461 U.S. 1, 103 S. Ct. 1610, 75 L. Ed. 2d 610 (1983)
After midnight on July 7, 1976, a young woman left her San Francisco apartment to shop at a nearby grocery store.1
Respondent accosted her inside the store.2 After the manager ordered him to leave, respondent waited outside, threw a beer bottle at her, and later followed her home by a circuitous route.3 When she entered her apartment building lobby, respondent forced her into the basement, where he raped and sodomized her and took her jewelry.4
She escaped to a nearby diner and gave police a description.5 Respondent was arrested two blocks away wearing the green fatigue jacket and Afro-style wig she had described and carrying her jewelry.6
Respondent was charged in San Francisco Superior Court with rape, forcible oral copulation, second-degree burglary, second-degree robbery, and false imprisonment.7 The court appointed the San Francisco Public Defender's Office to represent him.8 Deputy Public Defender Harvey Goldfine was assigned to the case.9 Goldfine represented respondent at the preliminary hearing and supervised an extensive investigation.10 Trial was scheduled for Thursday, September 23, 1976.11 On Friday, September 17, Goldfine was hospitalized for emergency surgery.12 Senior trial attorney Bruce Hotchkiss was assigned to the case.13
Hotchkiss interviewed respondent in jail the day he was assigned.14 He reviewed the files and investigation over the weekend.15 He conferred with respondent for three hours on Tuesday, September 21, and again on Wednesday.16 At the opening of trial on September 23, respondent told the court he had only had Hotchkiss for a day and a half and moved for a continuance.17 The trial judge denied the motion after Hotchkiss stated he had investigated and studied the case and felt prepared.18 Respondent repeated his complaints on the second day of trial.19 He first mentioned Goldfine's name and hospitalization that day.20 On the third day, respondent filed a pro se habeas petition claiming he had no attorney because Goldfine was in the hospital.21 The court treated it as a renewed continuance motion and denied it.22 Respondent refused to cooperate with Hotchkiss and declined to testify.23 The jury convicted him of robbery, burglary, and false imprisonment but hung on the rape and oral copulation counts.24 A second trial on those counts was held a week later with Hotchkiss again representing respondent.25 The second jury convicted on both counts.26
The California Court of Appeal affirmed all five convictions.27 The California Supreme Court denied review.28 Respondent's pro se federal habeas petition in the Northern District of California was denied.29 The Ninth Circuit reversed the denial.30 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.31
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the state trial court violated respondent's Sixth Amendment right to counsel by denying respondent's motion for a continuance until the Deputy Public Defender initially assigned to defend him was available?32
Trial judges necessarily require a great deal of latitude in scheduling trials.33 Broad discretion must be granted trial courts on matters of continuances; only an unreasoning and arbitrary insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay violates the right to the assistance of counsel.34 The Sixth Amendment does not guarantee a meaningful attorney-client relationship.35
Yes. The facts of the case begin with the crime on July 7, 1976.36 After midnight, the victim left her San Francisco apartment to shop at a nearby grocery store.37 Respondent accosted her inside the store. After the manager ordered him to leave, respondent waited outside, threw a beer bottle at her, and later followed her home by a circuitous route. When she entered her apartment building lobby, respondent forced her into the basement, where he raped and sodomized her and took her jewelry. She escaped to a nearby diner and gave police a description. Respondent was arrested two blocks away wearing the green fatigue jacket and Afro-style wig she had described and carrying her jewelry.
Respondent was charged in San Francisco Superior Court with rape, forcible oral copulation, second-degree burglary, second-degree robbery, and false imprisonment. The court appointed the San Francisco Public Defender's Office to represent him. Deputy Public Defender Harvey Goldfine was assigned to the case. Goldfine represented respondent at the preliminary hearing and supervised an extensive investigation. Trial was scheduled for Thursday, September 23, 1976. On Friday, September 17, Goldfine was hospitalized for emergency surgery. Senior trial attorney Bruce Hotchkiss was assigned to the case.
Hotchkiss interviewed respondent in jail the day he was assigned. He reviewed the files and investigation over the weekend. He conferred with respondent for three hours on Tuesday, September 21, and again on Wednesday. At the opening of trial on September 23, respondent told the court he had only had Hotchkiss for a day and a half and moved for a continuance. The trial judge denied the motion after Hotchkiss stated he had investigated and studied the case and felt prepared. Respondent repeated his complaints on the second day of trial. He first mentioned Goldfine's name and hospitalization that day. On the third day, respondent filed a pro se habeas petition claiming he had no attorney because Goldfine was in the hospital. The court treated it as a renewed continuance motion and denied it. Respondent refused to cooperate with Hotchkiss and declined to testify. The jury convicted him of robbery, burglary, and false imprisonment but hung on the rape and oral copulation counts. A second trial on those counts was held a week later with Hotchkiss again representing respondent. The second jury convicted on both counts. The California Court of Appeal affirmed all five convictions. The California Supreme Court denied review. Respondent's pro se federal habeas petition in the Northern District of California was denied. The Ninth Circuit reversed the denial. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Applying the rule to these facts, Hotchkiss was assigned six days before trial, reviewed the files prepared by Goldfine, conferred with respondent multiple times, and represented to the court that he was prepared and that a further continuance would not benefit him.38 The trial court denied the continuance after hearing these assurances from experienced counsel.39 Respondent's complaints focused on Hotchkiss's preparation time rather than a specific timely request for Goldfine.40 The Court of Appeals erred in finding a constitutional violation without any showing of prejudice or abuse of discretion by the trial court.41
The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the denial of habeas corpus relief.42
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan concurred only in the reversal because respondent did not make a timely motion for a continuance based on Goldfine's unavailability.43 He agreed the Court of Appeals misread the record on the timing of respondent's complaints.44 Brennan emphasized that the Court should not have reached the meaningful relationship issue since the facts were dispositive independently.45
He explained that the attorney-client relationship is important to effective representation and that indigent defendants have an interest in preserving a developed relationship with appointed counsel, supported by precedent involving retained counsel and state court decisions like Smith v. Superior Court.46 Brennan viewed the Court of Appeals' balancing requirement as a minimal burden that protects rights without guaranteeing rapport.47
Joined by Justice Stevens
Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment. He agreed that the Court of Appeals erred in construing respondent's complaints on the first day of trial as indicating a desire to be represented by Goldfine. Absent a timely request by respondent to postpone the trial until Goldfine recovered from his illness, the state trial judge had no reason to inquire into the likely length of Goldfine's unavailability.
