308 U.S. 338 (1939)
The petitioners were indicted for frauds on the revenue.1 At their initial trial, the prosecution relied on evidence consisting of intercepted telephone messages that constituted a vital part of its proof.2 The convictions obtained in that trial were reversed by the Supreme Court because the evidence had been secured in violation of section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934.3
After the reversal, the government conducted a new trial. Convictions again resulted from the second proceeding.4 The petitioners appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.5 They raised the question of whether the trial judge had improperly refused to permit examination of the prosecution concerning the uses made of the information derived from the prior unlawful interceptions.6
The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions.7 It limited the application of section 605 to the precise circumstances of the first Supreme Court decision and held that Congress had not rendered incompetent testimony made accessible through the use of unlawful taps.8 The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to consider the broader implications for the administration of federal criminal justice.9
Whether section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934 prohibits only the direct introduction of intercepted telephone conversations into evidence or also bars derivative uses of the information obtained from such interceptions?10
Section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934 not only prohibits the direct introduction into evidence of intercepted telephone conversations but also bars derivative uses of the information obtained from such interceptions.11 This follows from the statutory policy of protecting privacy and deterring methods inconsistent with ethical standards, as recognized in the prior Nardone decision.12 Allowing the government to exploit the fruits of unlawful wiretapping while excluding only the conversations themselves would stultify that policy.13 The accused bears the initial burden to show that a substantial portion of the government's case derives from the illegal interceptions, after which the government may prove an independent source for its evidence.14
No. Section 605 bars derivative uses in addition to direct introduction of the intercepted conversations.15 The petitioners sought to examine the prosecution on the uses made of information from the unlawful taps after the first convictions were reversed.16 The trial court refused that inquiry, and the Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the refusal by confining section 605 to the precise facts of the earlier Supreme Court decision.17 The established facts show that the intercepted messages constituted a vital part of the original proof.18 The government obtained new convictions after the reversal.19
Because the interceptions were unlawful, the trial court was required to afford the accused an opportunity, however limited, to demonstrate that a substantial portion of the case against them was a fruit of the poisonous tree.20 The refusal to permit any such examination prevented application of the correct rule and requires reversal so that the District Court may conduct the inquiry.21
Section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934 bars derivative uses of information obtained from unlawful interceptions in addition to prohibiting their direct introduction into evidence.22