501 U.S. 252 (1991)
In 1940, Congress authorized the Executive Branch to acquire a tract of land a few miles from the Capitol and to construct Washington National Airport, which remained under federal ownership and operation until 1987, first managed by the Civil Aeronautics Agency and later by the Federal Aviation Administration within the Department of Transportation.1
A few years after National opened, the Truman administration proposed that a federal corporation be formed to operate the airport.2 Instead, when Congress authorized construction of a second major airport to serve the Washington area, it again provided for federal ownership and operation.3 Dulles International Airport (Dulles) was opened in 1962 under the direct control of the FAA.4 National and Dulles are the only two major commercial airports owned by the Federal Government.5 National is by far the busiest and most profitable of the three airports due to its central location.6
In 1984 the Secretary of Transportation appointed an advisory commission that recommended transferring control of National and Dulles to a regional authority created by compact between Virginia and the District of Columbia, with an eleven-member Board of Directors appointed by the governors of Virginia and Maryland, the Mayor of the District, and the President.7 Virginia and the District both passed legislation authorizing the establishment of the recommended regional authority.8 A bill embodying the advisory commission's recommendations passed the Senate.9 In the House of Representatives, however, the legislation encountered strong opposition from Members who expressed concern that the surrender of federal control of the airports might result in the transfer of a significant amount of traffic from National to Dulles.10 Substitute bills were therefore drafted to provide for the establishment of a review board with veto power over major actions of MWAA's Board of Directors.11 After Congress received an opinion from the Department of Justice that a veto of MWAA action by such a board of review would plainly be legislative action that must conform to the requirements of Article I, section 7 of the Constitution.12 The Senate adopted a version of the review board that required Members of Congress to serve in their individual capacities as representatives of users of the airports.13
The Transfer Act specified that the Board of Review shall consist of nine Members of the Congress, eight of whom serve on committees with jurisdiction over transportation issues and none of whom may be a Member from Maryland, Virginia, or the District of Columbia, and detailed the actions that must be submitted to the Board of Review for approval, which include adoption of a budget, authorization of bonds, promulgation of regulations, endorsement of a master plan, and appointment of the chief executive officer of the Authority, with disapproval by the Board preventing submitted actions from taking effect.14 The Act also authorized the Board of Review to require Authority directors to consider any action relating to the airports.15 It required that any action changing the hours of operation at either National or Dulles be taken by regulation and therefore be subject to veto by the Board of Review.16 The Act contained a provision disabling MWAA's Board of Directors from performing any action subject to the veto power if a court should hold that the Board of Review provisions of the Act are invalid.17
On March 2, 1987, the Secretary of Transportation and MWAA entered into a long-term lease complying with all of the conditions specified in the then recently enacted Transfer Act.18 The lease provided for a 50-year term and annual rental payments of $3 million in 1987 dollars.19 After the lease was executed, MWAA's Board of Directors adopted bylaws providing for the Board of Review, and Virginia and the District of Columbia amended their legislation to give MWAA power to establish the Board of Review.20 On September 2, 1987, the directors appointed the nine members of the Board of Review from lists that had been submitted by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate.21 On March 16, 1988, MWAA's Board of Directors adopted a master plan providing for the construction of a new terminal at National with gates capable of handling larger aircraft, an additional taxiway turnoff to reduce aircraft time on the runway and thereby improve airport capacity, a new dual-level roadway system, and new parking facilities.22 On April 13, the Board of Review met and voted not to disapprove the master plan.23
In November 1988, Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., and two individuals who reside under flight paths of aircraft departing from, and arriving at, National brought this action against MWAA and the Board of Review, seeking a declaration that the Board of Review's power to veto actions of MWAA's Board of Directors is unconstitutional and an injunction against any action by the Board of Review as well as any action by the Board of Directors that is subject to Board of Review approval.24 The District Court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment.25 A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed.26 Because of the importance of the constitutional question, the Supreme Court granted MWAA's petition for certiorari.27
Whether respondents have standing to challenge the Board of Review's veto power?
