482 U.S. 691 (1987)
Joseph Burger operated a junkyard and vehicle dismantling business in Brooklyn, New York, consisting of an open lot surrounded by a high metal fence that contained vehicles and parts of vehicles.1 On November 17, 1982, at approximately noon, Officer Joseph Vega and four other plainclothes officers from the Auto Crimes Division of the New York City Police Department entered the junkyard to conduct an inspection pursuant to New York Vehicle and Traffic Law section 415-a5.2 The officers asked to see Burger's license and police book recording the acquisition and disposition of motor vehicles and parts, but Burger replied that he had neither.3 The officers announced their intention to conduct the inspection, Burger did not object, and the officers copied the vehicle identification numbers of several vehicles and parts present in the junkyard.4
After checking the numbers against a police computer, the officers determined that respondent was in possession of stolen vehicles and parts.5 The officers also determined that Burger possessed a wheelchair and a handicapped person's walker that had been located in a stolen vehicle.6 Burger was arrested and charged with five counts of possession of stolen property and one count of unregistered operation as a vehicle dismantler in violation of section 415-a1.7 On any given day, the Division conducts from 5 to 10 inspections of vehicle dismantlers, automobile junkyards, and related businesses.8 It was unclear from the record why, on that particular day, Burger's junkyard was selected for inspection.9
In the Kings County Supreme Court, Burger moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the inspection, primarily on the ground that section 415-a5 was unconstitutional.10 After a hearing, the court denied the motion.11 When respondent moved for reconsideration in light of a recent decision of the Appellate Division, People v. Pace, 101 App. Div. 2d 336, 475 N. Y. S. 2d 443 (1984), aff'd, 65 N. Y. 2d 684, 481 N. E. 2d 250 (1985), the court granted reargument.12 Upon reconsideration, the court distinguished the situation in Pace from that in the instant case.13 The court therefore reaffirmed its earlier determination in the instant case that section 415-a5 was constitutional.14 For the same reasons, the Appellate Division affirmed. 112 App. Div. 2d 1046, 493 N. Y. S. 2d 34 (1985).15
The New York Court of Appeals, however, reversed. 67 N. Y. 2d 338, 493 N. E. 2d 926 (1986).16 In its view, section 415-a5 violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures.17 According to the Court of Appeals, the fundamental defect of section 415-a5 is that it authorizes searches undertaken solely to uncover evidence of criminality and not to enforce a comprehensive regulatory scheme.18 Because of the important state interest in administrative schemes designed to regulate the vehicle-dismantling or automobile-junkyard industry, we granted certiorari. 479 U. S. 812 (1986).19
Whether the warrantless search of an automobile junkyard, conducted pursuant to a statute authorizing such a search, falls within the exception to the warrant requirement for administrative inspections of pervasively regulated industries?20
The Fourth Amendment permits warrantless administrative inspections of pervasively regulated industries if (1) there is a substantial government interest that informs the regulatory scheme, (2) the warrantless inspections are necessary to further the regulatory scheme, and (3) the statute's inspection program provides a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant by informing the owner that inspections will be made on a regular basis and by limiting the time, place, and scope of the inspections.
Yes. Joseph Burger operated a junkyard and vehicle dismantling business in Brooklyn, New York, consisting of an open lot surrounded by a high metal fence that contained vehicles and parts of vehicles. On November 17, 1982, at approximately noon, Officer Joseph Vega and four other plainclothes officers from the Auto Crimes Division of the New York City Police Department entered the junkyard to conduct an inspection pursuant to New York Vehicle and Traffic Law section 415-a5. The officers asked to see Burger's license and police book recording the acquisition and disposition of motor vehicles and parts, but Burger replied that he had neither.
The officers announced their intention to conduct the inspection, Burger did not object, and the officers copied the vehicle identification numbers of several vehicles and parts present in the junkyard. After checking the numbers against a police computer, the officers determined that respondent was in possession of stolen vehicles and parts. The officers also determined that Burger possessed a wheelchair and a handicapped person's walker that had been located in a stolen vehicle. Burger was arrested and charged with five counts of possession of stolen property and one count of unregistered operation as a vehicle dismantler in violation of section 415-a1. On any given day, the Division conducts from 5 to 10 inspections of vehicle dismantlers, automobile junkyards, and related businesses. It was unclear from the record why, on that particular day, Burger's junkyard was selected for inspection.
