erroneous.61