403 U.S. 528 (1971)
In May 1968, sixteen-year-old Joseph McKeiver was charged in Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania, with robbery, larceny, and receiving stolen goods as acts of juvenile delinquency under Pennsylvania law.1 At the adjudication hearing before Judge Theodore S. Gutowicz of the Court of Common Pleas, Family Division, Juvenile Branch, McKeiver was represented by counsel and requested a jury trial, which was denied.2 The judge found the evidence sufficient, adjudged McKeiver delinquent, and placed him on probation.3
In January 1969, fifteen-year-old Edward Terry was charged in the same Philadelphia court with assault and battery on a police officer and conspiracy as acts of juvenile delinquency.4 Terry's counsel requested a jury trial, which Judge Joseph C. Bruno denied.5 The judge found the evidence sufficient, adjudged Terry delinquent, and committed him to the Youth Development Center at Cornwells Heights.6
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted leave to appeal in both cases, consolidated them, and affirmed the adjudications of delinquency, concluding that a juvenile does not have a constitutional right to a jury trial in delinquency proceedings.7 The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.8
In January 1969, Barbara Burrus and approximately forty-five other black children ranging in age from eleven to fifteen were the subjects of juvenile court summonses issued in Hyde County, North Carolina.9 The charges arose out of a series of demonstrations in the county in late 1968 by black adults and children protesting school assignments and a school consolidation plan.10 The several cases were consolidated into groups for hearing before District Judge Hallett S. Ward, sitting as a juvenile court.11 Requests for jury trials were denied.12 In each case the court found that the juvenile had committed an act for which an adult may be punished by law.13 A custody order was entered declaring the juvenile a delinquent in need of more suitable guardianship and committing him to the custody of the County Department of Public Welfare for placement in a suitable institution.14 The court, however, suspended these commitments and placed each juvenile on probation for either one or two years.15
On appeal, the cases were consolidated into two groups.16 The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed.17 In its turn the Supreme Court of North Carolina deleted that portion of the order in each case relating to commitment, but otherwise affirmed.18 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.19
Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a jury trial be provided in a juvenile delinquency proceeding?20
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require jury trials in juvenile delinquency proceedings.21 The standard is fundamental fairness, yet the imposition of a jury trial requirement would not strengthen the factfinding function of the juvenile court and would remake the proceeding into a fully adversary process, eroding the juvenile court’s distinctive features of compassion, flexibility, and concern for rehabilitation.22
No. The cases arose from three separate juvenile proceedings in Pennsylvania and North Carolina.23 In May 1968 sixteen-year-old Joseph McKeiver was charged in Philadelphia County with robbery, larceny, and receiving stolen goods as acts of juvenile delinquency.24 At the adjudication hearing before Judge Theodore S. Gutowicz, counsel requested a jury trial that was denied; the judge found the evidence sufficient, adjudged McKeiver delinquent, and placed him on probation.25 In January 1969 fifteen-year-old Edward Terry was charged in the same court with assault and battery on a police officer and conspiracy.26 Judge Joseph C. Bruno denied Terry’s jury-trial request, found the evidence sufficient, adjudged him delinquent, and committed him to the Youth Development Center at Cornwells Heights. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed both adjudications, holding that a juvenile has no constitutional right to a jury trial in delinquency proceedings.27
In January 1969 Barbara Burrus and approximately forty-five other black children aged eleven to fifteen were the subjects of juvenile court summonses issued in Hyde County, North Carolina.28 The charges arose out of a series of demonstrations in the county in late 1968 by black adults and children protesting school assignments and a school consolidation plan. District Judge Hallett S. Ward, sitting as a juvenile court, denied their jury-trial requests, found that each had committed an act for which an adult may be punished by law, adjudged them delinquent, and entered custody orders that were suspended in favor of one- or two-year probation terms.29 The North Carolina courts affirmed. These proceedings satisfied fundamental fairness because the judges heard testimony, assessed credibility, and found the evidence sufficient without a jury, while the juvenile system retained its emphasis on rehabilitation rather than punishment.30 The absence of a jury therefore did not violate due process.31
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require that a jury trial be provided in a juvenile delinquency proceeding, and the judgments are affirmed.
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Harlan concurred in the judgments.32 He explained that if he felt constrained to follow Duncan v. Louisiana he would have great difficulty holding that the jury-trial right does not extend to state juvenile proceedings.33 He adhered to his view that criminal jury trials are not constitutionally required of the States either as a matter of Sixth Amendment law or due process.34
He noted that the premise of the plurality opinion is that juvenile delinquency proceedings have in practice actually become in many respects criminal trials.35
Justice White concurred in the opinion of the Court.36 He explained that the jury serves in criminal cases to prevent abuses of official power by insuring community participation in imposing serious deprivations of liberty.37 He observed that the juvenile justice system rests on more deterministic assumptions focused on rehabilitation rather than blameworthiness and punishment.38
The distinctive intake policies and less severe consequences of delinquency adjudication make the jury unnecessary under due process.39 He concluded that differences of substance between criminal and juvenile courts are sufficient to hold that a jury is not required in the latter.40
Joined by Justices Black And Marshall
Justice Douglas dissented.41 He argued that when a juvenile faces possible incarceration the proceeding is one in which liberty is in jeopardy.42 He maintained that the label civil or criminal is not determinative and that the substance of the proceeding, which can result in confinement until majority, requires the same procedural protections afforded adults.43
He concluded that the guarantees of the Bill of Rights made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment require a jury trial in these cases.44
Justice Brennan concurred in the Pennsylvania cases and dissented in the North Carolina cases.45 He agreed that the proceedings were not criminal prosecutions within the Sixth Amendment.46 He concluded that jury trial is required under due process only when no other procedure adequately protects against governmental oppression.47
In Pennsylvania the availability of public trials supplied sufficient protection.48 In North Carolina the exclusion of the public left no adequate substitute and therefore required reversal.49