441 U.S. 369 (1979)
In December 1976, William Thomas Butler and a man named Elmer Lee robbed a gas station in Goldsboro, North Carolina, and shot the station attendant during the robbery.1 The attendant survived the shooting and later testified against Butler at trial.2 A North Carolina trial court convicted Butler of kidnapping, armed robbery, and felonious assault based on the evidence presented.3
Following his arrest by Federal Bureau of Investigation agents in the Bronx, New York, on a North Carolina fugitive warrant, Butler received Miranda warnings at the scene.4 The agents then took Butler to the FBI office in New Rochelle, New York.5 There, after confirming that Butler had an eleventh-grade education and could read, the agents provided him with the Bureau's Advice of Rights form, which he read.6 Butler stated that he understood his rights, refused to sign the waiver at the bottom of the form, and said he would talk to the agents but would not sign any form.7 He subsequently made inculpatory statements to the agents without requesting the assistance of counsel or attempting to stop the questioning.8
Outside the presence of the jury, FBI Agent Martinez testified to these events at Butler's trial.9 The trial court denied Butler's motion to suppress the incriminating statements, concluding that Butler had effectively waived his rights.10 The statements were admitted into evidence, and the jury found Butler guilty of each offense charged.11
On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the convictions and ordered a new trial.12 The state supreme court determined that the statements had been admitted in violation of Miranda because Butler had refused to waive his right to counsel in writing and had not made a specific oral waiver.13
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the North Carolina Supreme Court's per se rule requiring an explicit waiver aligned with the Miranda decision.14
Whether Miranda v. Arizona requires that no statement of a person under custodial interrogation may be admitted in evidence against him unless at the time the statement was made he explicitly waived the right to the presence of a lawyer?15
The Miranda decision does not impose a per se requirement that a waiver of the right to counsel during custodial interrogation be explicitly stated.16 An express written or oral statement of waiver is usually strong proof of the validity of that waiver, but is not inevitably either necessary or sufficient to establish waiver.17 The question is not one of form, but rather whether the defendant in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights delineated in the Miranda case.18 Mere silence is not enough. The defendant's silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver, may support a conclusion that a defendant has waived his rights.19 The courts must presume that a defendant did not waive his rights. The prosecution's burden is great, but in at least some cases waiver can be clearly inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated.20
No. The North Carolina Supreme Court erred in its reading of the Miranda opinion by adopting an inflexible per se rule requiring an explicit waiver.21 In the established facts, Butler was adequately and effectively apprised of his rights when he read the Advice of Rights form after agents confirmed his eleventh-grade education and literacy.22 Butler stated that he understood his rights, refused to sign the waiver form, but explicitly said he would talk to the agents without signing any form, and then made inculpatory statements without requesting counsel or attempting to terminate the questioning. This course of conduct, combined with his understanding of the rights, permits a clear inference of waiver under the standard that examines the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.23
The prosecution met its heavy burden on these facts because Butler's words and actions demonstrated a knowing and voluntary relinquishment rather than mere silence after warnings.24
The North Carolina Supreme Court's per se rule requiring an explicit waiver does not reflect a proper understanding of the Miranda decision.25 The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the North Carolina Supreme Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with the conclusion that an implicit waiver can suffice when supported by the defendant's actions and words.26
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Blackmun joined the opinion of the Court.27 His joinder rests on the assumption that the Court's citation to Johnson v. Zerbst is not meant to suggest that the intentional relinquishment of a known right formula has any relevance in determining whether a defendant has waived his right to the presence of a lawyer under Miranda's prophylactic rule.28
Joined by Justices Marshall And Stevens
Justice Brennan dissented on the ground that Miranda held no effective waiver of the right to counsel during interrogation can be recognized unless specifically made after the warnings have been given.29 He concluded there was no allegation of an affirmative waiver in this case because Butler refused to sign the waiver form and said nothing when advised of his right to the assistance of a lawyer.30 Justice Brennan argued that the very premise of Miranda requires ambiguity to be interpreted against the interrogator and that only the most explicit waivers can be considered knowingly and freely given under the inherent compulsion of custodial interrogation.31
He would have affirmed the North Carolina Supreme Court's decision granting a new trial.32