487 U.S. 285 (1988)
On August 21, 1983, petitioner, a member of the Vice Lords street gang, became involved in a fight with members of a rival gang known as the Black Mobsters.1 Later that morning police discovered the body of James Jackson, a former Black Mobster, who had been severely beaten and left face down in a puddle of water.2 That afternoon local police obtained arrest warrants for battery and mob action arising from the initial fight, and a statement from one arrested gang member implicated petitioner and others in Jackson's murder.3 Petitioner was apprehended, advised of his Miranda rights, and questioned; he gave a statement about the gang fight but denied any knowledge of Jackson's death.4
On August 23, 1983, a Cook County grand jury indicted petitioner for the murder of James Jackson.5 Police Officer Michael Gresham removed petitioner from the lockup, informed him that he had been indicted and was being transferred to the Cook County jail, and answered petitioner's questions about which gang members had been charged.6 When petitioner began to explain his account of the crime and mention a supporting witness, Gresham interrupted and presented a Miranda waiver form containing five specific warnings.7 Petitioner read along as Gresham read the warnings aloud, initialed each warning, signed the form, and then gave a lengthy detailed statement describing the role of each Vice Lord, including himself, in Jackson's murder.8
Later the same day Assistant State's Attorney George Smith interviewed petitioner, reviewed the earlier Miranda waiver, had petitioner initial each right and sign a new waiver form, and obtained a second inculpatory statement.9 Before trial petitioner moved to suppress both statements on the ground that he had not knowingly and intelligently waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.10 The trial court denied the motion, the statements were introduced at trial, the jury found petitioner guilty of murder, and he was sentenced to twenty-four years in prison.11
On appeal the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, relying on its prior decision that Miranda warnings adequately inform a defendant of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel during postindictment questioning.12 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split of authority on the validity of such waivers.13
Whether police may initiate postindictment interrogation of a defendant who has not requested counsel?14
The Jackson rule extending Edwards to the Sixth Amendment context applies only when the defendant has requested counsel at arraignment or a preliminary hearing.15 If the defendant has not requested counsel, police may initiate interrogation after providing Miranda warnings and obtaining a valid waiver.16
Yes. Petitioner was indicted on August 23, 1983, for the murder of James Jackson.17 Police Officer Michael Gresham removed petitioner from the lockup and informed him of the indictment before presenting the Miranda waiver form.18 Petitioner never requested counsel at any stage prior to or during the questioning by Gresham or Assistant State's Attorney George Smith.19
Petitioner initialed each of the five Miranda warnings and signed the waiver form on two separate occasions before giving detailed statements.20 Because petitioner had not requested counsel, the presumption underlying the Jackson rule did not apply and the police-initiated interrogation was permissible.21
Police may initiate postindictment interrogation of a defendant who has not requested counsel when Miranda warnings are given and a valid waiver is obtained.22
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Brennan And Justice Marshall
Justice Stevens dissented on the ground that formal indictment marks the commencement of adversary proceedings and automatically triggers the Sixth Amendment right to counsel as a medium between the accused and the State.23 He argued that the appointment of counsel or the return of an indictment is the functional equivalent of a request for counsel.24 Police may not initiate private interviews without counsel present regardless of whether the defendant personally requested representation.25
Stevens concluded that the statements should have been suppressed because the practice of postindictment interrogation without counsel violates both the letter and spirit of Massiah, Henry, Moulton, and Jackson.26
Justice Blackmun dissented separately, agreeing with most of what Justice Stevens wrote.27 He would hold that after formal adversary proceedings against a defendant have been commenced, the Sixth Amendment mandates that the defendant not be subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.28 Blackmun rejected the majority's conclusion that the fact that petitioner's Sixth Amendment right came into existence with his indictment does not distinguish him from the preindictment interrogatee whose right to counsel is merely available for exercise.29
In his view, the Sixth Amendment does not allow the prosecution to take undue advantage of any gap between the commencement of the adversary process and the time at which counsel is appointed for a defendant.30
Whether Miranda warnings are sufficient to make a defendant's waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel knowing and intelligent?31
Yes. The Miranda warnings given to petitioner by Officer Gresham and Assistant State's Attorney Smith informed him of his right to counsel.34 The warnings also informed him of the right to have counsel present during questioning.35 They informed him of the right to appointed counsel if indigent.36 Petitioner read along with the warnings, initialed each one, and signed the waiver forms on two occasions while confirming he understood his rights.37 The warnings also made clear that any statement could be used against him in court.38 This conveyed the adverse consequences of forgoing counsel.39
Petitioner was therefore sufficiently aware of both the nature of the right and the consequences of abandoning it when he chose to speak.40
Miranda warnings are sufficient to make a defendant's waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel knowing and intelligent during postindictment questioning.41
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Brennan And Justice Marshall
Justice Stevens maintained that Miranda warnings cannot satisfy the higher standard required for a knowing and intelligent waiver of the Sixth Amendment right after indictment.42 He explained that the warnings fail to convey the full dangers and disadvantages of self-representation at that stage.43 Such dangers include the lawyer's ability to examine the indictment for legal sufficiency.44
They also include the lawyer's ability to negotiate a plea before interrogation occurs.45 Stevens concluded that an adversary party cannot ethically or constitutionally provide the advice necessary for a valid waiver once the adversarial relationship has solidified.46
Whether additional information beyond Miranda warnings must be provided before an indicted defendant can validly waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel during questioning?47
No additional information beyond the Miranda warnings is constitutionally required before an indicted defendant may validly waive the Sixth Amendment right to counsel during police questioning.48
No. Petitioner contended that he should have been told of the broad protective role of counsel after indictment and the gravity of his situation in greater detail.49 Yet he could not articulate with precision what further information was necessary.50 The court found that the Miranda warnings already conveyed the sum and substance of the Sixth Amendment rights and the limited role counsel would play at the questioning stage.51 Because the warnings touched all required constitutional bases and petitioner executed written waivers after being informed he had been formally charged, no further advisements were mandated.52
Additional information beyond Miranda warnings is not required before an indicted defendant can validly waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel during questioning.53