79 N.W. 738 (Wis. 1899)
A large dwelling house, expensive when constructed, has been destroyed, and the ground has been graded down, by the owner of the life estate, in order to make the property serve business purposes.1 There are no contract relations in the present case.2 The defendants are the grantees of a life estate.3
Business and manufacturing interests advanced and surrounded the once elegant mansion, until it stood isolated and alone, standing upon just enough ground to support it, and surrounded by factories and railway tracks, absolutely undesirable as a residence and incapable of any use as business property.4 Here was a complete change of conditions, not produced by the tenant, but resulting from causes which none could control.5
The consideration was regarded by the trial court as controlling, and the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the defendants.6 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the judgment.7
The opinion was filed on July 3, 1899, and a motion for rehearing was denied on September 26, 1899.8
Whether the destruction of a dwelling house and the grading of the land by the holder of the life estate constitutes waste when surrounding conditions have rendered the property valueless for its prior residential use?9
Waste may be defined to be any act or omission of duty by a tenant of land which does a lasting injury to the freehold, tends to the permanent loss of the owner of the fee, or to destroy or lessen the value of the inheritance, or to destroy the identity of the property, or impair the evidence of title.10 The law upon the subject of waste is subject to such reasonable modifications as may be demanded by the growth of civilization and varying conditions.11 A radical and permanent change of surrounding conditions must always be an important consideration upon the question whether a physical change constitutes waste.12
No. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin applied the governing rules to the specific facts of this case and concluded that the defendants' actions did not constitute waste.13
The property had become valueless for residence purposes through the growth and development of the city, with business interests surrounding the once elegant mansion until it stood isolated and alone.14 The defendants, holding a life estate without any contract obligations to preserve or restore the prior condition, destroyed the dwelling and graded the land to render the property useful for business purposes.15 The complete change in surrounding conditions was not produced by the tenant.16 This change deprived the property of its value and usefulness as previously used.17 Therefore, the question whether the changes constituted waste was properly resolved by the trial court in favor of the defendants.18
The court emphasized that under ordinary circumstances a reversioner is entitled to receive the property substantially in the condition in which it was received.19 Yet the radical and permanent change of conditions presented here required a different result.20 The trial court's judgment was therefore affirmed.21
The destruction of the dwelling house and the grading of the land by the holder of the life estate does not constitute waste when surrounding conditions have rendered the property valueless for its prior residential use.22