496 U.S. 444, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990)
In early 1986 the Michigan Department of State Police established a sobriety checkpoint pilot program after its director appointed an advisory committee that included representatives of the State Police, local police departments, state prosecutors, and the University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute.1
The committee developed written guidelines that required checkpoints to be selected pursuant to written procedures, operated by uniformed officers under the supervision of a field commander, with every vehicle stopped, occupants briefly questioned, and the vehicle visually inspected; only drivers showing signs of intoxication would be directed out of the traffic flow for further investigation.2
The first and only checkpoint operated under the program ran for seventy-five minutes on the northbound lane of I-75 in Saginaw County on May 2, 1986.3 During that operation 126 vehicles passed through the checkpoint, the average delay per vehicle was approximately twenty-five seconds, two drivers were arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol, and one driver was arrested for driving with a suspended license.4
Respondents are two licensed Michigan drivers who regularly travel the state and who were stopped at the checkpoint but not arrested.5 On the day before the Saginaw County checkpoint they filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Wayne County seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the checkpoint program.6
After trial the Wayne County Circuit Court ruled that the program violated the Fourth Amendment and the Michigan Constitution.7 The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the Fourth Amendment holding, the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.8
Whether the stopping of all vehicles at a fixed sobriety checkpoint constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment?9
The stopping of a vehicle and the detention of its occupants at a checkpoint constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, as established in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte and United States v. Brignoni-Ponce.10
Yes. The ESTABLISHED FACTS establish that the Michigan Department of State Police sobriety checkpoint program required every vehicle passing through the checkpoint to be stopped by uniformed officers.11 The first checkpoint operated for seventy-five minutes on I-75 in Saginaw County, during which 126 vehicles were stopped with an average delay of twenty-five seconds per vehicle.12 Respondents, two licensed Michigan drivers who regularly travel the state, were among those stopped at the checkpoint though not arrested.13
These stops match the definition of seizures because they involve governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied at a fixed location pursuant to written guidelines.14 The program guidelines mandated that all vehicles be stopped, occupants briefly questioned, and vehicles visually inspected before any further action.15 The trial court and Michigan Court of Appeals applied Fourth Amendment standards to these stops after respondents filed suit in Wayne County Circuit Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.16 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari after the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal.17
Because the ESTABLISHED FACTS show that the checkpoint involved a brief but complete stop of every motorist without individualized suspicion, the stops qualify as seizures under the Fourth Amendment.18
The checkpoint stops are seizures under the Fourth Amendment.19
Whether the constitutionality of a sobriety checkpoint program is properly evaluated under the balancing test from Martinez-Fuerte rather than requiring individualized suspicion?20
When a seizure is substantially less intrusive than a traditional arrest, its reasonableness is determined by balancing the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty, as set forth in Brown v. Texas and applied in Martinez-Fuerte; individualized suspicion is not required where the seizure involves a fixed checkpoint with minimal discretion.21
Yes. The ESTABLISHED FACTS demonstrate that the Michigan program used written guidelines for site selection.22 Uniform procedures required every vehicle to be stopped.23 These features made the seizures substantially less intrusive than roving-patrol stops or random stops invalidated in Brown v. Texas and Delaware v. Prouse.24
The program addressed the substantial state interest in preventing drunk driving through brief stops averaging twenty-five seconds.25 Further investigation occurred only for drivers showing signs of intoxication.26 The trial court and Court of Appeals applied the Brown three-prong balancing test to the program after hearing testimony on effectiveness.27 The Supreme Court confirmed that Martinez-Fuerte supplies the proper framework because the checkpoint involved fixed-location stops of all vehicles rather than standardless discretion.28
The ESTABLISHED FACTS further show that the advisory committee developed the guidelines to minimize intrusion.29 Because the seizures occurred at a predetermined checkpoint with visible signs of authority and no individualized targeting, the balancing test applies instead of a requirement of probable cause or reasonable suspicion for each stop.30
The constitutionality of the sobriety checkpoint program is properly evaluated under the Martinez-Fuerte balancing test.31
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment only.32 He fully agreed with the Court's emphasis on the tragic slaughter on the nation's highways caused by drunk drivers and the dangers posed to the public by intoxicated motorists.33 Blackmun recalled that nearly twenty years earlier in Perez v. Campbell he had highlighted how highway deaths exceeded the death toll of all American wars and had included official statistics documenting the crisis from 1900 through 1969.34
He observed that supplementing those figures for the subsequent two decades would reveal an even more discouraging comparison.35 Blackmun expressed pleasure that the Court was now stressing this tragic aspect of American life.36 He viewed the decision as consistent with precedents in Martinez-Fuerte and Prouse, noting that the minimal intrusion at fixed checkpoints justifies the balancing approach over any requirement of individualized suspicion.37
Whether the Michigan sobriety checkpoint program is consistent with the Fourth Amendment?38
A sobriety checkpoint program is consistent with the Fourth Amendment when the state's interest in preventing drunk driving is substantial, the checkpoint advances that interest through a reasonable arrest rate comparable to other programs, and the intrusion on motorists is minimal in both objective duration and subjective surprise, as measured by the Martinez-Fuerte factors.39
Yes. The ESTABLISHED FACTS show that the state's interest in preventing drunk driving is grave and legitimate, as the program was developed by an advisory committee including prosecutors and researchers to address alcohol-related accidents.40 The single checkpoint operation produced a 1.6 percent arrest rate from 126 vehicles stopped, which the Court found comparable to or better than rates in similar programs upheld in other states, demonstrating effectiveness in advancing the public interest beyond the trial court's erroneous focus solely on arrest numbers.41 The objective intrusion was slight because stops lasted an average of twenty-five seconds with uniform procedures, and the subjective intrusion was not substantial because checkpoints were clearly marked, officers were uniformed, and every vehicle was treated identically under written guidelines.42
Balancing these factors under the Martinez-Fuerte test, the program is constitutional.43 The ESTABLISHED FACTS confirm that respondents were stopped but not arrested, that the program followed the advisory committee's procedures to ensure brevity, and that no evidence showed excessive discretion or fear beyond that inherent in any checkpoint stop.44 The Michigan Court of Appeals erred in finding the subjective intrusion substantial and the effectiveness insufficient, leading the Supreme Court to reverse.45
The Michigan sobriety checkpoint program is consistent with the Fourth Amendment.46
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan dissented, joined by Justice Marshall.47 He argued that the Court misapplied the balancing test by undervaluing the nature of the intrusion and exaggerating the law enforcement need.48 The 1.6 percent arrest rate demonstrated ineffectiveness compared to conventional patrols.49
The subjective intrusion on motorists was substantial due to surprise without individualized suspicion.50 The program subjected the general public to arbitrary seizures inconsistent with Fourth Amendment protections requiring some level of individualized suspicion absent a showing of impracticality.51
Joined by Justices Brennan And Marshall
Justice Stevens dissented, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall.52 He contended that the decision departed from the requirement of individualized suspicion.53 The Michigan program's low arrest rate and lack of evidence of net reduction in accidents showed it did not meaningfully advance the public interest.54
Surprise at unannounced nighttime checkpoints created greater intrusion than permanent border checkpoints upheld in Martinez-Fuerte.55 The program functioned as a publicity stunt rather than an effective law enforcement tool, rendering it unconstitutional under precedents condemning random stops.56