474 U.S. 104 (1985)
On the morning of August 13, 1973, a stranger approached the rural New Jersey home of 17-year-old Deborah Margolin and told her that a heifer was loose at the foot of her driveway.1 She set out alone to investigate and never returned.2 Later that day, her mutilated body was found in a nearby stream.3
The victim's brothers were able to provide a description of the stranger's car and clothing.4 Based on this information, officers of the New Jersey State Police tentatively identified petitioner and, later that evening, found him at his place of employment.5 Petitioner responded to the officers' preliminary inquiries and agreed to return to the police barracks for further questioning.6
Approximately two hours later, Detective Charles Boyce led petitioner to an interrogation room and informed him of his Miranda rights.7 Petitioner inquired about the scope of his privilege to remain silent and then executed a written waiver.8 A 58 minute long interrogation session ensued.9 During the course of the interview, Detective Boyce told petitioner that Ms. Margolin had just died.10 Detective Boyce also told petitioner that he had been identified at the Margolin home earlier in the day.11 Finally, Detective Boyce indicated that blood stains had been found on petitioner's front stoop.12 Throughout the interview, Detective Boyce presented himself as sympathetic to petitioner's plight.13 On several occasions, he stated that he did not consider petitioner to be a criminal because the perpetrator of the deed had a mental problem and needed medical help rather than punishment.14 Eventually, petitioner fully confessed to the crime.15 After doing so, he lapsed into what Detective Boyce described as a state of shock.16 Repeated efforts to rouse him from his stupor failed, and the police summoned an ambulance to transport him to the hospital.17
The trial court rejected petitioner's motion to suppress the confession, and the jury found petitioner guilty of murder in the first degree.18 The Superior Court Appellate Division reversed, finding as a matter of law that the confession was the result of intense and mind bending psychological compulsion and therefore was impermissible under the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process.19 Over three dissents, the Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed again.20 After examining the totality of all the surrounding circumstances, the court found that the interrogation did not exceed proper bounds, and that the resulting confession, being voluntary, had been properly admitted into evidence.21
Petitioner then sought a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.22 That court dismissed the application without an evidentiary hearing.23 A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.24 Because the Courts of Appeals have reached differing conclusions on whether state-court voluntariness determinations are entitled to the § 2254(d) presumption of correctness, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.25
Whether the voluntariness of a confession is an issue of fact entitled to the § 2254(d) presumption?26
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), state-court findings of fact shall be presumed to be correct in a federal habeas corpus proceeding unless one of eight enumerated exceptions applies.27 The ultimate question of the voluntariness of a confession is a legal question requiring independent federal determination rather than a factual issue subject to that presumption.28
No. The Court's unbroken line of cases establishes that the ultimate issue of voluntariness is a legal question requiring independent federal determination rather than a factual issue subject to the presumption.29 Applying this rule to the established facts, the New Jersey Supreme Court's examination of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 58 minute long interrogation by Detective Boyce, including the false statements about the victim's death and the sympathetic presentation, does not receive the § 2254(d) presumption in federal habeas review.30 The federal courts must independently evaluate whether the confession was obtained in a manner compatible with due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.31
The voluntariness of a confession is not an issue of fact entitled to the § 2254(d) presumption of correctness.32
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Rehnquist dissented. He found it difficult to sensibly distinguish the determination that a particular confession was voluntary from the determinations which the Court has held to be entitled to a presumption of correctness under § 2254(d).33 While the Court relies principally on stare decisis for the result it reaches today, almost all the cases upon which it relies entailed direct review by this Court of state-court decisions rather than federal habeas review.34 He also disagreed with the decision to remand the case to the Court of Appeals for a second run at the voluntariness issue.35
He believed the majority of that court made it clear that it had evaluated the admissibility of the confession under the correct standard as defined by this Court today.36