377 U.S. 201 (1964)
The petitioner, a merchant seaman, was in 1958 a member of the crew of the S. S. Santa Maria.1 In April of that year federal customs officials in New York received information that he was going to transport a quantity of narcotics aboard that ship from South America to the United States.2 As a result of this and other information, the agents searched the Santa Maria upon its arrival in New York.3 They found in the afterpeak of the vessel five packages containing about three and a half pounds of cocaine.4 They also learned of circumstances, not here relevant, tending to connect the petitioner with the cocaine.5
He was arrested, promptly arraigned, and subsequently indicted for possession of narcotics aboard a United States vessel.6 In July a superseding indictment was returned, charging the petitioner and a man named Colson with the same substantive offense, and in separate counts charging the petitioner, Colson, and others with having conspired to possess narcotics aboard a United States vessel, and to import, conceal, and facilitate the sale of narcotics.7 The petitioner, who had retained a lawyer, pleaded not guilty and was released on bail, along with Colson.8
A few days later, and quite without the petitioner’s knowledge, Colson decided to cooperate with the government agents in their continuing investigation of the narcotics activities in which the petitioner, Colson, and others had allegedly been engaged.9 Colson permitted an agent named Murphy to install a Schmidt radio transmitter under the front seat of Colson’s automobile, by means of which Murphy, equipped with an appropriate receiving device, could overhear from some distance away conversations carried on in Colson’s car.10
On the evening of November 19, 1959, Colson and the petitioner held a lengthy conversation while sitting in Colson’s automobile, parked on a New York street.11 By prearrangement with Colson, and totally unbeknown to the petitioner, the agent Murphy sat in a car parked out of sight down the street and listened over the radio to the entire conversation.12 The petitioner made several incriminating statements during the course of this conversation.13 At the petitioner’s trial these incriminating statements were brought before the jury through Murphy’s testimony, despite the insistent objection of defense counsel.14 The jury convicted the petitioner of several related narcotics offenses, and the convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals.15
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether, under the circumstances here presented, the prosecution’s use at the trial of evidence of the petitioner’s own incriminating statements deprived him of any right secured to him under the Federal Constitution.16
Whether the prosecution’s use at the trial of evidence of the petitioner’s own incriminating statements deprived him of any right secured to him under the Federal Constitution?17
After a defendant has been indicted, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel prohibits government agents from deliberately eliciting incriminating statements from the defendant in the absence of his counsel.18 Such statements may not be used against the defendant at trial.19 This principle was established by Spano v. New York and Powell v. Alabama, which recognize the critical period between arraignment and trial when the aid of counsel is essential.20
Yes. Massiah had been indicted on narcotics charges and was free on bail with retained counsel when Colson began cooperating with federal agents.21 The agents arranged for Colson to carry a radio transmitter in his car, allowing Agent Murphy to surreptitiously listen to the conversation between Colson and Massiah on November 19, 1959.22 During this conversation, Massiah made incriminating statements without any knowledge that he was being overheard by government agents or that his counsel was present.23
These statements were then introduced at trial through Murphy's testimony.24 This indirect and surreptitious interrogation after indictment without counsel violated the Sixth Amendment guarantee, as the right to counsel applies to such post-indictment elicitation of statements just as it does to formal interrogations.25
The prosecution's use at trial of evidence of Massiah's incriminating statements, which were deliberately elicited by federal agents after indictment and without the presence of counsel, deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel.26
Related opinions on this issue
Justice White dissented from the majority's holding.27 He contended that the new constitutional rule barring the use of evidence which is relevant, reliable and highly probative rests on anything but solid foundations.28 White emphasized that Massiah was not prevented from consulting with counsel as often as he wished and that no meetings with counsel were disturbed or spied upon.29
He argued that the proper test for admissibility is whether the statements were voluntary rather than the automatic exclusion announced by the Court.30 White concluded that the rule would unduly hamper law enforcement by discouraging the use of cooperating confederates in criminal investigations.31