For this reason, Blackmun concurred in the reversal of the Court of Appeals' judgment. He also agreed that the record was dispositive and that the Court of Appeals had no occasion to announce a new constitutional rule under the Sixth Amendment.
Whether the record shows that respondent made a timely and good-faith request for a continuance to permit his originally assigned counsel to represent him at trial?48
The trial court was abundantly justified in denying respondent's midtrial motion for a continuance so as to have Goldfine represent him.49 On this record, it could reasonably have concluded that respondent's belated requests to be represented by Goldfine were not made in good faith but were a transparent ploy for delay.50
No. In the established facts, respondent first mentioned Goldfine's name and hospitalization on the second day of trial and filed the pro se habeas petition claiming Goldfine was his attorney on the third day, eleven days after Hotchkiss had been substituted.51 Until then, all complaints concerned Hotchkiss's alleged lack of preparation time.52 Respondent had expressly stated he was satisfied with Hotchkiss on the first day of trial.53 The trial court exhibited patience with a contumacious litigant and reasonably viewed the belated requests as not made in good faith.54
The Court of Appeals misread the record in construing the complaints as indicating an unspoken preference for Goldfine.55
The record does not show that respondent made a timely and good-faith request for a continuance to permit Goldfine to represent him at trial.56
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan agreed with the Court that the Court of Appeals misread the record in concluding respondent made a timely motion for a continuance based on Goldfine's unavailability.57 He noted that respondent's initial motions focused on Hotchkiss's preparation and that even liberally construing the statements, the trial judge could not reasonably have understood a request for Goldfine until the third day.58 Brennan concurred in the reversal on this ground alone without needing to reach broader issues.59
Joined by Justice Stevens
Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment. He agreed that the Court of Appeals erred in construing respondent's complaints on the first day of trial as indicating a desire to be represented by Goldfine. Absent a timely request by respondent to postpone the trial until Goldfine recovered from his illness, the state trial judge had no reason to inquire into the likely length of Goldfine's unavailability.
For this reason, Blackmun concurred in the reversal of the Court of Appeals' judgment. He also agreed that the record was dispositive and that the Court of Appeals had no occasion to announce a new constitutional rule under the Sixth Amendment.
Whether the Sixth Amendment right to counsel includes the right to a meaningful attorney-client relationship?60
The Court of Appeals' conclusion that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel would be without substance if it did not include the right to a meaningful attorney-client relationship is without basis in the law.61 No court could possibly guarantee that a defendant will develop the kind of rapport with his attorney that the Court of Appeals thought part of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel.62
No. The Court of Appeals announced a new component of the Sixth Amendment without citing any authority.63 Applying the rule to the established facts, respondent received able representation from Hotchkiss, who secured a hung jury on the most serious charges despite respondent's refusal to cooperate.64 The novel right to a meaningful relationship finds no support in precedent and cannot be guaranteed by any court.65 The Court of Appeals' holding that no prejudice need be shown for violation of this supposed right was therefore misplaced.66
The Sixth Amendment does not guarantee a meaningful attorney-client relationship between an accused and his counsel.67
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan stated that the interest recognized by the Court of Appeals finds support in other cases and does not require any court to guarantee that a defendant develop rapport with his attorney.68 He explained that the right to counsel is fundamental and that a defendant has an interest in his relationship with counsel because counsel must work closely with the defendant.69 Brennan cited cases involving retained counsel where denial of a continuance violated due process or the right to counsel and argued that the same considerations apply to appointed counsel for indigent defendants.70
He viewed the Court of Appeals' requirement that the trial court balance the defendant's interest against the public interest in efficient administration as a minimal and sensible burden.71
Joined by Justice Stevens
Justice Blackmun agreed that the Court of Appeals had no occasion to announce a new constitutional rule under the Sixth Amendment after examining the record carefully.72 He stated that this Court likewise had no occasion to consider the Sixth Amendment issue once it found the record dispositive. Blackmun viewed the majority's discussion of the right to counsel and the concerns of victims as unnecessary dicta in this case.
He concurred in the judgment for the reason that the record was dispositive without needing to reach the broader constitutional question.