466 U.S. 789, 104 S. Ct. 2118, 80 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1984)
In March 1979, Roland Vincent was a candidate for election to the Los Angeles City Council.1
A group of his supporters, known as Taxpayers for Vincent, entered into a contract with Candidates' Outdoor Graphics Service to fabricate and post 15-by-44-inch cardboard signs bearing the message "Roland Vincent — City Council" on utility poles at locations throughout the city.2 The signs were attached by draping them over the horizontal crosswires supporting the poles and stapling the cardboard together at the bottom.3
Section 28.04 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code prohibits any person from painting, marking, posting, or otherwise affixing any sign on public property including sidewalks, utility poles, lampposts, and similar structures.4 City employees from the Bureau of Street Maintenance routinely removed all such signs, including 48 Vincent signs among the 1,207 signs removed during the week of March 1 to March 7, 1979.5
On March 12, 1979, Taxpayers for Vincent and the sign company filed this action in the United States District Court for the Central District of California against the city, the Director of the Bureau of Street Maintenance, and members of the City Council.6 They sought an injunction against enforcement of the ordinance as well as compensatory and punitive damages.7 After discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.8
The District Court entered findings of fact summarizing uncontroverted record material, including that both political and nonpolitical signs were removed without regard to content.9 The large number of illegally posted signs constituted clutter and visual blight.10 Posting on utility pole crosswires would add to the blight and encourage increased posting elsewhere.11 The prohibition left speakers free to picket, parade, distribute handbills, carry signs, and post on private property with owner permission.12 The District Court concluded that the city's aesthetic, safety, and traffic interests supported the ordinance as a reasonable time, place, and manner regulation and granted summary judgment in favor of the city.13
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit did not question the District Court's findings of fact but rejected its conclusions of law.14 It held that the ordinance was presumptively unconstitutional, that the city had failed to demonstrate its aesthetic interests were substantial because it had not shown a comprehensive effort to remove other visual clutter, and that the total ban was not the least restrictive means of achieving the city's goals.15 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.16
Whether Section 28.04 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code, which prohibits the posting of signs on public property, abridges freedom of speech under the First Amendment?17
The government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.18
Yes. The ordinance is content-neutral because it applies to all signs regardless of their message, as the District Court found that both political and nonpolitical signs are removed without regard to content.19 The city has a substantial interest in prohibiting the unsightly clutter of signs on its public property, as the District Court found that the large number of illegally posted signs constitute a clutter and visual blight.20 The ordinance is narrowly tailored because it eliminates the exact source of the evil it sought to remedy by banning signs on public property.21
The ordinance leaves open ample alternative channels for communication because the District Court found that the prohibition leaves speakers free to picket and parade, to distribute handbills, to carry signs and to post their signs on private property with the permission of the owners thereof.22
The ordinance does not abridge freedom of speech under the First Amendment.23
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment. He agreed that the Los Angeles ordinance is a valid time, place, and manner restriction.24 The city has a substantial interest in eliminating visual clutter, and the ordinance leaves open ample alternative channels for communication.25
He wrote separately to emphasize that the government's interest in aesthetics can be a substantial one.26 The visual environment is an important aspect of the quality of life in a community.27 Cities may legitimately seek to preserve and enhance the appearance of their streets and neighborhoods.28
He also noted that the ordinance is not a total ban on signs.29 It prohibits only the posting of signs on public property.30 Individuals remain free to express their views in many other ways.31
Whether the ordinance is unconstitutionally overbroad on its face?32
A statute may be challenged on overbreadth grounds if it is written so broadly that it may inhibit the constitutionally protected speech of third parties. Such a challenge is permitted only if there is a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court.33
No. Appellees failed to demonstrate a realistic danger that the ordinance will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of individuals not before the Court.34 They did not identify any significant difference between their claim that the ordinance is invalid on overbreadth grounds and their claim that it is unconstitutional when applied to their political signs.35 The record suggests that many of the signs posted in violation of the ordinance are posted in such a way that they may create safety or traffic problems that the sign company has tried to avoid.36 If the ordinance may be validly applied to the sign company, it can be validly applied to most if not all of the signs of parties not before the Court.37
The ordinance is not unconstitutionally overbroad on its face.38
Whether the ordinance is unconstitutional as applied to the posting of political campaign signs on utility pole crosswires during a municipal election campaign?39
The government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.
No. The application of the ordinance to the Vincent signs is valid.40
The District Court found that posting on utility pole crosswires would add somewhat to the blight and inevitably would encourage greatly increased posting in other unauthorized and unsightly places.41 The city's interest in eliminating visual clutter would be achieved less effectively if the city were required to distinguish between different types of signs.42 The ordinance is limited to signs posted on public property and does not reach signs on private property.43
The findings of the District Court indicate that there are ample alternative modes of communication in Los Angeles.44
The ordinance is constitutional as applied to the posting of political campaign signs on utility pole crosswires during a municipal election campaign.45