277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928)
Nectow was the owner of a tract of land containing 140,000 square feet in Cambridge, Massachusetts, of which the locus in question comprised about 29,000 square feet.1 The locus had frontages of 304.75 feet on Brookline Street to the west, 100 feet on Henry Street to the north, 264 feet on Nectow's remaining land to the east, and 75 feet on land of the Ford Motor Company to the south.2
The City of Cambridge had enacted a zoning ordinance dividing the city into residential, business, and unrestricted districts, with further subclassifications.3 The ordinance placed the locus in district R-3, which permitted only dwellings, hotels, clubs, churches, schools, philanthropic institutions, greenhouses, and gardening, along with customary incidental accessories.4 Surrounding the locus, the territory to the east and south was zoned unrestricted, while lands beyond Henry Street to the north and Brookline Street to the west were in restricted residential districts.5
Immediately adjacent to the locus stood a large Ford auto assembling factory to the south, along with a soap factory and the tracks of the Boston & Albany Railroad nearby.6 Some residences existed opposite the locus on Brookline and Henry streets within the same district.7 The locus itself was vacant at the time, although a mansion house had previously occupied the site.8
Prior to the ordinance's passage, Nectow had entered into a contract for the sale of the greater part of his entire tract for $63,000, but the purchaser refused to comply once the zoning restrictions took effect.9 The ordinance barred all business and industrial uses from the locus while leaving the remainder of the tract unrestricted.10 Provision had also been made for widening Brookline Street, which would reduce the depth of the locus to 65 feet if carried out.11
Nectow filed suit against the City of Cambridge and its inspector of buildings seeking a mandatory injunction directing them to pass upon his application for a building permit without regard to the zoning ordinance.12 The case was referred to a master who viewed the premises and surrounding territory, held a hearing, and reported findings of fact.13 After confirming the master's report, a justice of the court referred the case to the full court, which sustained the ordinance as applied to Nectow's land and dismissed the bill, as reported at 260 Mass. 441.14
The master determined that no practical use could be made of the land for residential purposes because there would not be an adequate return on any investment for its development.15 The master further concluded that districting the locus in a residence district would not promote the health, safety, convenience, and general welfare of the inhabitants of that part of the city, taking into account the natural development, the character of the district, and the resulting benefit to the whole city.16
Whether the Cambridge zoning ordinance as applied to Nectow's land deprives him of property without due process of law in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment?17
The governmental power to interfere by zoning regulations with the general rights of the land owner by restricting the character of his use, is not unlimited, and other questions aside, such restriction cannot be imposed if it does not bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.18
Yes. The rule requires that zoning restrictions bear a substantial relation to public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.19 Here, the master's finding, after viewing the premises and hearing evidence, that no practical use can be made of the land for residential purposes and that the districting would not promote the health, safety, convenience and general welfare directly negates any such relation.20 The presence of the Ford auto assembling factory to the south, the soap factory, and the Boston & Albany Railroad tracks, combined with the unrestricted zoning of adjacent lands to the east and south, confirms the locus's incompatibility with residential development.21
The anticipated reduction in depth to 65 feet from street widening and the failed $63,000 contract further illustrate the arbitrary nature of the restriction as applied.22
Because the zoning ordinance as applied to Nectow's land does not bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare, it deprives him of property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.23