208 U.S. 412 (1908)
On February 19, 1903, the legislature of the State of Oregon passed an act whose first section provided that no female shall be employed in any mechanical establishment, or factory, or laundry in this State more than ten hours during any one day.1 Subsequently, on September 18, 1905, an information was filed in the Circuit Court of the State for the county of Multnomah charging that Curt Muller, the owner of a laundry known as the Grand Laundry in the city of Portland, had unlawfully permitted his overseer Joe Haselbock to require a female employee, Mrs. E. Gotcher, to work more than ten hours on September 4, 1905.2
A trial in the circuit court resulted in a verdict against the defendant, who was sentenced to pay a fine of ten dollars.3 The Supreme Court of the State affirmed the conviction in State v. Muller, 48 Oregon 252, after which the case was brought to the United States Supreme Court on a writ of error.4
It is the law of Oregon that women, whether married or single, have equal contractual and personal rights with men, as recognized in decisions such as First National Bank v. Leonard.5 In the brief filed before the Court on behalf of the defendant in error, there was presented a copious collection of legislation from states such as Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Louisiana along with reports from committees and factory inspectors concerning the effects of long hours of labor on women.6
Whether the Oregon statute limiting the working hours of women in laundries to ten hours per day violates the Fourteenth Amendment by preventing persons sui juris from making their own contracts?7
The general right to contract in relation to one's business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, yet it is equally well settled that this liberty is not absolute and extending to all contracts, and that a State may, without conflicting with the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, restrict in many respects the individual’s power of contract.8
No. Although the statute restricts the contractual rights of women employed in laundries, the difference between the sexes justifies a different rule respecting restriction of the hours of labor.9
Women's physical structure and the performance of maternal functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence. This is especially true when the burdens of motherhood are upon her. Even when they are not, continuance for a long time on her feet at work tends to injurious effects upon the body, and as healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the physical well-being of woman becomes an object of public interest and care to preserve the strength and vigor of the race.10
The Oregon statute does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.11
Whether the statute applies equally to all persons similarly situated or instead constitutes invalid class legislation?12
Legislation designed for her protection may be sustained, even when like legislation is not necessary for men and could not be sustained. Differentiated by these matters from the other sex, she is properly placed in a class by herself.13
No. The statute does not constitute invalid class legislation because women are properly placed in a class by themselves due to inherent differences.14
The two sexes differ in structure of body, in the functions to be performed by each, in the amount of physical strength, in the capacity for long-continued labor particularly when done standing, the influence of vigorous health upon the future well-being of the race, the self-reliance which enables one to assert full rights, and in the capacity to maintain the struggle for subsistence.15 This difference justifies a difference in legislation and upholds that which is designed to compensate for some of the burdens which rest upon her.16
The Oregon law applies specifically to females in mechanical establishments, factories, or laundries.17 The conviction of Curt Muller for the events at the Grand Laundry involving Mrs. E. Gotcher on September 4, 1905, demonstrates its targeted application to this class, which rests on the inherent difference between the two sexes and the different functions in life which they perform.18
The statute is not invalid class legislation.19
Whether the statute qualifies as a valid exercise of the police power?20
A State may, without conflicting with the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, restrict in many respects the individual’s power of contract when the restriction relates to the public health, safety, or welfare, including the well-being of the race through protecting women's health and maternal functions.21
Yes. The statute qualifies as a valid exercise of the police power because it is designed to protect the physical well-being of women, which is essential to vigorous offspring and the strength and vigor of the race.22
A widespread belief, supported by legislation from many states and reports from committees, bureaus of statistics, and factory inspectors, recognizes that long hours of labor are dangerous for women primarily because of their special physical organization.23 The reasons for the reduction of the working day to ten hours include the physical organization of women, her maternal functions, the rearing and education of the children, and the maintenance of the home.24
The limitations placed upon her contractual powers are not imposed solely for her benefit, but also largely for the benefit of all.25
The statute qualifies as a valid exercise of the police power.26