500 U.S. 257 (1991)
Robert L. McCormick was a member of the West Virginia House of Delegates who represented a district that had long suffered from a shortage of medical doctors.1 For several years West Virginia allowed foreign medical school graduates to practice under temporary permits while studying for the state licensing exams.2 McCormick was a leading advocate and supporter of this program.3
In the early 1980s, after a move in the House to end the temporary permit program, the temporarily licensed doctors formed an organization and hired lobbyist John Vandergrift.4 In 1984 Vandergrift worked for legislation extending the program, which McCormick sponsored.5 The bill passed and extended the program for another year.6 Shortly thereafter McCormick agreed to sponsor 1985 legislation that would grant the doctors permanent licenses based on their years of experience.7
During his 1984 reelection campaign McCormick told Vandergrift that his campaign was expensive, that he had paid considerable sums out of his own pocket, and that he had not heard anything from the foreign doctors.8 Vandergrift arranged cash payments from the doctors that were delivered to McCormick in multiple installments during 1984.9 These included an initial delivery of nine $100 bills followed later the same day by $2,000 in cash and two additional payments in the fall.10 McCormick did not list any of these payments as campaign contributions.11 He did not report the money as income on his 1984 federal income tax return.12 The doctors' organization kept detailed books but recorded the payments only with initials or codes.13
In the spring of 1985 McCormick sponsored the permanent licensing legislation.14 He spoke in favor of it during floor debate, and the bill was enacted.15 Two weeks after enactment McCormick received another cash payment from the doctors.16 Following an investigation a federal grand jury indicted McCormick on five Hobbs Act counts and one count of filing a false income tax return.17 After a six-day trial the jury convicted him on the first Hobbs Act count and the tax count but could not reach verdicts on the remaining Hobbs counts, resulting in a mistrial on those counts.18
The Court of Appeals affirmed both convictions.19 The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of disagreement among the courts of appeals regarding the meaning of the phrase "under color of official right" as used in the Hobbs Act.20
Whether the Court of Appeals erred by affirming the Hobbs Act conviction on legal and factual grounds that were never submitted to the jury?21
Yes. The Court of Appeals affirmed McCormick's conviction by applying its own seven-factor test to conclude that the payments were not campaign contributions and that McCormick was extorting money.25 It did so without examining the jury instructions given at trial or ordering a new trial on the proper legal standard.26
The Court of Appeals erred by affirming the Hobbs Act conviction on legal and factual grounds that were never submitted to the jury.27
Whether proof of an explicit quid pro quo is required before an elected official may be convicted under the Hobbs Act for receiving campaign contributions?28
The receipt of campaign contributions by an elected official violates the Hobbs Act only if the payments are made in return for an explicit promise or undertaking by the official to perform or not to perform an official act.29 This requirement applies specifically when the payments are characterized as campaign contributions.30
Yes. Under the established facts McCormick received cash payments from the doctors during his 1984 reelection campaign and later sponsored the 1985 permanent licensing legislation. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that a quid pro quo need not be shown when the parties never intended the payments to be legitimate campaign contributions.31
Such a rule would criminalize routine legislative advocacy and campaign financing without more explicit statutory language than the Hobbs Act contains.32
Proof of an explicit quid pro quo is required before an elected official may be convicted under the Hobbs Act for receiving campaign contributions.33
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment.34 He agreed with the majority that proof of an explicit quid pro quo is required to convict an elected official under the Hobbs Act for receiving campaign contributions.35 Scalia noted that the distinction between campaign contributions with anticipation of favorable action and those in exchange for an explicit promise is reasonable but lacks justification in the statutory text of the Hobbs Act, which contains no allusion to campaign contributions or quid pro quos.36
He suggested that the assumption that "under color of official right" includes receipt of money from private sources for official duties may be questionable, potentially making the conduct better characterized as bribery under statutes like the Travel Act rather than extortion.37 Scalia raised this point without deciding it, emphasizing the need for careful examination of the statute's text and history before extending the Hobbs Act further into the area of payments for official action.38
Whether the trial court's jury instructions adequately distinguished voluntary campaign contributions from payments that violate the Hobbs Act?39
No. The trial court instructed the jury that voluntary is that which is freely given without expectation of benefit.42 The jury could find extortion if payments were made with the expectation that McCormick's official conduct would be influenced.43 Under the established facts the jury could therefore have convicted McCormick on the basis of an expectation of benefit even if it found the payments to be campaign contributions.44 The instructions were inadequate to prevent conviction on an impermissible theory.45
The trial court's jury instructions did not adequately distinguish voluntary campaign contributions from payments that violate the Hobbs Act.46
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Blackmun And Justice O'connor
Justice Stevens dissented.47 He argued that the jury instructions, read as a whole, properly focused the jury's attention on the critical issue of the candidate's and contributor's intent at the time the specific payment was made.48 He maintained that an implicit understanding is sufficient for extortion under the Hobbs Act.49 Subtle extortion is just as wrongful and probably much more common than the kind of express understanding that the majority opinion seems to require.50
Stevens emphasized that the petitioner did not object to the instructions at trial.51 The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, supported the conclusion that McCormick was guilty of extortion.52 He would have affirmed the conviction because the petitioner was fairly tried and convicted by a properly instructed jury.53
Whether the conviction for filing a false income tax return could be affirmed independently after the Court of Appeals' errors on the Hobbs Act count?54
A conviction for filing a false income tax return cannot be affirmed on the ground that the jury's finding on the Hobbs Act count implicitly rejected the campaign contribution characterization when the Hobbs Act conviction itself was based on erroneous instructions.55 Independent review of the tax instructions is required on remand.56
No. The Court of Appeals affirmed the tax conviction solely because the Hobbs Act verdict indicated the payments were not campaign contributions.57 The tax instructions used the same definition of voluntary.58 The jury could have convicted on the tax count even if the payments were contributions given with an expectation of benefit.59 The established facts therefore require independent review of the tax instructions on remand rather than automatic affirmance.60
The conviction for filing a false income tax return cannot be affirmed independently after the Court of Appeals' errors on the Hobbs Act count.61