500 U.S. 145 (1991)
Nolan Lucas was charged in Michigan with two counts of criminal sexual conduct.1 The State maintained that Lucas had used a knife to force his ex-girlfriend into his apartment, where he beat her and forced her to engage in several nonconsensual sex acts.2
Lucas did not file a written motion and offer of proof within 10 days after arraignment as required by Michigan's rape-shield statute.3 At the start of trial, Lucas' counsel asked the trial court to permit the defense to present evidence of a prior sexual relationship between the girlfriend and Lucas, even though counsel knew it went against the statute.4
The trial court denied the motion because none of the statutory requirements had been complied with and no in camera hearing had been held.5 A bench trial followed in which Lucas' defense was consent; the trial court did not credit his testimony, found him guilty on both counts, and sentenced him to a prison term of 44 to 180 months.6
The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the notice-and-hearing requirement is unconstitutional in all cases where it is used to preclude evidence of past sexual conduct between a rape victim and a criminal defendant.7 The court relied on an earlier decision stating that the requirement serves no useful purpose in such cases.8 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the per se rule.9
Whether the Michigan Court of Appeals erred in adopting a per se rule that the notice-and-hearing requirement of Michigan's rape-shield statute violates the Sixth Amendment in all cases where it is used to preclude evidence of past sexual conduct between a rape victim and a criminal defendant?10
Yes. The Michigan Court of Appeals erred by adopting a per se rule that the notice-and-hearing requirement violates the Sixth Amendment whenever evidence of past sexual conduct between the victim and defendant is at issue.13 Lucas failed to file any written motion and offer of proof within ten days after arraignment.14 The trial court denied the request because no statutory requirements had been met and no in camera hearing had occurred.15
Precedents establish that preclusion can be an appropriate sanction to protect against surprise, harassment, and undue delay even if alternative sanctions exist in most cases.16
The Michigan Court of Appeals' per se rule is inconsistent with Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.17
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment while noting his dissent in Taylor v. Illinois, where the Court rejected the argument that the Sixth Amendment prohibits preclusion of otherwise admissible evidence as a sanction for violating a reciprocal-discovery rule.18 In a separate dissent in Taylor, he reserved judgment on whether preclusion might be a permissible sanction for noncompliance with a rule designed for specific kinds of evidence, based on his belief that such rules may embody legitimate state interests differing substantially from truth-seeking.19 The notice-and-hearing requirement represents a valid legislative determination that rape victims deserve heightened protection against surprise, harassment, and unnecessary invasions of privacy.20
It is also designed to minimize trial delay by allowing the court to rule on admissibility in advance and to identify evidence where credibility determinations are dispositive, permitting parties to gather evidence soon after the offense when memories are fresh.21 These interests may be advanced by imposition of the preclusion sanction without unduly distorting the truth-seeking process.22 Of course, the State's interest in full disclosure remains paramount, and preclusion may be disproportionate in most cases, but failure to comply may in some cases justify even the severe sanction of preclusion.23
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Stevens dissented and would affirm the judgment of the Michigan Court of Appeals because it was unquestionably correct.24 He questioned whether the Michigan Court of Appeals truly adopted the per se rule described by the Court, noting that the state court's per curiam opinion never uses the term per se, never mentions the Federal Constitution, and never cites any federal cases.25 The ten-day notice period required by the Michigan statute is uniquely strict, as Michigan appears to be the only State requiring notice within 10 days after arraignment, while other jurisdictions require notice at various times before trial.
The Court of Appeals correctly held that the ten-day notice provision is unconstitutional when used to preclude testimony of a victim's past sexual relationship with the defendant in cases involving consent defenses and prior relationships, where notice serves no useful purpose because surprise is not an issue and credibility is for the jury.26 This rule is consistent with Taylor v. Illinois, which approved preclusion only in cases of willful misconduct designed to obtain tactical advantage, and the Michigan opinion does not preclude exceptional responses to exceptional cases.27 Because the Court of Appeals correctly held the unique Michigan statute unconstitutional, he would affirm its judgment.28