462 U.S. 1039 (1983)
In September 1980, Oregon police were investigating the death of Lowell Reynolds in Tillamook County.1 Reynolds' body had been found in his wrecked pickup truck that had left the roadway and come to rest in a shallow creek.2
Respondent James Edward Bradshaw was asked to accompany a police officer to the Rockaway Police Station for questioning about the incident.3 Once at the station, Bradshaw was advised of his Miranda rights and repeated his earlier account of providing liquor to Reynolds and others at a party while denying any involvement in the traffic accident.4
Bradshaw was placed under arrest for furnishing liquor to a minor and again advised of his rights.5 A police officer then presented a theory placing Bradshaw behind the wheel of the vehicle.6 Bradshaw stated that he wanted an attorney before it went any further, and the conversation was terminated.7
Sometime later, during his transfer from the Rockaway Police Station to the Tillamook County Jail, Bradshaw inquired of a police officer, "Well, what is going to happen to me now?"8 The officer responded by reminding Bradshaw of his rights.9 The two then discussed where he was being taken and the offense with which he would be charged.10 The officer suggested that Bradshaw might help himself by taking a polygraph examination.11 Bradshaw agreed to do so to clear up the matter.12
The next day, after another reading of his Miranda rights and signing a written waiver, the polygraph examination was administered.13 At its conclusion, Bradshaw recanted his earlier story and admitted he had been driving the vehicle while intoxicated and had passed out at the wheel.14
Bradshaw was charged with first-degree manslaughter, driving while under the influence of intoxicants, and driving while his license was revoked.15 His motion to suppress the statements was denied, and he was convicted after a bench trial in an Oregon trial court.16 The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the determination.17
Whether respondent's question to a police officer during transport initiated further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police after he had invoked his right to counsel?18
Under the rule of Edwards v. Arizona, when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, further interrogation should not take place unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. This prophylactic rule protects the accused from being badgered by police officers.19
Yes. Bradshaw's question during transport initiated the conversation. It was ambiguous but evinced a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation rather than a routine custodial inquiry such as a request for a drink of water. The officer understood it as relating generally to the investigation and reminded Bradshaw of his rights before proceeding to discuss the charges and polygraph option.20
Bradshaw's question initiated further communication with the police under the Edwards standard.21
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Powell concurs in the judgment.22 He notes that Edwards has produced disagreement over whether it created a per se rule and over the meaning of initiation.23 He observes that the plurality and dissent differ on whether initiation requires a desire for discussion about the subject matter of the investigation or merely evinces a willingness for generalized discussion.24
Powell prefers not to fragment the Zerbst totality of circumstances standard into a rigid two-step analysis of initiation followed by waiver.25 He argues that courts should examine all relevant facts and circumstances rather than focusing simplistically on who spoke first.26 He agrees that Bradshaw knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel based on the trial court's findings and the sequence of renewed warnings and the signed waiver.27
Justice Marshall dissents.28 He argues that the Oregon Court of Appeals properly applied Edwards because Bradshaw's question did not initiate communication about the subject matter of the criminal investigation.29 He contends that the question was merely a normal reaction to being taken from the station and placed in a police car for transport.30
Marshall emphasizes that allowing interrogation to resume on such a query would permit police to capitalize on the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings.31 He notes that valid waivers after invocation require the accused himself to reopen dialogue about the investigation.32
Whether the statements obtained from respondent following the inquiry were admissible under the standard announced in Edwards v. Arizona?33
If the accused initiates further communication, the prosecution must still demonstrate that the subsequent waiver of the right to counsel was knowing and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances, including the fact that the accused reopened the dialogue.34
Yes. The state trial court found that the police made no threats, promises or inducements to talk, that defendant was properly advised of his rights and understood them and that within a short time after requesting an attorney he changed his mind without any impropriety on the part of the police.35 The court held that the statements made to the polygraph examiner were voluntary and the result of a knowing waiver of his right to remain silent.36 Following the initiation during transport, Bradshaw agreed to the polygraph the next day after signing a written waiver, and the trial court held the statements voluntary based on firsthand observation of the witnesses.37
The statements obtained were admissible because a valid waiver occurred under the totality of the circumstances.38
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Powell agrees with the plurality that the facts and circumstances when viewed in their entirety clearly establish a valid waiver of the right to counsel.39 He moves from the initiation step to conclude that the subsequent renewal of Miranda warnings, the written waiver, and the absence of coercion satisfy the Zerbst standard.40 Powell stresses that the question of waiver is uniquely one of fact best left to the trial court that heard the evidence and assessed credibility.41
In these circumstances Bradshaw knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel.42
Justice Marshall would hold that because there was no proper initiation under Edwards, there can be no valid waiver regardless of subsequent events.43 He maintains that unless the accused himself initiates further communication with the police about the subject matter of the investigation, a valid waiver of the right to counsel cannot be established.44 Marshall argues that the per se rule of Edwards requires that interrogation cease until counsel is present.45
The trial court's findings on voluntariness cannot overcome the absence of initiation by the accused.46