536 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2008)
Robert Miller, a quadriplegic who uses an electric wheelchair, attends between three and six NASCAR events each year at the California Speedway in Fontana.1
When spectators seated immediately in front of him stand during the most exciting parts of the races, Miller's view of the track becomes obstructed.2
The California Speedway Corporation opened the facility in 1997.3 It contains two designated wheelchair seating areas in the grandstands, with lower-priced seats located at the bottom of the stadium and higher-priced seats located near the top.4 Miller always purchases tickets for the top row.5
On October 25, 2001, Miller filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Central District of California against the California Speedway Corporation.6 The complaint alleged that the Speedway had violated Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act because its wheelchair areas did not provide lines of sight comparable to those available to members of the general public.7
The district court granted the Speedway's motion for summary judgment.8 It held that the governing Department of Justice regulation did not address lines of sight over standing spectators.9 Miller appealed the judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.10
The regulatory background began with the 1990 enactment of the ADA.11 The Access Board published proposed ADA Accessibility Guidelines in January 1991.12 The Access Board published final guidelines in July 1991.13 The Department of Justice adopted the ADAAG verbatim as its own standards in Appendix A, including section 4.33.3.14
In 1994 the Department of Justice published a supplement to its Technical Assistance Manual that addressed lines of sight in assembly areas where spectators stand.15
Whether the Department of Justice's 1994 supplement to the Technical Assistance Manual provides a valid interpretation of 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, App. A, § 4.33.3?16
An agency's interpretation of its own regulation must be given controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.17 The Technical Assistance Manual is an interpretation of the DOJ's regulation and is entitled to significant weight as to the meaning of the regulation.18
Yes. The language of section 4.33.3 is ambiguous with respect to lines of sight over standing spectators.19 The Department of Justice's interpretation in the 1994 TAM supplement is neither plainly erroneous nor inconsistent with the regulation.20 The interpretation sensibly requires lines of sight over standing spectators in assembly areas such as the California Speedway where spectators routinely stand during events.21
This construction makes the facility usable by wheelchair patrons such as Miller in the actual conditions under which the races take place.22
The Department of Justice's 1994 supplement to the Technical Assistance Manual provides a valid interpretation of 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, App. A, § 4.33.3.23
Whether the Access Board's 1991 commentary on lines of sight must be imputed to the Department of Justice when the DOJ adopted the ADAAG standards?24
When the DOJ adopts the Access Board's guidelines as its own standards, it adopts the text of the guidelines themselves and not the Access Board's commentary, notices of proposed rulemaking, or internal memoranda.25 The Attorney General is free to interpret the regulations in a manner that is more strict than contemplated by the Access Board.26
No. The Department of Justice adopted the text of the ADAAG as its own standards but did not adopt the Access Board's commentary.27
The Access Board's commentary on lines of sight over standing spectators therefore is not imputed to the DOJ.28 The DOJ remained free to resolve the ambiguity in section 4.33.3 by issuing its own interpretation in the 1994 TAM supplement.29
The Access Board's 1991 commentary on lines of sight need not be imputed to the Department of Justice when the DOJ adopted the ADAAG standards.30
Whether the Department of Justice was required to use notice-and-comment rulemaking to issue its 1994 interpretation addressing lines of sight over standing spectators?31
No. The 1994 TAM supplement is an interpretive rule that clarifies the scope of the ambiguous term in section 4.33.3 without adding new substantive obligations.34
Even if the supplement reflected a change in the DOJ's understanding, notice-and-comment procedures were not required because the supplement remained within the bounds of an interpretive rule.35
The Department of Justice was not required to use notice-and-comment rulemaking to issue its 1994 interpretation addressing lines of sight over standing spectators.36