To establish standing, respondents must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.28
Yes. Respondents alleged that the master plan allows increased air traffic at National and a consequent increase in accident risks, noise, and pollution.29 This personal injury to respondents is fairly traceable to the Board of Review's veto power.30 Knowledge that the master plan was subject to the veto power undoubtedly influenced MWAA's Board of Directors when it drew up the plan.31 Invalidation of the veto power will prevent the enactment of the master plan, redressing the injury.32
The harm also includes the creation of an impediment to a reduction in activity at National, as the Board of Review was created by Congress as a mechanism to preserve operations at National at their present level, or at a higher level if possible.33
Respondents have standing to challenge the Board of Review's veto power.34
Whether the Board of Review exercises federal power as an agent of Congress?35
Separation-of-powers analysis does not turn on the labeling of an activity; an entity created at the initiative of Congress, the powers of which Congress has delineated, the purpose of which is to protect an acknowledged federal interest, and membership in which is restricted to congressional officials, exercises sufficient federal power as an agent of Congress to mandate separation-of-powers scrutiny.36
Yes. Control over National and Dulles was originally in federal hands, and was transferred to MWAA only subject to the condition that the States create the Board of Review.37 The Federal Government has a strong and continuing interest in the efficient operation of the airports, which are vital to the smooth conduct of Government business, especially to the work of Congress.38 Most significant, membership on the Board of Review is limited to federal officials, specifically members of congressional committees charged with authority over air transportation.39
The Transfer Act imposes no requirement that the Members of Congress who are appointed to the Board actually be users of the airports.40 The Transfer Act imposes the requirement that the Board members have congressional responsibilities related to the federal regulation of air transportation.41 The list system, combined with congressional authority over committee assignments, guarantees Congress effective control over appointments.42 Control over committee assignments also gives Congress effective removal power over Board members because depriving a Board member of membership in those committees deprives the member of authority to sit on the Board.43
The Board of Review exercises federal power as an agent of Congress.44
Related opinions on this issue
Justice White dissented on the ground that the Board is a creature of state law.45 It was created by Virginia and the District of Columbia enactments and bylaws.46 Members of Congress serve in their individual capacities as representatives of airport users.47
He argued that the majority's conclusion that the Board exercises federal power ignores the plain terms of the enactments and agreements.48 The Transfer Act is a legitimate exercise of congressional authority under the Property Clause.49 Even assuming separation-of-powers principles apply, White contended that the Board does not offend those principles.50
Congress exercises no removal power.51 The appointment process does not constitute impermissible congressional control.52
Whether the Board of Review's composition and veto authority over MWAA decisions violates separation of powers?53
If the power exercised by an agent of Congress is executive, the Constitution does not permit it; if the power is legislative, Congress must exercise it in conformity with the bicameralism and presentment requirements of Article I, Section 7.54
Yes. The Board of Review's power over key operational decisions such as budgets, bonds, master plans, and regulations is either executive or legislative.55 Because the Board is an agent of Congress, exercise of executive power by it is forbidden, and exercise of legislative power without bicameral passage and presentment is likewise forbidden.56 The statutory scheme challenged today provides a blueprint for extensive expansion of the legislative power beyond its constitutionally confined role by enabling Members of Congress to retain control, outside the ordinary legislative process, of the activities of state grant recipients charged with executing virtually every aspect of national policy.57
The Board of Review's composition and veto authority violates separation of powers.58
Related opinions on this issue
Justice White dissented on the ground that the Court strains to bring state enactments within separation-of-powers doctrine.59 It extends the doctrine even though both Congress and the Executive argue for constitutionality.60 He maintained that the Board does not exercise federal power.61
The Transfer Act is a legitimate exercise of authority under the Property Clause consistent with South Dakota v. Dole.62 Even if separation-of-powers principles apply, the Board neither exercises executive power in a manner forbidden by Bowsher nor legislative power in a manner forbidden by Chadha.63 White concluded that the majority inflates separation-of-powers reasons to strike down an innovative governmental experiment approved by Congress, the Executive, and two state legislatures.64