491 U.S. 164 (1989)
Brenda Patterson, a black woman, began her employment with McLean Credit Union in May 1972 as a teller and file coordinator in North Carolina.1 She remained in that position until July 1982, when the credit union laid her off.2 After her termination, Patterson commenced an action in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, alleging that McLean Credit Union had harassed her, failed to promote her to an intermediate accounting clerk position, and discharged her, all because of her race, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.3 She also asserted a state-law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under North Carolina tort law.4
The District Court ruled that a claim for racial harassment is not actionable under § 1981 and declined to submit that portion of the case to the jury.5 The jury received and deliberated upon Patterson's § 1981 claims alleging discrimination in her discharge and the failure to promote her, returning verdicts for the employer on both claims.6 The District Court directed a verdict for the employer on the state tort claim, concluding that the employer's conduct did not rise to the level of outrageousness required under North Carolina law.7
In the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Patterson challenged the District Court's refusal to submit her § 1981 racial harassment claim to the jury.8 She also argued that the District Court had erred in instructing the jury that she must show she was better qualified than the white employee promoted in her place.9 The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's judgment in full, holding that racial harassment does not abridge the right to make and enforce contracts under § 1981, while upholding the jury instruction on the promotion claim.10
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether Patterson's racial harassment claim is actionable under § 1981 and whether the jury instruction on her promotion claim was erroneous.11 After oral argument on these issues, the Court requested the parties to brief and argue an additional question whether or not the interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 adopted by this Court in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), should be reconsidered.12
Whether the interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 adopted by this Court in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), should be reconsidered?13
The doctrine of stare decisis is of fundamental importance to the rule of law, and any departure from it in the area of statutory interpretation demands special justification, such as intervening development of the law or unworkability of the precedent.14
No. The Court applied this rule to the established facts that Patterson, a black woman employed by McLean Credit Union from May 1972 until her layoff in July 1982, brought claims under § 1981 for racial harassment, failure to promote, and discharge.15 No special justification was shown for overruling Runyon because there were no intervening changes in the law.16 The decision is not unworkable.17 It is consistent with the national policy against racial discrimination as reflected in the facts of the case and subsequent legislation.18
The interpretation of § 1981 in Runyon should not be reconsidered.19
Whether a claim of racial harassment relating to the conditions of employment is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981?20
Section 1981 protects only the right to make and enforce contracts and does not reach postformation conduct relating to the terms and conditions of continuing employment.21
No. The Court applied this rule to the established facts that Patterson alleged her supervisor periodically stared at her.22 He gave her too many tasks including sweeping and dusting not given to white employees.23 He told her that blacks work slower than whites.24 He criticized her in staff meetings.25 All of this conduct the District Court and Court of Appeals treated as postformation conduct not involving the making or enforcement of contracts.26
A claim of racial harassment relating to the conditions of employment is not actionable under § 1981.27
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, And Stevens In Part
Justice Brennan dissented from the holding that racial harassment claims are not actionable under § 1981.28 He argued that the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 demonstrates Congress intended to reach postformation conduct demonstrating that a contract was not made on racially neutral terms.29 He would hold the statute covers harassment sufficiently severe or pervasive to belie any claim of a racially neutral contract formation.30
Patterson's evidence of racial slurs, unequal assignments, denied promotions, and closer scrutiny could support a jury finding of such harassment.31
Whether the District Court erred in instructing the jury that petitioner had to prove she was better qualified than the white employee promoted in her stead on her § 1981 discriminatory promotion claim?32
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework applicable to § 1981 claims, once the employer articulates a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason such as superior qualifications, the plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion to show pretext but may do so through a variety of evidence and is not required to prove she was better qualified.33
Yes. The Court applied the McDonnell Douglas framework to claims of racial discrimination under § 1981.34 Patterson established a prima facie case by showing she applied for and was qualified for an available position, was rejected, and a white employee filled the position.35 The employer articulated a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason that the white applicant was better qualified.36
The District Court nevertheless erred by instructing the jury that Patterson was required to prove she was better qualified to demonstrate pretext.37 She could have used other evidence such as the employer's past treatment of her and its failure to train her for an accounting position.38
The District Court erred in instructing the jury that petitioner had to prove she was better qualified than the white employee promoted in her stead on her § 1981 discriminatory promotion claim.39
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, And Stevens In Part
Justice Brennan agreed that the District Court erred in its jury instruction on the promotion claim.40 He explained that a plaintiff may prove pretext in many ways other than showing superior qualifications.41 Evidence of the employer's past treatment of the plaintiff is one recognized method of demonstrating that the stated reason is not the true reason.42
He noted that the plaintiff is not limited to any particular form of evidence.43 The instruction was much too restrictive, cutting off other methods of proving pretext plainly recognized in the Court's cases, such as showing the employer's general policy and practice with respect to minority employment or its past treatment of the plaintiff.44