529 U.S. 753 (2000)
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Maria Ohler was arrested and tried on federal drug charges. The District Court granted the Government's motion in limine to admit her prior felony conviction as impeachment evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1). Ohler testified at trial and, on direct examination, admitted that she had been convicted of possession of methamphetamine in 1993. The jury convicted her on both counts, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. We agree with the Court of Appeals that Ohler may not challenge the District Court's in limine ruling on appeal when she herself introduced the conviction on direct examination.
Maria Ohler drove a van from Mexico to California in July 1997. As she passed through the San Ysidro Port of Entry, customs inspectors discovered that someone had tampered with an interior panel of the van and, upon searching, found approximately 81 pounds of marijuana. Ohler was arrested and charged with importation of marijuana and possession with intent to distribute.
Before trial, the Government filed motions in limine seeking to admit Ohler's prior felony conviction both as character evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and as impeachment evidence under Rule 609(a)(1). The District Court denied the motion to admit the conviction as character evidence but reserved ruling on whether it could be used for impeachment. On the first day of trial, the court ruled that if Ohler testified, evidence of her prior conviction would be admissible under Rule 609(a)(1). Ohler testified in her own defense, denied knowledge of the marijuana, and admitted on direct examination that she had been convicted of possession of methamphetamine in 1993. The jury found her guilty on both counts, and she was sentenced to 30 months' imprisonment and three years' supervised release.
On appeal, Ohler challenged the District Court's in limine ruling allowing the Government to use her prior conviction for impeachment. The Ninth Circuit held that Ohler waived her objection by introducing the conviction during her direct testimony and affirmed. We granted certiorari to resolve a circuit conflict over whether appellate review of such an in limine ruling is available when the defendant subsequently testifies and introduces the conviction herself. We affirm.
It is a general principle that a party who introduces evidence ordinarily cannot complain on appeal that the evidence was erroneously admitted. Ohler seeks to avoid the consequences of that principle by invoking Rules 103 and 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Those Rules, however, do not address the precise question before us. Rule 103 explains the prerequisites for assigning error to an evidentiary ruling on appeal — timely objection and effect on a substantial right — but it does not purport to define when a party waives an objection by later introducing the evidence during trial. Rule 609(a) identifies the circumstances in which a witness's prior conviction may be used for impeachment and was amended in 1990 to clarify that prior-conviction evidence may be introduced on direct examination; it does not speak to whether a party who introduces such evidence on direct examination may later appeal the underlying in limine ruling.
Ohler further contends that it would be unfair to require a defendant to forgo the tactical advantage of preemptively introducing the conviction in order to preserve the right to appeal. She argues that waiting for cross-examination may make the defendant appear less credible because jurors may think she tried to conceal the conviction. The Government disputes that a defendant gains a net advantage by introducing the conviction herself and suggests, in any event, that the jury may not appreciate that the defendant disclosed the conviction only after a failed motion to exclude it.
Whatever the merits of those contentions, the central point is that both parties must make strategic choices as trial unfolds. A defendant must decide whether to take the stand; if she testifies she is exposed to cross-examination, including impeachment by prior convictions, and that choice may succeed or backfire. If she elects to testify despite a prior conviction, she then faces a tactical decision whether to introduce the conviction on direct examination and thereby remove some of its sting, or to wait and risk the prosecution's eliciting it on cross-examination.
The Government, for its part, must decide whether to impeach a testifying defendant by use of her prior conviction. Although the trial judge here had indicated he would allow use of Ohler's conviction if she testified, the prosecution still had to weigh whether using the conviction might be deemed reversible error on appeal and to assess the apparent effect of the defendant's testimony. Cross-examination, which follows direct examination, gives the Government the advantage of making that decision after hearing the defendant's testimony.
Ohler's position would deprive the Government of its usual right to decide, after the defendant testifies, whether to use her prior conviction for impeachment. She seeks to short-circuit that decision by offering the conviction herself (and thereby reducing its sting) while nonetheless reserving the right to appeal its admission. That effort conflicts with the reasoning of Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38 (1984), which recognized that any possible harm flowing from an in limine ruling permitting impeachment by prior conviction is speculative until the Government chooses to exercise its option to elicit the testimony. Only when the Government actually uses the conviction is there a complete record on which an appellate court can assess whether a substantial right has been denied.
In our view, putting the defendant to the choice in accordance with the normal rules of trial is not unfair. The defendant remains free to take the stand and present any admissible testimony; she simply cannot both introduce a prior conviction herself to blunt its force and then, on appeal, challenge the trial judge's in limine ruling that would have allowed the Government to use that conviction for impeachment.
Finally, Ohler contends that applying this waiver rule unconstitutionally burdens her right to testify. Cases such as Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987), address whether a rule prevents a defendant from testifying at all. Here the rule does not prevent Ohler from testifying or from presenting admissible testimony; it simply forecloses a later appellate challenge to the admission of evidence that she herself introduced on direct examination. The risk that impeachment and cross-examination may deter testimony is inherent in the normal operation of trial, and defendants are required to weigh such considerations in deciding whether to testify.
For these reasons, we conclude that a defendant who preemptively introduces evidence of a prior conviction on direct examination may not on appeal claim that the admission of that evidence was error. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is therefore affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Justice SOUTER, with whom Justice Stevens, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join, dissenting.
The majority holds that a testifying defendant necessarily waives the right to appeal an adverse in limine ruling admitting prior convictions for impeachment. I dissent. The holding lacks support in precedent, in the Rules of Evidence, and in the objectives of a fair trial.
The only Supreme Court decision the majority cites as tangential support is Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38 (1984). In Luce we held that a criminal defendant who remained off the stand could not appeal an in limine ruling to admit prior convictions for impeachment because an appellate court cannot reliably determine why the defendant did not testify or what effect the in limine ruling had on the trial. Luce rested on the practical impossibility of non-speculative appellate review when there is no trial record of actual impeachment.
This case differs because Ohler did testify, creating a factual record on which the in limine ruling's impact can be reviewed. She testified and the conviction came out on direct examination. The presence of a record eliminates the speculative concerns that drove Luce and makes that decision inapplicable to the issue presented here.
The majority primarily relies on the general proposition that a party who introduces evidence cannot later complain on appeal that it was erroneously admitted. But that maxim does not address the present circumstance, where a party unsuccessfully sought exclusion of the evidence and then introduced it only to minimize its adverse effect. The law of evidence and leading treatises generally treat that situation as exceptional: a party who objected and whose objection was overruled may introduce the evidence he expects his adversary will offer in order to blunt its force without thereby waiving the objection.
Nor is the fairness of the majority's rule apparent when judged against the objectives of trial and the Rules of Evidence, which are designed to promote accurate factfinding rather than to reward tactical advantage. When a defendant voluntarily discloses prior convictions at the outset of her testimony, the factfinder can take those convictions into account while assessing her credibility. If, by contrast, the convictions are revealed only on cross-examination, the jury may infer concealment and attribute current deceit, an impression that bears not merely on past conduct but on the factfinder's evaluation of the defendant's honesty in the present testimony. That tactical advantage for the prosecution can distort the search for truth and is not a justification for forbidding a defendant to introduce the convictions herself while preserving appellate review of the trial court's ruling.
Allowing a defendant to introduce prior convictions on direct examination when she has already opposed their admission thus tends to promote fairness and dispassionate factfinding; the majority's rule discourages that course without any persuasive countervailing gain to the accuracy of adjudication. For these reasons I respectfully dissent.