In the Kings County Supreme Court, Burger moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the inspection, primarily on the ground that section 415-a5 was unconstitutional. After a hearing, the court denied the motion. When respondent moved for reconsideration in light of a recent decision of the Appellate Division, People v. Pace, 101 App. Div. 2d 336, 475 N. Y. S. 2d 443 (1984), aff'd, 65 N. Y. 2d 684, 481 N. E. 2d 250 (1985), the court granted reargument. Upon reconsideration, the court distinguished the situation in Pace from that in the instant case. The court therefore reaffirmed its earlier determination in the instant case that section 415-a5 was constitutional. For the same reasons, the Appellate Division affirmed. 112 App. Div. 2d 1046, 493 N. Y. S. 2d 34 (1985).
The New York Court of Appeals, however, reversed. 67 N. Y. 2d 338, 493 N. E. 2d 926 (1986). In its view, section 415-a5 violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. According to the Court of Appeals, the fundamental defect of section 415-a5 is that it authorizes searches undertaken solely to uncover evidence of criminality and not to enforce a comprehensive regulatory scheme. Because of the important state interest in administrative schemes designed to regulate the vehicle-dismantling or automobile-junkyard industry, we granted certiorari. 479 U. S. 812 (1986). The vehicle dismantling industry is closely regulated because section 415-a requires licensing, recordkeeping of acquisitions and dispositions, and makes records and inventory available for inspection, with criminal penalties for noncompliance, and because junkyards have a long history of regulation as a modern branch of the traditional junk and secondhand industry. The state has a substantial interest in regulating the industry to combat motor vehicle theft, as shown by the Governor's message noting over 130,000 automobiles stolen in 1976 with losses exceeding $225 million.
The inspections are necessary to further the scheme because surprise is crucial to detect stolen cars and parts that pass quickly through junkyards, and a warrant requirement would frustrate the purpose by alerting operators. Section 415-a5 provides a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant because it informs operators that inspections occur during regular business hours, limits the scope to records and vehicles or parts on the premises, and restricts inspections to vehicle-dismantling businesses.
The warrantless inspection of Burger's junkyard was constitutional under the pervasively regulated industry exception to the warrant requirement.21
Related opinions on this issue
Justice O’Connor concurred in the judgment and in the opinion of the Court.22 She wrote separately to emphasize that the Court’s decision today does not authorize warrantless inspections of all businesses.23 The vehicle dismantling industry is a pervasively regulated industry with a long history of regulation.24
The statute at issue here is carefully crafted to limit the time, place, and scope of the inspections.25 The statute requires that inspections be conducted during regular business hours and that they be limited to the records and the premises where vehicles and vehicle parts are kept.26 These limitations ensure that the inspections are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.27
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan dissented on the ground that the vehicle-dismantling business is not closely regulated.28 The provisions governing vehicle dismantling in New York simply are not extensive.29 A vehicle dismantler must register and pay a fee, display the registration in various circumstances, maintain a police book, and allow inspections.30
Of course, the inspections themselves cannot be cited as proof of pervasive regulation justifying elimination of the warrant requirement.31 Nor can registration and recordkeeping requirements be characterized as close regulation.32 New York City, like many States and municipalities, imposes similar, and often more stringent licensing, recordkeeping, and other regulatory requirements on a myriad of trades and businesses.33
Few substantive qualifications are required of an aspiring vehicle dismantler.34 No regulation governs the condition of the premises, the method of operation, the hours of operation, the equipment utilized, etc.35 This scheme stands in marked contrast to the mine safety regulations relevant in Donovan v. Dewey.36
Justice Stevens joined Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion.37 He wrote separately to emphasize that the administrative search exception should not be extended to situations where the primary purpose of the search is to uncover evidence of criminal activity.38 In this case, the inspection was conducted by police officers who were looking for evidence of stolen vehicles and parts.39
This is not a purely administrative inspection.40 It is a search for evidence of crime.41 The Fourth Amendment requires that such searches be conducted pursuant to a warrant.42
The statute at issue here does not provide the necessary safeguards to ensure that the inspections are reasonable.43 He would hold the statute unconstitutional.44
Whether an otherwise proper administrative inspection is unconstitutional because the ultimate purpose of the regulatory statute pursuant to which the search is done is the same as that of penal laws?45
An administrative inspection conducted pursuant to a valid regulatory scheme is not rendered unconstitutional merely because the scheme has the same ultimate purpose as penal laws or because evidence of crimes is discovered during the inspection.46
