465 U.S. 168 (1984)
Carl Edwin Wiggins was convicted in a Texas court of robbery and sentenced to life imprisonment as a recidivist.1
His conviction was set aside because of a defective indictment.2 When Wiggins was retried he was again convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.3 Standby counsel were appointed to assist Wiggins at both trials.4
Prior to the first trial, a hearing was held on Wiggins' motion to proceed pro se.5 The court granted the motion, but simultaneously appointed two attorneys to act as standby counsel.6 Wiggins initially objected to their presence.7 Shortly thereafter, however, counsel asked Wiggins how they should conduct themselves at trial, and Wiggins expressly requested that they bring appropriate objections directly to the attention of the court, without first consulting him.8 After the trial, newly appointed counsel discovered that the original indictment was defective, and a new trial was granted.9
On April 16, 1973, about two months before the second trial began, Wiggins filed a request for appointed counsel, stating that he wished to rescind his earlier waiver of counsel.10 The next day Wiggins filled out and signed a form captioned "Petition for Appointment of Counsel and Order Thereon."11 The trial court appointed Benjamin Samples.12 About a month later Wiggins filed an additional request for counsel.13 Five days later Wiggins filled out another appointment of counsel form, and the trial court appointed R. Norvell Graham.14 When pretrial proceedings began on June 4, 1973, Wiggins announced that he would be defending himself pro se; he then firmly requested that counsel not be allowed to interfere with Wiggins' presentations to the court.15
The trial began on June 5, 1973.16 Wiggins conducted the defense's voir dire of prospective jurors and made the opening statement for the defense to the jury.17 Wiggins filed numerous pro se motions in the course of the trial.18 He cross-examined the prosecution's witnesses freely, and registered his own objections.19 Throughout the trial Wiggins selected the witnesses for the defense, examined them, decided that some questions would not be asked by the defense, and decided which witnesses would not be called.20 Wiggins filed his own requested charges to the jury, and made his own objections to the court's suggested charge.21 After exhausting direct appellate and state habeas review Wiggins filed a petition for federal habeas corpus relief.22 The District Court denied the habeas petition, but the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed.23
Whether a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to self-representation is violated when standby counsel participates in the trial over the defendant's objection?24
The Faretta right to self-representation is not infringed by the unsolicited participation of standby counsel.25 This holds provided the pro se defendant maintains actual control over the case he chooses to present to the jury.26 Standby counsel's participation must not destroy the jury's perception that the defendant is representing himself.27
No. Wiggins was accorded all specific rights to have his voice heard, including conducting voir dire, making the opening statement, cross-examining witnesses, filing pro se motions, selecting witnesses, and making closing arguments.28 Standby counsel's participation occurred largely outside the jury's presence or with Wiggins' acquiescence at times, and conflicts were resolved in Wiggins' favor.29 The jury remained fully aware that Wiggins was conducting his own defense.30
The unsolicited participation of standby counsel did not violate Wiggins' Sixth Amendment right to self-representation.31
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Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan dissented, arguing that the Faretta right includes the right to be free from unsolicited interference by counsel.32 When standby counsel makes motions, objections, or arguments without the defendant's consent, the defendant is deprived of the core value of self-representation.33 The record demonstrates that Wiggins repeatedly objected to his appointed attorneys' participation, yet the attorneys continued to make motions and objections on Wiggins' behalf, interfering with his ability to control his own defense and potentially confusing the jury.34
The Court's conclusion that the attorneys' participation was not substantial enough to violate Faretta is unsupported by the record.35
Whether standby counsel may make motions, objections, and arguments without the pro se defendant's consent consistent with the right to conduct one's own defense?36
Standby counsel may make motions, objections, and arguments without the pro se defendant's consent.37 Such participation is consistent with the right to conduct one's own defense when it does not interfere with the defendant's actual control over tactical decisions or destroy the jury's perception that the defendant is representing himself.38 The Faretta right focuses on the defendant's opportunity to present his case in his own way rather than an absolute bar on unsolicited assistance.39
Yes. The established facts show that Wiggins maintained actual control by filing and arguing at least twelve pro se motions, conducting voir dire, making opening and closing statements, cross-examining witnesses, selecting defense witnesses, and deciding which questions to ask or witnesses to call.40 Although standby counsel made motions and objections, many occurred outside the jury's presence, conflicts were resolved in Wiggins' favor, and Wiggins often adopted or acquiesced in counsel's actions.41 The jury's perception remained that Wiggins was representing himself because he handled the core elements of the defense presentation.42
Standby counsel may make motions, objections, and arguments without the pro se defendant's consent without violating the right to self-representation when the two core limitations are respected.43
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Justice White concurred in the Court's opinion and judgment.44 He wrote separately only to note that the Court's opinion does not address the question whether a defendant who has elected self-representation may later complain that standby counsel was ineffective.45 That question is not presented in this case.46
He expressed no view on it.47 The concurrence makes clear that the decision leaves open any future claim that standby counsel provided ineffective assistance after a defendant elects self-representation.48 No position is taken on that distinct issue because it was not raised here.49
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in adopting a per se rule that standby counsel must be seen but not heard during a pro se trial?50
The Court of Appeals erred in adopting a per se rule that standby counsel must be seen but not heard.51 Faretta's logic and its citation to United States v. Dougherty indicate that no absolute bar on standby counsel's unsolicited participation is appropriate.52 The proper inquiry focuses on whether the defendant had a fair chance to present his case in his own way while preserving actual control and jury perception.53
Yes. The Court of Appeals held that court-appointed standby counsel is to be seen but not heard and may not compete with the defendant or supersede his defense.54 This per se rule is inconsistent with the facts showing Wiggins received all affirmative rights of self-representation and that counsel's participation was limited, often approved or acquiesced in by Wiggins, and resolved in his favor when disputed.55 The rule would improperly silence standby counsel even when their limited role assists without eroding the defendant's control or appearance of self-representation.56
The Court of Appeals erred in adopting the per se seen-but-not-heard rule.57