551 U.S. 930 (2007)
In 1992 Scott Louis Panetti broke into the home of his estranged wife's parents in Texas, shot and killed both of them in front of his wife and daughter, and held his wife and daughter hostage overnight before surrendering to police.1 Tried for capital murder in 1995, Panetti sought to represent himself. A court-ordered psychiatric evaluation revealed a fragmented personality, delusions, and hallucinations, and noted multiple prior hospitalizations for these disorders.2
He was found competent to stand trial and to waive counsel.3 At trial he claimed insanity and engaged in bizarre and trance-like behavior before the jury.4 Less than two months after sentencing the trial court found him incompetent to waive appointment of state habeas counsel.5 The Texas courts denied relief on direct appeal and state habeas. The federal district court and Fifth Circuit rejected Panetti's first federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and this Court denied certiorari.6
On October 31, 2003 the state trial court set an execution date of February 5, 2004. Panetti then filed his first motion under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 46.05 claiming, for the first time, that mental illness rendered him incompetent to be executed. The trial judge denied the motion without a hearing, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.7
Panetti filed a second federal habeas petition. The district court stayed execution to permit the state trial court to consider evidence of his current mental state. The state court ordered two mental-health experts to examine Panetti. Their April 28, 2004 report concluded he knew he was to be executed and understood the reason.8 Without holding a hearing or ruling on Panetti's ten pending motions—including requests for a competency hearing, funds for his own expert, and transcription—the state judge found him competent on May 26, 2004 and closed the case.9
Panetti returned to federal court. The district court concluded the state proceedings failed to comply with Texas law and were constitutionally inadequate under Ford v. Wainwright. It reviewed the incompetency claim without deference to the state finding but denied relief because Panetti had not shown he met the Fifth Circuit's competency standard. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, and this Court granted certiorari.10
Whether a federal habeas application raising a Ford-based incompetency claim filed after the claim becomes ripe is subject to the restrictions on second or successive applications under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)?11
The phrase 'second or successive' in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) does not encompass a Ford-based incompetency claim raised in a habeas application filed as soon as the claim becomes ripe.12 Congress did not intend AEDPA's gatekeeping provisions to bar such filings.13 Treating them as successive would produce perverse results by forcing premature and often meritless claims.14
No. The established facts demonstrate that Panetti first raised his Ford claim only after the state trial court set an execution date on October 31, 2003, at which point the claim became ripe.15 He filed his second federal habeas petition promptly thereafter. The Court therefore treated the application as falling outside the second-or-successive bar.16
The facts further show that Panetti had not argued incompetency to be executed in his first federal habeas petition. That petition was denied before any execution date existed.17 This confirms that the claim could not have been presented earlier without being unripe.18 Applying the rule to these facts yields the conclusion that the District Court possessed jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim without requiring dismissal under § 2244(b)(2).19
The District Court had statutory authority to adjudicate Panetti's second federal habeas application raising the Ford claim.20
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, And Justice Alito
Justice Thomas dissented on the ground that AEDPA's text requires dismissal because Panetti's Ford claim was presented for the first time in a second federal habeas application that did not satisfy either statutory exception in § 2244(b)(2).21 He maintained that the pre-AEDPA abuse-of-the-writ doctrine had treated subsequent Ford claims as second or successive yet often permitted them to proceed.22 AEDPA eliminated that discretion and mandated dismissal.23
Justice Thomas argued that Martinez-Villareal did not control because Panetti had not raised the Ford claim in his initial habeas application.24 He rejected judicial-economy rationales as insufficient to override the statute's plain command.25
Whether the state court provided the procedures required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments when it adjudicated the petitioner's claim of incompetency to be executed?26
Under Ford v. Wainwright, once a prisoner makes a substantial threshold showing of incompetency, the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments entitle him to a fair hearing.27 That hearing includes, at a minimum, an opportunity to submit expert psychiatric evidence that may differ from the State's own examination.28 The state court's failure to afford these basic protections constitutes an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.29
No. The established facts establish that Panetti made a substantial threshold showing by submitting the Renewed Motion to Determine Competency supported by a psychologist's letter and a law professor's declaration describing his mental condition on death row.30 This prompted the state court to appoint its own experts under Article 46.05(f).31
The facts further reveal that the state court never held a competency hearing.32 It never ruled on Panetti's ten pending motions requesting funds for his own mental-health expert and transcription of proceedings.33 It issued its competency finding solely on the basis of the court-appointed experts' report without allowing Panetti an adequate opportunity to respond with contrary expert evidence.34 These procedural deficiencies, applied to the named facts, demonstrate that the state court unreasonably applied Ford.35 Federal review of the incompetency claim therefore proceeds without deference to the state determination.36
The state court failed to provide the procedures to which Panetti was entitled under the Constitution.37
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, And Justice Alito
Justice Thomas dissented on the ground that Panetti failed to make the substantial threshold showing required by Ford.38 His Renewed Motion rested only on an unsworn one-page letter from a psychologist after an eighty-five-minute interview and a one-page lay declaration from a law professor.39 There were no new medical records or affidavits from daily observers.40
He concluded that the state court therefore was not obligated to provide additional procedures.41 In any event the court gave Panetti an unlimited opportunity to submit evidence.42 It received his seventeen-page objections to the experts' report.43 The court reasonably relied on the neutral experts' conclusion that Panetti was competent.44
Whether the Fifth Circuit's standard for determining competency to be executed—which requires only that the prisoner know the fact of his impending execution and the factual predicate for it—is consistent with the Eighth Amendment?45
The Eighth Amendment prohibits execution of a prisoner whose mental illness renders him incapable of reaching a rational understanding of the reason for his execution.46 A competency standard that deems delusions irrelevant once the prisoner is merely aware of the State's stated reason for the punishment is inconsistent with Ford.47 It fails to account for gross delusions that place the prisoner's awareness in a context so far removed from reality that the punishment serves no proper retributive purpose.48
No. The established facts show that Panetti's experts testified he suffered from schizo-affective disorder producing a fixed delusion that the State's true reason for execution was to stop him from preaching rather than to punish him for murder.49 This was true even though he could parrot the State's announced rationale.50
The facts further indicate that the Fifth Circuit, applying its awareness-only test, held these delusions legally irrelevant so long as Panetti knew the fact of execution and the State's identified link to his crime.51 Applying the Ford-derived rule to these specific facts demonstrates that the Fifth Circuit's standard is too restrictive.52 It ignores the possibility that severe mental illness can distort awareness into a context bearing little relation to the community's shared understanding of the punishment.53
The Fifth Circuit employed an improperly restrictive test for competency to be executed.54
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, And Justice Alito
Justice Thomas declined to reach the substantive competency standard because AEDPA barred review altogether and the state court's competency determination was reasonable on the existing record.55 He criticized the majority for imposing a new rational-understanding requirement without conducting the historical or contemporary standards-of-decency analysis normally required under the Eighth Amendment.56 He emphasized that the Court had failed to justify the new substantive rule through traditional Eighth Amendment sources such as common-law practice or legislative enactments reflecting current societal values.57