382 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 1979)
In January 1972 Mary V. Nowling Elliott, a simple elderly woman who could neither read nor write, owned an undivided one-fifth interest in the minerals underlying a seventy-five acre tract of land.1 B.G. Russell offered to buy her entire interest, but she refused and instead orally agreed to sell him two of the thirteen to fifteen mineral acres she owned for $3300.00.2 Russell prepared a mineral deed that instead conveyed her entire one-fifth interest in the minerals under the seventy-five acres.3 Elliott's daughter, who lived with her and could read and write, reviewed the deed but did not understand it and advised that it was probably all right.4 Several days later Russell told Elliott he had made a mistake and offered her $15,000 for the interest conveyed, but she refused and insisted on reconveyance of the portion she had not intended to sell.5
On February 16, 1972 Russell and his wife purported to reconvey to Elliott the thirteen seventy-fifths interest of which she had been defrauded.6 However on February 11, 1972 Russell had already conveyed a substantial portion of the same mineral rights to C.P. McClelland, who later conveyed those rights to respondents Love, Harris, and Carpenter.7 Elliott remained unaware of the Russell-McClelland transaction and subsequent conveyances until October 1973, when a title search conducted in connection with her attempt to sell more mineral rights revealed them.8 She then brought an action seeking cancellation of the original deed.9
The trial court found that by trick and fraud Elliott was induced to sign a conveyance other than the one she intended, that there was no lawful delivery, and that the instrument was void, with Elliott free of negligence given her lack of education and age.10 On appeal the district court reversed, characterizing the central question as whether the deed was void at law or merely voidable in equity.11 The district court implicitly treated the deed as voidable, making available the defenses of laches and bona fide purchaser status.12 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision on the ground that it conflicted with a decision of another district court of appeal.13
Whether a deed procured by such fraud as was found in this case is void at law or merely voidable in equity on petition of the defrauded grantor?14
Delivery is an essential requisite of the execution of a deed conveying valid legal title. Without delivery, nothing passes to the grantee.15 The rule that a deed procured by fraud is void is limited to situations where the fraud in the execution is such that it can be said there was a complete failure of delivery.16 Where all the essential legal requisites of a deed are present, it conveys legal title. Fraud in the inducement renders such a legally effective deed voidable in equity.17
No. In this case the execution of the deed, including delivery, was complete in all its legal requisites.18 Elliott knew that she was executing and delivering a deed of mineral rights. The law charged her with the responsibility of informing herself as to the legal effect of the document she was signing.19 The trial court's findings of fact that the grantee committed fraud and that the grantor was not negligent do not compel the conclusion that there was such a substitution of documents as to constitute failure of delivery or such an alteration of documents as to be the equivalent of a forgery.20
The fraud practiced by Russell consisted of substituting a clause conveying the entire one-fifth interest rather than the two mineral acres orally agreed upon.21 Yet Elliott understood she was signing and delivering a mineral deed, and her daughter reviewed the instrument before execution.22 These facts establish inducement fraud rather than the type of execution fraud that prevents delivery from occurring at all.23
The deed was merely voidable in equity rather than void at law.24
Whether the district court correctly held the deed voidable and whether the case should be remanded for trial on the good faith of subsequent purchasers?25
Because of its holding that the deed was void, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff.26 Therefore there were no findings of fact on the issue of the good faith of the purchasers from McClelland.27 While the district court was correct in holding the deed voidable rather than void, there was no basis for it to conclude from the record that the defendants were bona fide purchasers.28 The case should be remanded for trial of this factual issue.29
Yes. The district court was correct in holding that the deed was voidable.30 However, because the trial court had granted summary judgment based on the deed being void, there were no findings on the good faith of the subsequent purchasers from McClelland who conveyed to Love, Harris, and Carpenter.31 Therefore the case must be remanded for trial on that issue.32
The Supreme Court approved the district court's determination that the deed conveyed legal title and was only voidable.33 It quashed the portion of the district court's decision that had resolved the bona fide purchaser question without an evidentiary record.34
The district court's holding that the deed was voidable is approved, but its decision for the respondents is quashed and the case remanded for further proceedings on the good faith of the subsequent purchasers.35