No. The New York regulatory scheme serves the legitimate administrative goals of ensuring that vehicle dismantlers are legitimate business persons and that stolen vehicles and parts passing through junkyards can be identified and traced, even though the ultimate purpose of reducing automobile theft overlaps with penal laws.47 Section 415-a5 contributes to these goals by requiring records that enable tracing of vehicles and parts to their last legitimate owner.48 The discovery of evidence of crimes, such as the stolen wheelchair and walker, during an otherwise proper administrative inspection does not render the search illegal.49 The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the statute was designed solely to give police an expedient means of enforcing penal sanctions, because an administrative scheme may address a social problem both through regulation and through penal sanctions that share the same ultimate purpose.50
The administrative inspection was not unconstitutional despite the overlap between the regulatory statute's purpose and penal laws.51
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan dissented on the ground that the fundamental defect in section 415-a5 is that it authorizes searches intended solely to uncover evidence of criminal acts.52 The New York Court of Appeals correctly found that section 415-a5 authorized a search of Burger's business solely to discover whether defendant was storing stolen property on his premises.53 In the law of administrative searches, one principle emerges with unusual clarity and unanimous acceptance: the government may not use an administrative inspection scheme to search for criminal violations.54
Here the State has used an administrative scheme as a pretext to search without probable cause for evidence of criminal violations.55 It thus circumvented the requirements of the Fourth Amendment by altering the label placed on the search.56 This crucial point is most clearly illustrated by the fact that the police copied the serial numbers from a wheelchair and a handicapped person's walker that were found on the premises, and determined that these items had been stolen.57
Obviously, these objects are not vehicles or parts of vehicles, and were in no way relevant to the State's enforcement of its administrative scheme.58
Justice Stevens joined Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion. He wrote separately to emphasize that the administrative search exception should not be extended to situations where the primary purpose of the search is to uncover evidence of criminal activity. In this case, the inspection was conducted by police officers who were looking for evidence of stolen vehicles and parts.
This is not a purely administrative inspection. It is a search for evidence of crime. The Fourth Amendment requires that such searches be conducted pursuant to a warrant.
The statute at issue here does not provide the necessary safeguards to ensure that the inspections are reasonable. He would hold the statute unconstitutional.
Whether the fact that the inspecting officers were police officers rather than administrative agents renders the inspection unconstitutional?59
The fact that police officers rather than specialized administrative agents conduct an otherwise proper administrative inspection does not render the inspection unconstitutional, because many states lack resources to assign enforcement to specialized agencies and police officers have numerous duties beyond traditional criminal enforcement.60
No. The inspecting officers were members of the Auto Crimes Division of the New York City Police Department, which routinely conducts five to ten inspections of vehicle dismantlers and junkyards on any given day.61 The significance of police officers conducting the inspection lies in their role as enforcers of penal laws and their power to arrest for offenses other than violations of the administrative scheme, but state police officers have numerous duties in addition to traditional police work.62 So long as the regulatory scheme is properly administrative, it is not rendered illegal by the fact that the inspecting officer has the power to arrest individuals for violations other than those created by the scheme itself.63 Imposing a requirement that enforcement be carried out only by specialized agents would burden the states unnecessarily.64
The fact that police officers conducted the inspection did not render it unconstitutional.65
Related opinions on this issue
Justice O’Connor concurred in the judgment and in the opinion of the Court. She wrote separately to emphasize that the Court’s decision today does not authorize warrantless inspections of all businesses. The vehicle dismantling industry is a pervasively regulated industry with a long history of regulation.
The statute at issue here is carefully crafted to limit the time, place, and scope of the inspections. The statute requires that inspections be conducted during regular business hours and that they be limited to the records and the premises where vehicles and vehicle parts are kept. These limitations ensure that the inspections are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan dissented on the ground that searches by the police are inherently more intrusive than purely administrative inspections.66 Moreover, unlike administrative agents, the police have general criminal investigative duties which exceed the legitimate scope and purposes of purely administrative inspections.67 The unguided discretion afforded police in this scheme precludes its substitution for a warrant.68
The sole limitation on a police search of the premises of a vehicle dismantler is that it must occur during business hours.69 Otherwise it is open season.70
Justice Stevens joined Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion. He wrote separately to emphasize that the administrative search exception should not be extended to situations where the primary purpose of the search is to uncover evidence of criminal activity. In this case, the inspection was conducted by police officers who were looking for evidence of stolen vehicles and parts.
This is not a purely administrative inspection. It is a search for evidence of crime. The Fourth Amendment requires that such searches be conducted pursuant to a warrant.
The statute at issue here does not provide the necessary safeguards to ensure that the inspections are reasonable. He would hold the statute unconstitutional.