532 U.S. 17 (2001)
Respondent was charged with involuntary manslaughter in connection with the death of his 2-month-old son Alex.1 The coroner testified at trial that Alex died from “shaken baby syndrome,” the result of child abuse.2 He estimated that Alex’s injury most likely occurred minutes before the child stopped breathing.3 Alex died two days later when he was removed from life support.4 Evidence produced at trial revealed that Alex had a broken rib and a broken leg at the time of his death.5 His twin brother Derek, who was also examined, had several broken ribs.6
Respondent had been alone with Alex for half an hour immediately before Alex stopped breathing.7 Respondent’s experts testified that Alex could have been injured several hours before his respiratory arrest.8 Alex was in the care of the family’s babysitter, Susan Batt, at that time.9 Batt had cared for the children during the day for about two weeks prior to Alex’s death.10 The defense theory was that Batt, not respondent, was the culpable party.11
Batt informed the court in advance of testifying that she intended to assert her Fifth Amendment privilege.12 At the State’s request, the trial court granted her transactional immunity from prosecution pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2945.44.13 She then testified to the jury that she had refused to testify without a grant of immunity on the advice of counsel, although she had done nothing wrong.14 Batt denied any involvement in Alex’s death.15 She testified that she had never shaken Alex or his brother at any time, specifically on the day Alex suffered respiratory arrest.16 She said she was unaware of and had nothing to do with the other injuries to both children.17 The jury found respondent guilty of involuntary manslaughter, and he appealed.18
The Court of Appeals of Ohio, Sixth District, reversed respondent’s conviction on grounds not relevant here.19 The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the reversal.20 Respondent petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court of the United States granted.21
Whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the Supreme Court of Ohio’s judgment that rested on a determination of federal law?22
This Court retains power to review the decision of a federal issue in a state cause of action.23 The state court's judgment must rest, as a threshold matter, on a determination of federal law.24 The decision must fairly appear to be interwoven with federal law with no adequate and independent state ground clear from the face of the opinion.25
Yes. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the reversal of respondent's conviction on the alternative ground that Susan Batt had no valid Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.26 That determination rested on the state court's interpretation of federal precedents including Hoffman v. United States.27 Because the state court's decision is interwoven with federal law and no adequate independent state ground appears on the face of the opinion, this Court has jurisdiction to review the federal question presented.28
This Court has jurisdiction to review the Supreme Court of Ohio’s judgment.29
Whether a witness who denies all culpability has a valid Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination?30
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination extends not only to answers that would in themselves support a conviction but likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant. The privilege protects innocent witnesses as well as the guilty whenever the witness has reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer.31
Yes. Although Susan Batt denied any involvement in the abuse of the children, she had cared for Alex and his twin brother Derek during the day for about two weeks prior to Alex’s death.32 She was with Alex within the potential timeframe of the fatal trauma.33 The defense theory at trial was that Batt, not respondent, was responsible for Alex’s death and the uncharged injuries to both children.34
In this setting Batt had reasonable cause to apprehend that answers to questions at respondent’s trial might tend to incriminate her, so she possessed a valid Fifth Amendment privilege even though she claimed innocence.35
A witness who denies all culpability has a valid Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.36