41 N.Y.2d 553, 362 N.E.2d 960, 394 N.Y.S.2d 161
On the evening of May 28, 1972, during the Memorial Day weekend, two police officers employed by the City of Kingston responded to a report of boisterous individuals behind a commercial building in the city.1 They encountered plaintiff Donald C. Parvi along with Raymond Dugan and Dixie Dugan, all of whom appeared to have been drinking.2 The officers instructed the men to move on or face being locked up, prompting Raymond Dugan to flee while Parvi and Dixie Dugan remained.3
When Parvi and Dixie Dugan stated they had nowhere to go, the officers ordered them into the patrol car pursuant to a standard operating procedure and transported them to an isolated, unlit area known as Coleman Hill, the site of an abandoned golf course outside the city limits.4 En route, the men requested to be dropped off at another location, but the officers refused.5 The officers left them there without providing any orientation or instructions on how to return to Kingston, where Parvi had resided for twelve years.6
The drop-off point was approximately 350 feet from the New York State Thruway, with no barriers other than a low guardrail.7 Audible traffic sounds emanated from the highway.8 By 10:00 P.M., Parvi and Dugan had wandered onto the Thruway and were struck by a vehicle driven by David R. Darling, resulting in severe injuries to Parvi and the death of Dugan.9
Parvi subsequently brought an action against the City of Kingston asserting claims for false imprisonment and negligence.10 At trial, the Supreme Court dismissed the complaint at the close of the plaintiff's case.11 The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal by a divided vote of three to two, and the Court of Appeals granted review.12
Whether the plaintiff made out a prima facie case of false imprisonment against the City of Kingston?13
The four elements of false imprisonment are that the plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant intended to confine him, (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged.14
Yes. The officers intended to confine Parvi when they ordered him into the police car after he stated he had nowhere to go, presenting arrest as the only alternative and evidencing direct and willful action.15 Parvi did not consent to the confinement because his only alternative was arrest and the officers refused the request to be released at another place, particularly given his intoxication.16 Parvi was conscious of the confinement at the time as shown by his responsiveness to the command to enter the car, his colloquy during the drive, and his request to be let off elsewhere, even though he later had little recollection.17 The confinement was not privileged because the city failed to plead justification and the practice of transporting intoxicated persons out of town for the purpose of avoiding guardhouse chores does not constitute justification.18
The burden of pleading and proving legal justification rested on the city for this warrantless confinement.19 The conditional nature of any privilege is lost when the act is done for a purpose other than advancing the interest in safety.20
The plaintiff made out a prima facie case of false imprisonment against the City of Kingston.21
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Judge Jasen
Chief Judge Breitel dissented on the false imprisonment claim.22 He contended that there was no confinement at all because the officers merely excluded Parvi from one particular area and transported him to another site.23 Parvi and Dugan were apparently pleased with the choice of location.24
He further argued that Parvi failed to establish consciousness of confinement or lack of consent as a matter of law.25 Parvi had no independent recollection of the events.26 His conclusory statement about being ordered into the car against his will was insufficient to establish a prima facie case.27
Whether the plaintiff made out a prima facie case of negligence against the City of Kingston?28
Once an actor voluntarily takes charge of another who is helpless, the actor must perform that undertaking with due care.29 The duty cannot be fulfilled by placing the helpless person in a position of peril equal to or greater than that from which he was rescued.30 It is reasonably foreseeable that an intoxicated person placed at night in a lonely rural setting near a superhighway might wander onto the road.31
Yes. Having taken Parvi into custody, the officers owed a duty to exercise reasonable care to secure his safety rather than discontinuing aid in a manner that left him worse off.32 By placing him in an isolated, unlit rural setting approximately 350 feet from the Thruway without orientation or barriers, the officers placed Parvi in a position of peril equal to or greater than that from which he was removed.33 It was reasonably foreseeable that Parvi, who appeared sufficiently intoxicated for the police to take action, might wander onto the road depending on the jury's determination of the degree of his intoxication and the surrounding conditions.34
The argument that Parvi's voluntary intoxication was the proximate cause of his injuries as a matter of law would negate the duty that arose from the decision to take him into custody.35
The plaintiff made out a prima facie case of negligence against the City of Kingston.36
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Judge Jasen
Chief Judge Breitel dissented on the negligence claim.37 He argued that the police officers owed only a duty to exercise ordinary care.38 That duty was discharged by leaving Parvi at a camping ground equipped with lean-tos and removed from the hazards of the city.39
He further contended that it was not foreseeable that Parvi would wander away, climb over a guardrail, and be struck by an automobile on the Thruway.40 There was therefore no breach of duty as a matter of law.41