59 U.S. 272, 18 How. 272 (1856)
This case originates as an action of ejectment in the Circuit Court for the District of New Jersey and reaches the Supreme Court on a certificate of division of opinion from the circuit judges.1 Both the plaintiffs and the defendants claim title to the disputed lands through Samuel Swartwout.2 The plaintiffs trace their interest to a levy of execution dated April 10, 1839, while the defendants rely on a marshal's sale conducted on June 1, 1839.3
Swartwout had served as Collector of the Customs for the port of New York for eight years ending March 29, 1838.4 His accounts were audited by the First Auditor and certified by the First Comptroller on November 10, 1838, establishing a balance due of $1,374,119.65.5 The Solicitor of the Treasury issued a distress warrant under the Act of May 15, 1820, to recover this sum.6
The warrant directed a levy on Swartwout's lands, with the lien attaching upon recordation in the district court.7 The marshal carried out the levy prior to the plaintiffs' execution date and later sold the property.8 The special verdict in the ejectment action confirmed these events without identifying defects in the underlying proceedings.9
The circuit court certified the question of whether the distress warrant and ensuing proceedings sufficed to transfer Swartwout's title against the plaintiffs' claim.10 Additional objections concerned the marshal's failure to levy on the corporate stock and the sufficiency of his return regarding available goods and chattels.11
Whether the distress warrant issued by the Solicitor of the Treasury under the act of May 15, 1820, is inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States?12
Congress possesses authority under its taxing and revenue powers to authorize executive officers to issue distress warrants for the collection of balances due from public receivers such as customs collectors.13 Such mechanisms do not usurp the judicial power vested in Article III courts when they follow long-established historical practices for public debts.14
No. The distress warrant issued by the Solicitor of the Treasury to recover the $1,374,119.65 balance due from Swartwout as Collector of the Customs for the port of New York does not constitute an exercise of judicial power reserved exclusively to life-tenured courts.15 The auditing of Swartwout's accounts by the First Auditor and certification by the First Comptroller on November 10, 1838, followed by the Solicitor's issuance of the warrant under the Act of May 15, 1820, represent executive functions that Congress may assign to administrative officers to secure public revenue.16 These steps align with the constitutional grant of power to raise and collect taxes, which includes authority to prescribe appropriate remedies and securities for collection without converting every accounting into a judicial controversy.17 The subsequent levy on Swartwout's lands and the marshal's sale on June 1, 1839, therefore transferred valid title to the defendants under the established lien procedure.18
The distress warrant and proceedings under the Act of May 15, 1820, are consistent with the Constitution.19
Whether the proceedings under the act of 1820 deprive a collector of property without due process of law?20
Due process of law encompasses settled usages and modes of proceeding existing under the common law of England and the statutory law of the American colonies and states at the time of the Constitution's adoption.21 It particularly includes summary processes historically employed to recover debts owed to the government by receivers of public money.22
No. The proceedings authorized by the Act of May 15, 1820, do not deprive Swartwout of property without due process because they conform to longstanding historical practices for recovering balances due from customs collectors.23 The special verdict established that Swartwout's accounts had been audited and a precise balance certified before the Solicitor issued the distress warrant.24 This mirrored English Exchequer procedures and early state statutes such as the Massachusetts act of 1786 that permitted treasurers to issue warrants of distress against delinquent collectors.25 The lien attached upon recordation in the district court and the marshal's levy preceded the plaintiffs' execution of April 10, 1839, providing the defendants with title through the June 1, 1839 sale.26
These mechanisms supplied adequate process for public revenue collection without requiring full judicial trial in every instance.27
The proceedings under the Act of May 15, 1820, constitute due process of law.28
Whether the auditing of accounts and issuance of the distress warrant constitute an exercise of judicial power vested exclusively in courts?29
Not every exercise of judgment by an administrative officer constitutes an exercise of the judicial power under Article III.30 Public-rights matters involving revenue collection may be assigned by Congress to executive processes.31 Congress retains discretion to consent to judicial review of such determinations under prescribed conditions.32
No. The auditing of Swartwout's accounts by the First Auditor and First Comptroller and the Solicitor of the Treasury's issuance of the distress warrant represent executive rather than judicial acts.33 Although these steps involve application of legal rules to facts, they fall within Congress's authority to direct the collection of revenue and to impose appropriate remedies on officers charged with public funds.34 The Act of May 15, 1820, permitted Swartwout to bring the question of indebtedness before a district court, demonstrating that Congress had consented to judicial review without transforming the initial executive determination into an unconstitutional exercise of judicial power.35 The circuit court's certified question concerning title transfer was therefore resolved without finding any invasion of Article III prerogatives.36
The auditing of accounts and issuance of the distress warrant do not constitute an exercise of judicial power vested exclusively in courts.37
Whether the constitutional requirement of an oath or affirmation for warrants applies to the distress warrant in this civil proceeding?38
No. The Fourth Amendment's oath or affirmation requirement does not apply to the distress warrant issued by the Solicitor of the Treasury in this civil proceeding to recover the certified balance due from Swartwout.41 The warrant authorized a levy upon lands to satisfy a debt and conferred no broader search authority than is customary in ordinary executions.42 The special verdict and marshal's return confirming the levy on Swartwout's lands prior to the plaintiffs' execution date establish that the process operated solely as a civil collection mechanism, rendering the criminal warrant protections inapposite.43
The constitutional requirement of an oath or affirmation for warrants does not apply to the distress warrant.44
Whether the marshal's return that he levied on lands provides prima facie evidence that the levy was not irregular for want of goods or chattels?45
A marshal's return, stating that lands have been levied upon by virtue of a distress warrant, constitutes at least prima facie evidence that the levy was not irregular by reason of the existence of goods or chattels subject to the process.46
Yes. The marshal's return that he levied on Swartwout's lands by virtue of the distress warrant supplies prima facie evidence that the levy was not irregular for want of goods or chattels.47 The special verdict confirmed the sequence of events, including the marshal's sale on June 1, 1839, without any finding of available corporate stock or other chattels that should have been levied first.48 Objections concerning the marshal's failure to levy on the corporate stock therefore fail because the return itself establishes the regularity of the proceedings against the lands under the warrant.49
The marshal's return provides prima facie evidence that the levy was not irregular for want of goods or chattels.50