494 U.S. 344 (1990)
Tyris Lemont Harvey was convicted of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct in connection with the rape of Audrey Sharp on June 11, 1986.1 On July 2, 1986, Harvey was taken into custody and made a statement to an investigating officer.2 He was arraigned later that same day and counsel was appointed for him.3
More than two months later Harvey told another police officer that he wanted to make a second statement but did not know whether he should talk to his lawyer.4 The officer told Harvey that he did not need to speak with his attorney because his lawyer was going to get a copy of the statement anyway.5 Harvey then signed a constitutional rights waiver form on which he initialed the portions advising him of his right to remain silent, his right to have a lawyer present before and during questioning, and his right to have a lawyer appointed for him prior to any questioning.6
At a bench trial Sharp testified that Harvey visited her home at 2:30 a.m. on the date in question, confronted her with a barbecue fork after placing a call, and after a struggle threw her to the floor of her kitchen, pursued her with the fork and a pair of garden shears, and forced her to engage in sexual acts.7 Harvey testified in his own defense that he had gone to Sharp's home at 9 p.m., invited her to smoke crack cocaine in return for sexual favors, that after she refused following smoking the cocaine she grabbed the barbecue fork and threatened him, triggering a brief fight during which he grabbed the fork and threw it to the floor, and that the two never engaged in sexual intercourse.8
On cross-examination the prosecutor used Harvey's second statement to the police to impeach his testimony.9 This included his claim that he had thrown the barbecue fork to the floor by showing that he had omitted that information from his statement to the police.10 The prosecutor stipulated that the statement was not subject to proper Miranda and therefore could not have been used in the case in chief.11 The prosecutor argued that it could be used for impeachment because the statement was voluntary.12 The trial court permitted the questioning.13 The trial judge believed the victim's testimony and found Harvey guilty as charged.14
The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the conviction on the ground that the statement was taken in violation of defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.15 The impeachment was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the trial involved a credibility contest between defendant and the victim.16 The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.17
Whether the prosecution may use a statement taken in violation of the Jackson prophylactic rule to impeach a defendant's false or inconsistent testimony?18
Under Michigan v. Jackson, once a defendant invokes the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, any subsequent waiver obtained through police-initiated interrogation is presumed invalid.19 Statements taken pursuant to that waiver are inadmissible in the prosecution's case in chief.20 Statements taken in violation of only prophylactic rules such as those in Miranda v. Arizona or Jackson may nevertheless be used to impeach a defendant's inconsistent trial testimony when the statements are voluntary.21 The search for truth outweighs the speculative deterrent effect of broader exclusion, as established in Harris v. New York and Oregon v. Hass.22
Yes. The Michigan Court of Appeals found that Harvey's second statement was taken in violation of the Jackson rule because the police officer initiated the conversation after counsel had been appointed following arraignment on July 2, 1986.23 The statement remained voluntary because Harvey signed a waiver form after being advised of his rights and affirmatively indicated he understood them.24 The prosecutor used the statement solely to impeach Harvey's trial testimony that he had thrown the barbecue fork to the floor during the encounter with Sharp.25 An omission that directly contradicted his earlier account given to police.26
Because the violation involved only the Jackson prophylactic presumption rather than an involuntary statement, the impeachment use is permitted under the Harris and Hass framework.27 That framework balances truth-seeking against the limited deterrent value of exclusion for impeachment purposes.28
The prosecution may use a statement taken in violation of the Jackson prophylactic rule to impeach a defendant's false or inconsistent testimony at trial.29
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Brennan, Marshall, And Blackmun, Jj.
Justice Stevens dissented on the ground that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel protects the defendant's choice to communicate with the State only through counsel as a medium once the right is implemented after formal charges.30 This protection extends to any use of evidence obtained through state-initiated contact, including impeachment.31 He argued that the violation here was not merely prophylactic but went to the core constitutional guarantee because the post-indictment interview occurred after the adversarial process had begun.32
The fruits are therefore inadmissible for any purpose at trial.33 Stevens further contended that allowing impeachment use would encourage police to conduct repeated private interviews with represented defendants for discovery value.34 The cost of exclusion from the case in chief would be minimal once probable cause had been established.35
He rejected the majority's analogy to Miranda cases because Sixth Amendment exclusion follows directly from the right itself rather than as a remedy for a completed wrong.36