466 U.S. 170 (1984)
In 1980 Kentucky State Police narcotics agents received reports that marihuana was being grown on petitioner Oliver's farm.1 Arriving at the farm, the agents drove past Oliver's house to a locked gate with a No Trespassing sign.2 They walked around the gate and along the road for several hundred yards, passing a barn and a parked camper, before locating a field of marihuana more than a mile from the house.3
Oliver was arrested and indicted for manufacturing a controlled substance under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).4 After a pretrial hearing the federal district court suppressed evidence of the marihuana field, finding that Oliver had posted No Trespassing signs at regular intervals, locked the gate, and that the field was bounded by woods, fences, and embankments and could not be seen from any public access point.5 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit sitting en banc reversed the suppression order.6
Separately, after receiving an anonymous tip that marihuana was being grown in the woods behind respondent Thornton's residence, two police officers entered the woods by a path between the residence and a neighboring house.7 They followed a footpath through the woods until they reached two marihuana patches fenced with chicken wire.8 The officers later obtained a warrant based on those observations, seized the marihuana, and Thornton was arrested and indicted.9
The trial court granted Thornton's motion to suppress the fruits of the second search because the warrant rested on information from the earlier warrantless entry.10 The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the suppression.11 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases.12
Whether the open fields doctrine first enunciated in Hester v. United States remains valid after Katz v. United States and its progeny?13
The open fields doctrine permits police officers to enter and conduct searches in open fields without a warrant.14 The Fourth Amendment's special protection extends only to persons, houses, papers, and effects.15 This rule remains consistent with the reasonable expectation of privacy standard established in Katz v. United States.16
Yes. The doctrine controls the established facts in which Kentucky State Police narcotics agents drove past Oliver's house to a locked gate bearing a No Trespassing sign, walked around the gate along a road for several hundred yards, and located a marihuana field more than a mile from the house.17 The same conclusion applies to the parallel facts in which officers entered woods behind Thornton's residence and discovered marihuana patches fenced with chicken wire. The Court determined that open fields fall outside the Amendment's enumerated protections.18
Society does not recognize a legitimate privacy expectation in such areas regardless of seclusion or posted warnings.19
The open fields doctrine remains valid after Katz and governs both cases, rendering the discovered marihuana admissible.20
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Brennan
Justice Marshall dissented because the open fields doctrine conflicts with the privacy-based approach that the Court has followed since Katz v. United States.21 He argued that the Fourth Amendment protects people from unreasonable government intrusions into legitimate expectations of privacy rather than rigid categories of real property.22 The precautions taken by Oliver and Thornton, including posted signs, fences, and locked gates, created a legitimate expectation that society should recognize as reasonable.23
Marshall concluded that the majority's property-based analysis was inconsistent with both the language and spirit of the Amendment and that the evidence should have been suppressed.24
Whether an individual may legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted in open fields outside the curtilage of the home?25
An individual may not legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in fields except in the area immediately surrounding the home.26 Open fields do not provide the setting for intimate activities the Fourth Amendment is intended to shelter.27 The common law has long distinguished open fields from curtilage.28
No. The established facts show that the marihuana fields lay more than a mile from Oliver's house.29 The patches discovered on Thornton's property were reached only after officers followed a footpath through the woods. Both locations therefore lay well outside any curtilage.30 The Court explained that the Amendment reflects respect for the sanctity of the home and its immediate surroundings.31 It affords no comparable protection to open fields where societal expectations of privacy do not attach.32
An individual may not legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted in open fields outside the curtilage of the home.33
Whether fences, locked gates, and No Trespassing signs establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in an open field under the Fourth Amendment?34
No. The established facts establish that Oliver had posted No Trespassing signs at regular intervals and locked the gate at the entrance to the farm.37 Thornton had similarly posted signs and fenced the marihuana patches with chicken wire.38 The Court held these measures insufficient to create a protected privacy interest.39 The Court reasoned that the common-law distinction between open fields and curtilage, together with the text of the Fourth Amendment, demonstrates that such precautions cannot convert an open field into a constitutionally protected space.40
Fences, locked gates, and No Trespassing signs do not establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in an open field under the Fourth Amendment.41
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Justice White concurred separately to emphasize that the open fields doctrine rests on the plain text of the Fourth Amendment.42 The Amendment protects only persons, houses, papers, and effects.43 No expectation of privacy, however reasonable, can convert a field into a house or effect.44
White joined Parts I and II of the majority opinion because those parts disposed of the issue without needing to address the expectation-of-privacy analysis further.45 His separate writing underscored that textual limits preclude any privacy claim from expanding the Amendment's enumerated categories.46
Whether the seclusion of a field or the steps taken to conceal activity within it create a legitimate expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize?47
The seclusion of a field or steps taken to conceal activity within it do not create a legitimate expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize.48 The correct inquiry focuses on whether the government's intrusion infringes personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment rather than on the defendant's efforts at concealment.49
No. The established facts show that Oliver's field was bounded on all sides by woods, fences, and embankments and could not be seen from any public access point.50 Thornton's patches were reached only after officers traveled a considerable distance from any public road.51 The Court concluded these circumstances did not generate a protected privacy interest.52 The Court explained that the societal understanding embodied in the common law and the Amendment's text treats open fields as areas where privacy expectations are not legitimate even when highly secluded.53
The seclusion of a field or the steps taken to conceal activity within it do not create a legitimate expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize.54
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Brennan
Justice Marshall dissented on the ground that positive law criminalizing trespass on posted or enclosed land supports the asserted privacy interests of Oliver and Thornton.55 Many private uses to which secluded fields are put, such as solitary walks, agricultural businesses, meetings with lovers or fellow worshippers, and creative endeavors, deserve privacy under societal understandings.56 The owners' clear manifestations of intent to exclude the public through signs, fences, and locked gates establish that the asserted privacy interests are reasonable.57
Marshall concluded that these factors, examined through the traditional criteria for assessing expectations of privacy, entitled the landowners to Fourth Amendment protection and required suppression of the evidence.58