468 U.S. 961 (1984)
The badly burned body of Sandra Boulware was discovered in a vacant lot in the Roxbury section of Boston at approximately 5 a. m. on Saturday, May 5, 1979.1 An autopsy revealed that Boulware had died of multiple compound skull fractures caused by blows to the head.2 After a brief investigation, the police decided to question one of the victim’s boyfriends, Osborne Sheppard.3 Sheppard told the police that he had last seen the victim on Tuesday night and that he had been at a local gaming house from 9 p. m. Friday until 5 a. m. Saturday.4 He identified several people who would substantiate the claim.5
By interviewing those people, the police learned that Sheppard had borrowed an automobile at about 3 o’clock Saturday morning to give two men a ride home.6 Sheppard did not return until nearly 5 a. m. even though the trip normally took only 15 minutes.7 On Sunday morning, police officers visited the owner of the car Sheppard had borrowed.8 The owner consented to an inspection of the vehicle.9 Bloodstains and pieces of hair were found on the rear bumper.10 Pieces of hair were also found within the trunk compartment.11 The officers noticed strands of wire in the trunk similar to wire strands found on and near the body of the victim.12 The owner stated that when he last used the car on Friday night, he had placed articles in the trunk and had not noticed any stains.13
Detective Peter O’Malley drafted an affidavit setting forth the investigation results.14 The affidavit requested authorization to search Sheppard’s residence for a fifth bottle of amaretto liquor, two nickel bags of marijuana, a woman’s jacket described as black-grey, possessions of Sandra D. Boulware, similar type wire and rope matching those on the body, a blunt instrument that might have been used on the victim, men’s or women’s clothing that may have blood or gasoline burns, and items that may have fingerprints of the victim.15 The affidavit was reviewed by the District Attorney, the first assistant, and a sergeant.16 All of them concluded it set forth probable cause.17 Because it was Sunday and the local court was closed, O’Malley found a warrant form previously used in the Dorchester District entitled “Search Warrant — Controlled Substance G. L. c. 276 §§1 through 3A.”18 He deleted the subtitle “controlled substance” with a typewriter.19 He substituted “Roxbury” for “Dorchester” and typed in Sheppard’s name and address.20 He did not delete the reference to “controlled substance” in the portion that would constitute the warrant itself.21
O’Malley took the affidavit and form to a judge’s residence.22 The judge examined the affidavit and stated he would authorize the search as requested.23 After O’Malley pointed out the form dealt with controlled substances and showed where he had crossed out subtitles, the judge said he would make the necessary changes.24 The judge made some changes, dated and signed the warrant, but did not change the substantive portion authorizing a search for controlled substances or incorporate the affidavit.25 The judge informed O’Malley the warrant was sufficient.26 O’Malley and other officers then searched Sheppard’s residence.27 They limited the scope to the items listed in the affidavit and discovered several incriminating pieces of evidence.28 Sheppard was charged with first-degree murder.29 At a pretrial suppression hearing, the trial judge concluded the warrant failed to particularly describe the items to be seized.30 The judge ruled the evidence admissible because the police had acted in good faith.31 Sheppard was convicted at trial.32 On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed the conviction, holding the evidence must be excluded.33 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.34
Whether the officers reasonably believed that the search they conducted was authorized by a valid warrant?35
The exclusionary rule should not be applied when the officer conducting the search acted in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate that subsequently is determined to be invalid.36
Yes. The officers in this case took every step that could reasonably be expected of them.37 Detective O’Malley prepared an affidavit which was reviewed and approved by the District Attorney.38 He presented that affidavit to a neutral judge.39 The judge concluded that the affidavit established probable cause to search Sheppard’s residence and informed O’Malley that he would authorize the search as requested.40 O’Malley then produced the warrant form and informed the judge that it might need to be changed.41 He was told by the judge that the necessary changes would be made.42 He then observed the judge make some changes and received the warrant and the affidavit.43 At this point, a reasonable police officer would have concluded, as O’Malley did, that the warrant authorized a search for the materials outlined in the affidavit.44
Sheppard contends that since O’Malley knew the warrant form was defective, he should have examined it to make sure that the necessary changes had been made.45 However, that argument is based on the premise that O’Malley had a duty to disregard the judge’s assurances that the requested search would be authorized and the necessary changes would be made.46 Whatever an officer may be required to do when he executes a warrant without knowing beforehand what items are to be seized, an officer is not required to disbelieve a judge who has just advised him, by word and by action, that the warrant he possesses authorizes him to conduct the search he has requested.47 In Massachusetts, as in most jurisdictions, the determinations of a judge acting within his jurisdiction, even if erroneous, are valid and binding until they are set aside under some recognized procedure.48 If an officer is required to accept at face value the judge’s conclusion that a warrant form is invalid, there is little reason why he should be expected to disregard assurances that everything is all right, especially when he has alerted the judge to the potential problems.49 In sum, the police conduct in this case clearly was objectively reasonable and largely error-free.50 An error of constitutional dimensions may have been committed with respect to the issuance of the warrant, but it was the judge, not the police officers, who made the critical mistake.51 Suppressing evidence because the judge failed to make all the necessary clerical corrections despite his assurances that such changes would be made will not serve the deterrent function that the exclusionary rule was designed to achieve.52