556 U.S. 778, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009)
Jesse Montejo was arrested on September 6, 2002, in connection with the robbery and murder of Lewis Ferrari, who had been found dead in his home the previous day.1 Police focused on Montejo as a known associate of Jerry Moore, a former employee of the victim.2 Montejo waived his Miranda rights and was interrogated at the sheriff's office through the late afternoon and evening of September 6 and into the early morning of September 7.3 During the videotaped sessions he first claimed only to have driven Moore to the victim's home and ultimately admitted that he had shot and killed Ferrari during a botched burglary.4
On September 10, 2002, Montejo appeared before a judge for Louisiana's required 72-hour hearing.5 The minute record shows that the court set no bond and ordered the Office of Indigent Defender appointed to represent him.6 Later the same day two police detectives returned to the prison, asked Montejo to help locate the murder weapon, read him his Miranda rights again after some discussion, and obtained his agreement to accompany them.7 During the trip Montejo wrote an inculpatory letter of apology addressed to the victim's widow.8 He first met his court-appointed attorney only after the group returned.9
The letter was admitted at trial over defense objection.10 The jury convicted Montejo of first-degree murder and sentenced him to death.11 The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence.12 It rejected Montejo's argument that the letter should have been suppressed under Michigan v. Jackson because Montejo had not requested counsel at the 72-hour hearing and therefore the Jackson presumption did not apply.13
Montejo petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which the United States Supreme Court granted.14
Whether the rule of Michigan v. Jackson forbidding police to initiate interrogation of a criminal defendant once he has requested counsel at an arraignment or similar proceeding should be overruled?15
A prophylactic rule created to protect the Sixth Amendment right to counsel should be overruled when it has proved unworkable in practice, its benefits are marginal because other protections suffice, and its substantial costs to the truth-seeking process outweigh any gains under traditional stare decisis factors including workability, antiquity, reliance interests, and the strength of its reasoning.16
Yes. The Jackson rule creates an unworkable distinction in states such as Louisiana that appoint counsel automatically without any request from the defendant.17 The court did so for Montejo at his September 10, 2002 72-hour hearing when it ordered the Office of Indigent Defender appointed even though Montejo stood mute.18 This produces arbitrary results between defendants in different states.19
It forces impractical case-by-case inquiries into whether a defendant somehow asserted the right during rushed, often unrecorded preliminary hearings.20 The rule's benefits are minimal.21 The Miranda-Edwards-Minnick line already prevents police from badgering suspects into waiving the right to counsel during custodial interrogation after an invocation.22 The costs include suppressing voluntary confessions and deterring police from seeking them even when a defendant like Montejo has received Miranda warnings multiple times and agreed to accompany officers on the trip to locate the murder weapon.23
Michigan v. Jackson is overruled.24
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Breyer joined Justice Stevens' dissent except for footnote 5.25 Although the principles of stare decisis are not inflexible, he believes they bind the Court here.26 Breyer reached a similar conclusion in Arizona v. Gant and in several other recent cases where he would have adhered to precedent rather than overrule it.27
Whether Montejo's letter of apology should have been suppressed on the ground that he had been appointed counsel at his 72-hour hearing?28
Once Michigan v. Jackson is overruled, the mere appointment of counsel by the court without any request or assertion by the defendant does not invalidate a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel that is obtained after the defendant receives Miranda warnings.29
No. Montejo received Miranda warnings at the time of his initial interrogation on September 6 and 7, 2002, and again before agreeing to accompany the detectives on September 10, 2002, after which he wrote the inculpatory letter.30 Because he never requested counsel at the 72-hour hearing where the court appointed representation on its own, no presumption of involuntariness arises and the waiver remains valid.31 The letter was properly admitted at trial.32
The letter was properly admitted at trial.
Whether the case should be remanded to allow Montejo to argue that his letter should have been suppressed under Edwards v. Arizona?33
When a decision changes the legal landscape by overruling a Sixth Amendment analogue to Edwards, the defendant should receive an opportunity on remand.34
Yes. Montejo did not previously litigate an Edwards objection because Jackson provided broader protection.35 The overruling of Jackson leaves open the possibility that he made an unequivocal election of counsel when the officers approached him on September 10, 2002.36 That would have required that any subsequent interrogation cease unless Montejo himself initiated contact.37
The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings.38