443 U.S. 31, 99 S. Ct. 2627, 61 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1979)
In September 1976, Detroit police officers on patrol received a radio call to investigate two persons reportedly appearing intoxicated in an alley.1 Upon arrival at approximately 10 p.m. on September 14, the officers found respondent Gary DeFillippo and a young woman who was lowering her slacks.2 The woman stated she was about to relieve herself.3
An officer asked DeFillippo for identification.4 He first claimed to be Sergeant Mash of the Detroit Police Department and purported to give a badge number the officer could not hear.5 He then changed his answer to state that he either worked for or knew Sergeant Mash.6 DeFillippo did not appear intoxicated.7
Detroit City Code § 39-1-52.3 authorized a police officer to stop and question an individual upon reasonable cause to believe the behavior warranted further investigation for criminal activity.8 The Detroit Common Council had amended the ordinance to make it unlawful for any person stopped under the provision to refuse to identify himself and produce evidence of identity.9 When DeFillippo failed to identify himself, the officers took him into custody for violating the ordinance.10
One officer searched DeFillippo and found a package of marihuana in one shirt pocket and a tinfoil packet inside a cigarette package in the other pocket.11 The tinfoil packet was later opened at the station and determined to contain phencyclidine.12 DeFillippo was charged with possession of the controlled substance phencyclidine.13 At the preliminary examination he moved to suppress the evidence obtained in the search; the trial court denied the motion.14
The Michigan Court of Appeals allowed an interlocutory appeal and reversed.15 It held the Detroit ordinance unconstitutionally vague and concluded that because respondent had been arrested pursuant to that ordinance, both the arrest and the search were invalid.16 The court remanded with instructions to suppress the evidence and quash the information.17 The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal.18
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Michigan court's holding that evidence should be suppressed on federal constitutional grounds although obtained as a result of an arrest pursuant to a presumptively valid ordinance.19
Whether an arrest made in good-faith reliance on an ordinance, which at the time had not been declared unconstitutional, is valid regardless of a subsequent judicial determination of its unconstitutionality?20
Under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, an arresting officer may search a person validly arrested without a warrant.21 The constitutionality of such a search does not depend on any indication that the person possesses weapons or evidence.22 The fact of a lawful arrest standing alone authorizes the search.23 Whether an officer is authorized to make an arrest ordinarily depends on state law.24 The validity of an arrest does not depend on whether the suspect actually committed a crime or on the kinds and degree of proof necessary for a conviction.25 Probable cause to justify an arrest means facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the suspect has committed or is committing an offense.26 Police are charged to enforce laws until and unless they are declared unconstitutional.27 This is subject to the possible exception of a law so grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional that any person of reasonable prudence would be bound to see its flaws.28
Yes. The officers arrived in response to a radio call reporting intoxicated persons in an alley.29 They observed DeFillippo with a woman lowering her slacks at 10 p.m.30 This conduct satisfied the ordinance's requirement of behavior warranting further investigation.31 DeFillippo's inconsistent statements claiming to be Sergeant Mash and then stating he worked for or knew Sergeant Mash constituted a refusal to identify himself under the amended Detroit City Code § 39-1-52.3.32 At the time of the arrest no controlling precedent had declared the ordinance unconstitutional, so the officers possessed probable cause to believe DeFillippo's conduct violated a presumptively valid ordinance.33 The arrest therefore was valid when made under Michigan's general arrest statute, and the incidental search that uncovered marihuana and phencyclidine was likewise valid.34
The subsequent judicial determination that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague does not retroactively invalidate the arrest or require suppression of the evidence.35
The arrest made in good-faith reliance on the ordinance was valid regardless of the later determination of unconstitutionality, the search incident to that arrest was lawful, and the evidence should not have been suppressed.36
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Blackmun joined the opinion but added that a risk exists that police could use stop-and-identify ordinances pretextually to arrest persons.37 They could conduct searches and charge other offenses if contraband is found.38 This would allow avoiding constitutional review of the ordinance itself.39
No evidence appears in this record that Detroit police employed the ordinance in such a habitual pretextual manner.40 If a defendant demonstrated that police routinely arrest but do not prosecute under the ordinance, that showing would rebut any claim of reasonable good-faith reliance.41 It would permit challenge to the ordinance with suppression of resulting evidence if it is held unconstitutional.42
Justice Brennan dissented on the ground that the dispute lies between the respondent and the State rather than between the respondent and individual officers.43 Because the State bears responsibility for both its legislative enactments and its police actions, it cannot defend an unconstitutional search by asserting that officers acted in good faith on a law the legislature passed.44 The ordinance is patently unconstitutional because it forces a person stopped on mere suspicion to choose between relinquishing the right to remain silent and relinquishing the right not to be searched.45 This thereby authorizes precisely what Terry v. Ohio and its progeny forbid.46
Invalidating only prosecutions while upholding arrests leaves the constitutional dilemma intact.47 Therefore both the arrest and the search must be held invalid and the evidence suppressed.48