496 U.S. 583 (1990)
In the early morning hours of November 30, 1986, a patrol officer spotted Inocencio Muniz and a passenger parked in a car on the shoulder of a highway in Pennsylvania. When the officer inquired whether Muniz needed assistance, Muniz replied that he had stopped the car so he could urinate. The officer smelled alcohol on Muniz's breath and observed that Muniz's eyes were glazed and bloodshot and his face was flushed. The officer directed Muniz to remain parked until his condition improved, but Muniz drove off. The officer pursued Muniz, pulled him over, and asked him to perform three standard field sobriety tests: a horizontal gaze nystagmus test, a walk and turn test, and a one leg stand test. Muniz performed these tests poorly and informed the officer that he had failed the tests because he had been drinking.
The patrol officer arrested Muniz and transported him to the West Shore facility of the Cumberland County Central Booking Center. Following its routine practice, the booking center videotaped the ensuing proceedings. Muniz was informed that his actions and voice were being recorded, but he was not advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona. Officer Hosterman first asked Muniz his name, address, height, weight, eye color, date of birth, and current age. Muniz responded to each of these questions, stumbling over his address and age. The officer then asked Muniz, "Do you know what the date was of your sixth birthday?" After Muniz offered an inaudible reply, the officer repeated the question, and Muniz responded, "No, I don't."
Officer Hosterman next requested Muniz to perform each of the three sobriety tests that Muniz had been asked to perform earlier during the initial roadside stop. The videotape reveals that his eyes jerked noticeably during the gaze test, that he did not walk a very straight line, and that he could not balance himself on one leg for more than several seconds. During the latter two tests, he did not complete the requested verbal counts from 1 to 9 and from 1 to 30. Moreover, while performing these tests, Muniz attempted to explain his difficulties in performing the various tasks and often requested further clarification of the tasks he was to perform. Finally, Officer Deyo asked Muniz to submit to a breathalyzer test designed to measure the alcohol content of his expelled breath. Officer Deyo read to Muniz the Commonwealth's Implied Consent Law and explained that under the law his refusal to take the test would result in automatic suspension of his driver's license for one year. Muniz asked a number of questions about the law, commenting in the process about his state of inebriation, and ultimately refused to take the breath test.
At this point, Muniz was for the first time advised of his Miranda rights. Muniz then signed a statement waiving his rights and admitted in response to further questioning that he had been driving while intoxicated. Both the video and audio portions of the videotape were admitted into evidence at Muniz's bench trial, along with the arresting officer's testimony that Muniz failed the roadside sobriety tests and made incriminating remarks at that time. Muniz was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3731(a)(1). Muniz filed a motion for a new trial, contending that the court should have excluded the testimony relating to the field sobriety tests and the videotape taken at the booking center because they were incriminating and completed prior to Muniz receiving his Miranda warnings. The trial court denied the motion.
On appeal, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed. The appellate court agreed that when Muniz was asked to submit to a field sobriety test, and later perform these tests before the videotape camera, no Miranda warnings were required because such sobriety tests elicit physical, rather than testimonial, evidence within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. The court concluded, however, that when the physical nature of the tests begins to yield testimonial and communicative statements, the protections afforded by Miranda are invoked. The court explained that Muniz's answer to the question regarding his sixth birthday and the statements and inquiries he made while performing the physical dexterity tests and discussing the breathalyzer test are precisely the sort of testimonial evidence that should have been excluded. Concluding that the audio portion of the videotape should have been suppressed in its entirety, the court reversed Muniz's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. After the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied the Commonwealth's application for review, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Whether the seven biographical questions asked at the booking center constituted custodial interrogation under Miranda v. Arizona?1
Custodial interrogation under Miranda encompasses express questioning or its functional equivalent that the police should know is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.2 Routine booking questions seeking biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services fall outside Miranda's coverage when not designed to elicit incriminating admissions.3
No. The seven questions regarding Muniz's name, address, height, weight, eye color, date of birth, and current age were requested for record-keeping purposes only during the booking process at the Cumberland County Central Booking Center and were reasonably related to administrative concerns rather than investigation.4 In the established facts, Officer Hosterman asked these questions as part of standard procedure before any Miranda warnings, and Muniz stumbled over his address and age while responding, yet the questions themselves did not confront him with the trilemma of truth, falsity, or silence in an investigatory sense.5
The answers to the seven biographical questions were admissible because they fell within the routine booking question exception and did not constitute custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings.6
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Joined by Rehnquist, C. J., Joined
Chief Justice Rehnquist agreed that the seven booking questions should not be suppressed but reached that result for a different reason. He concluded that the responses were not testimonial at all rather than relying on a routine booking exception. Rehnquist would have reversed the judgment of the Superior Court in its entirety.
