445 U.S. 573 (1980)
In January 1970, New York detectives conducted a two-day investigation into the murder of a gas station manager.1 On January 14 they assembled evidence sufficient to establish probable cause to believe that Theodore Payton had committed the crime.2 On the morning of January 15 at about 7:30 a.m., six officers went to Payton’s apartment in the Bronx without having obtained a warrant.3 Although light and music emanated from inside, there was no response to their knock on the metal door.4 They summoned emergency assistance and approximately thirty minutes later used crowbars to break open the door and enter.5 No one was present, but the officers seized a .30-caliber shell casing that lay in plain view and that was later admitted into evidence at Payton’s murder trial.6
In a companion case, on March 14, 1974, police officers acting with probable cause went to the Queens house where Obie Riddick was living to arrest him for two armed robberies that had occurred in 1971.7 When Riddick’s young son opened the door the officers saw Riddick sitting in bed.8 They entered the house, placed him under arrest, and before permitting him to dress opened a chest of drawers two feet from the bed.9 They discovered narcotics and related paraphernalia that were later admitted at his trial on narcotics charges.10
In both cases the New York trial courts upheld the warrantless entries and plain-view seizures under provisions of the New York Code of Criminal Procedure that authorized such actions, and the Appellate Divisions affirmed.11 The New York Court of Appeals, in a single 4-3 opinion, affirmed the convictions of both Payton and Riddick.12 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases, which were argued together.13
Whether the Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect’s home to effect a routine felony arrest?14
The Fourth Amendment prohibits the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home to effect a routine felony arrest.15
Yes. In Payton's case the officers had assembled probable cause through a two-day investigation.16 Yet they entered his apartment without any warrant by breaking the door with crowbars after receiving no response to their knock.17 They seized a shell casing in plain view.18
In Riddick's case the officers likewise possessed probable cause but entered the home without a warrant after the son opened the door.19 Then they searched a nearby chest of drawers and recovered narcotics paraphernalia.20 The Fourth Amendment draws a firm line at the entrance to the house.21 It treats the physical entry of the home as the chief evil against which the Amendment is directed.22
Absent exigent circumstances that line may not be crossed without a warrant even when the entry is solely to effect an arrest.23
The warrantless and nonconsensual entries violated the Fourth Amendment and the judgments of the New York Court of Appeals must be reversed.24
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Blackmun concurred in the Court's opinion while noting that the decision leaves intact the authority of police to make warrantless home entries when exigent circumstances exist.25 He explained that the same balancing of governmental and individual interests that justified warrantless public arrests in United States v. Watson produces the opposite result for entries into the home.26 There the suspect's interest in the sanctity of his residence outweighs governmental interests absent exigency.27
Blackmun stressed that the Fourth Amendment does not forbid all warrantless home entries but only those that are unreasonable.28 This preserves flexibility for true emergencies while protecting routine arrests.29
Joined by Burger, C. J., And Rehnquist, J.
Justice White dissented on the ground that the common law had long authorized warrantless entries into dwellings to arrest for felony upon probable cause.30 The Fourth Amendment was not intended to abrogate that authority.31 He argued that an arrest warrant issued by a neutral magistrate supplies sufficient protection.32
Requiring a separate search warrant or an arrest warrant plus additional justification for entry would severely hamper effective law enforcement because many felony arrests occur inside homes.33 White further maintained that the majority's rigid rule ignores centuries of common-law development and the practical realities facing officers who must decide quickly whether exigent circumstances justify immediate action.34
Justice Rehnquist joined Justice White's dissent and separately underscored the practical consequences of the majority's holding.35 He observed that the convictions set aside involved serious felonies—murder in Payton's case and armed robberies in Riddick's case.36 The exclusionary rule was now being used to nullify state-court judgments obtained after trials in which the seized evidence had been properly admitted under then-existing law.37
Rehnquist expressed concern that the decision transposed errors previously made in the search context into the distinct area of home arrests supported by probable cause.38 This disrupted the administration of criminal justice without historical or constitutional warrant.39