He emphasized that the need for the use of the human voice does not automatically make an answer testimonial.7
Whether Muniz's response to the question about the date of his sixth birthday was testimonial evidence within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment?8
Evidence is testimonial when the accused's communication itself explicitly or implicitly relates a factual assertion or discloses information, thereby forcing the suspect to confront the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury, or contempt during custodial interrogation.9
Yes. The sixth birthday question required Muniz to calculate and communicate the date or admit he did not know it, and his response that he did not know revealed his mental confusion through the content of the answer itself.10 In the established facts, after Muniz responded to the biographical questions at the booking center, Officer Hosterman asked whether Muniz knew the date of his sixth birthday, Muniz replied no after an inaudible attempt, and this content supported an inference of impaired mental faculties distinct from any slurring in delivery.11
Muniz's response to the sixth birthday question was testimonial, was elicited during custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings, and therefore should have been suppressed.12
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Joined by Scalia, J., Joined
Justice O’Connor joined Parts I, II, and III of the Court's opinion.13 She disagreed, however, with the conclusion that the answer to the sixth birthday question was testimonial.14 O’Connor reasoned that the question was part of the routine booking process and was not intended to elicit incriminating information.15
The fact that it may have done so in this case does not change its character.16 She would hold that all of the evidence was admissible.17
Joined by Rehnquist, C. J., Joined
Justice Kennedy dissented from the conclusion that the sixth birthday question required a testimonial response.18 He viewed the question as a routine booking question.19 Kennedy stated that the response, while incriminating, was not the product of interrogation within the meaning of Miranda.20
He argued that the Court's distinction between the content of the response and the manner of speaking is unworkable because all responses have both content and manner.21 Kennedy would affirm the judgment of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in its entirety.22
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented from the holding that Muniz's response to the sixth birthday question should have been suppressed.23 He argued that the question tested Muniz's ability to perform a simple mathematical exercise.24 Rehnquist noted that the use of the human voice does not automatically render an answer testimonial.25
He compared it to requiring a suspect to use his body to demonstrate physical coordination and saw no reason why the police should not examine the functioning of Muniz's mental processes for the same purpose.26 Rehnquist would reverse in its entirety the judgment of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.27
Justice Marshall concurred that the sixth birthday question required a testimonial response and constituted custodial interrogation.28 He stressed that the privilege against self-incrimination must be given a broad construction.29 Marshall emphasized that the question served no apparent recordkeeping need because the police already possessed Muniz's date of birth.30
The absence of any administrative need suggests that the question was designed to obtain an incriminating response.31 He would affirm the judgment of the state court.32
Whether the slurred nature of Muniz's speech during his answers to the biographical questions was testimonial evidence?33
The privilege against self-incrimination does not protect against compulsion to produce real or physical evidence such as the physical properties of a suspect's voice or the manner of articulation, as distinguished from the communicative content of any statements made.34
No. The slurred nature of Muniz's speech revealed only the physical inability to articulate words clearly due to lack of muscular coordination and constituted nontestimonial real or physical evidence.35 In the established facts, Muniz responded to the seven biographical questions at the booking center with slurred speech that indicated intoxication, yet the incriminating value derived solely from the manner of delivery rather than any factual assertion in the content.36
The slurred nature of Muniz's speech was not testimonial and its admission at trial did not violate the Fifth Amendment.37
Whether Muniz's statements and performance while completing the three sobriety tests at the booking center were testimonial evidence?38
Physical sobriety tests that measure reflexes, dexterity, and balance produce real or physical evidence outside Fifth Amendment protection.39 Verbal statements made during such tests are not the product of custodial interrogation when the officer's instructions and limited inquiries are attendant to a legitimate procedure and not reasonably likely to elicit incriminating responses.40
No. Muniz's performance on the horizontal gaze nystagmus, walk and turn, and one leg stand tests yielded only physical evidence of intoxication, and his statements attempting to explain difficulties or request clarification were voluntary rather than elicited by custodial interrogation.41 In the established facts, Officer Hosterman gave scripted instructions for the tests at the booking center, Muniz's eyes jerked, he failed to walk straight or balance, and he made explanatory remarks, yet the instructions focused on physical actions and were not likely to be perceived as calling for verbal responses beyond those attendant to the procedure.42
Neither the physical performance of the sobriety tests nor Muniz's accompanying statements constituted testimonial evidence or the product of custodial interrogation, so both were admissible.43
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Justice Marshall dissented from the holding that Muniz's statements in connection with the sobriety tests were not the products of custodial interrogation.44 He argued that the officers should have known the circumstances and detailed instructions were reasonably likely to elicit incriminating responses given Muniz's apparent intoxication.45 Marshall noted that the directions to count aloud sought testimonial responses whose content would indicate his state of mind.46
He would affirm the judgment of the state court because Muniz was not first given the Miranda warnings.47
Whether Muniz's statements and questions while being asked to submit to the breathalyzer test were the product of custodial interrogation under Miranda v. Arizona?48
Statements made when a suspect is asked to submit to a breathalyzer test are not the product of custodial interrogation when the officer reads a prepared script explaining the test and implied consent law and asks only limited focused inquiries whether the suspect understands and wishes to submit, because such inquiries are attendant to a legitimate police procedure and not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.49
No. Officer Deyo's explanation of the Implied Consent Law and inquiries whether Muniz understood and wished to submit were limited and attendant to the breathalyzer procedure, rendering Muniz's questions and comments about his inebriation voluntary rather than the product of custodial interrogation.50 In the established facts, after the sobriety tests Muniz was read the law, asked questions about it while commenting on his state, and ultimately refused the test, yet these exchanges occurred before any Miranda warnings and did not involve words or actions reasonably likely to prompt incriminating statements beyond the administrative context.51
Muniz's statements and questions surrounding the breathalyzer test were not the product of custodial interrogation, so their admission did not violate Miranda.52
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Justice Marshall dissented from the conclusion that Muniz's statements in connection with the breathalyzer test were not the products of custodial interrogation.53 He contended that the officers should have known the circumstances combined with the explanation of the Implied Consent Law were reasonably likely to elicit incriminating responses from an intoxicated suspect. Marshall further noted that the 14-minute observation period suggested an expectation of such statements.54
He would affirm the judgment of the state court.