559 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 175 L. Ed. 2d 1045 (2010)
In August 2003, a social worker assigned to the Child Advocacy Center referred allegations that Michael Blaine Shatzer, Sr., who was then incarcerated at the Maryland Correctional Institution-Hagerstown serving a sentence for an unrelated child-sexual-abuse offense, had sexually abused his three-year-old son.1 Detective Shane Blankenship interviewed Shatzer at the correctional institution on August 7, 2003.2 After Blankenship reviewed Shatzer's Miranda rights and obtained a written waiver, Shatzer declined to speak without an attorney present when the detective explained the purpose of the visit.3 Blankenship ended the interview, Shatzer returned to the general prison population, and the investigation was closed shortly thereafter.4
Two years and six months later, the same social worker referred more specific allegations about the same incident.5 Detective Paul Hoover was assigned to the reopened investigation.6 Hoover and the social worker first interviewed the victim, then eight years old, who provided additional details.7 On March 2, 2006, they went to the Roxbury Correctional Institute, where Shatzer had been transferred, and interviewed him in a maintenance room.8 Hoover then read Shatzer his Miranda rights and obtained a written waiver on a standard department form.9 Hoover interrogated Shatzer about the incident for approximately 30 minutes.10 Shatzer denied ordering his son to perform fellatio but admitted to masturbating in front of his son from a distance of less than three feet.11 He also agreed to submit to a polygraph examination.12
Five days later, on March 7, 2006, Hoover and another detective administered the polygraph after again reading Shatzer his Miranda rights and obtaining a written waiver.13 After the examiner concluded that Shatzer had failed the test, the detectives questioned him further.14 Shatzer became upset, began to cry, and stated, "I didn't force him. I didn't force him." He then requested an attorney, and the interrogation ended.15 The State's Attorney for Washington County charged Shatzer with second-degree sexual offense, sexual child abuse, second-degree assault, and contributing to conditions rendering a child in need of assistance.16
Before trial, Shatzer moved to suppress his March 2006 statements.17 The trial court held a suppression hearing and denied the motion, reasoning that Shatzer had experienced a break in custody for Miranda purposes between the 2003 and 2006 interrogations.18 Shatzer pleaded not guilty, waived his right to a jury trial, and proceeded to a bench trial based on an agreed statement of facts.19 The trial court found him guilty of sexual child abuse of his son and sentenced him to thirty years' imprisonment, with all but fifteen years suspended.20 The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed and remanded.21 The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.22
Whether a break in Miranda custody lasting more than two weeks ends the Edwards presumption?23
The Edwards rule establishes a presumption that once a suspect invokes the right to counsel during custodial interrogation, any subsequent waiver during further police-initiated custodial interrogation is involuntary.24 This judicially crafted prophylactic rule is not a constitutional command and therefore may be modified when its benefits no longer outweigh its costs.25 The presumption terminates after a break in Miranda custody of fourteen days or more because that interval provides sufficient time for the suspect to return to normal life, consult with counsel or others, and dissipate the coercive pressures that Edwards was designed to prevent.26
Yes. Shatzer invoked his right to counsel during the August 2003 interview conducted by Detective Blankenship at the Maryland Correctional Institution-Hagerstown.27 After the invocation, the interview ended and Shatzer was released back into the general prison population.28 More than two years and six months later, Detective Hoover reopened the investigation and interviewed Shatzer at the Roxbury Correctional Institute on March 2, 2006, after obtaining a Miranda waiver.
That interval greatly exceeds the fourteen-day period that ends the Edwards presumption.29 Because the break in custody was of sufficient duration, the 2006 statements were not subject to suppression under Edwards.30
A break in Miranda custody lasting more than two weeks ends the Edwards presumption, rendering the 2006 statements admissible.31
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Thomas joined the portion of the opinion holding that release into the general prison population constitutes a break in custody.32 He declined to join the fourteen-day rule, however, because he believes the Edwards presumption itself lacks constitutional foundation and should not be extended beyond the original facts of Edwards.33 In his view, any judicially created prophylaxis must maintain the closest possible fit with Fifth Amendment interests, and the fourteen-day period fails that test because it is arbitrary and does not explain why fourteen days provides the closest possible fit with the Self-Incrimination Clause or why its benefits outweigh its costs.34
He would not extend the Edwards rule beyond the circumstances present in Edwards itself.
Joined by Justice Ginsburg And Justice Sotomayor As To Part I
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment that the two-and-one-half-year break rendered Edwards inapplicable.35 He rejected the bright-line fourteen-day rule, arguing that the duration necessary to dissipate coercive effects varies with the circumstances of each case.36 He emphasized that an indigent suspect who requests counsel and is later reapproached without counsel may reasonably conclude that the police have not honored their promise, thereby increasing rather than dissipating compulsion.37
A 14-day break does not eliminate the rationale for the initial Edwards rule because the detainee has been told that he may remain silent and speak only through a lawyer and that if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided for him.38
Whether a suspect's release back into the general prison population after an initial invocation of the right to counsel constitutes a break in Miranda custody?39
Miranda custody exists only when the suspect is subjected to the inherently compelling pressures of investigative interrogation in a police-dominated atmosphere.40 Lawful imprisonment imposed after conviction does not generate those pressures.41 When a previously interrogated suspect is released back into the general prison population, the suspect regains accustomed surroundings, daily routines, and a degree of control over life that severs the connection between continued detention and the prior refusal to cooperate, thereby ending Miranda custody for Edwards purposes.
Yes. After declining to speak without counsel in the 2003 interview, Shatzer was returned to the general prison population at the Maryland Correctional Institution-Hagerstown.42 He remained there until an unrelated transfer to the Roxbury Correctional Institute.43 In both facilities he could visit the library each week, have regular exercise and recreation periods, can participate in basic adult education and occupational training, are able to send and receive mail, and are allowed to receive visitors twice a week.
His continued incarceration after the 2003 interview did not depend on his cooperation with the investigation, and the former interrogator had no power to alter the length of his sentence.44 These facts establish that Shatzer had returned to normal prison life, ending the Miranda custody that Edwards protects against.45
Release back into the general prison population after an initial invocation constitutes a break in Miranda custody.46
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Thomas joined the holding that release into the general prison population ends Miranda custody for Edwards purposes.47 He maintained, however, that the underlying Edwards presumption should not be extended at all once custody terminates, because the presumption is not constitutionally required and any prophylactic extension must be narrowly tailored to Fifth Amendment concerns.48 The Court's 14-day rule fails to satisfy the criteria that judicially created prophylactic rules maintain the closest possible fit between the rule and the Fifth Amendment interests they seek to protect.49
Joined by Justice Ginsburg And Justice Sotomayor As To Part I
Justice Stevens agreed that the return to the general prison population in this case created a sufficient break in custody.50 He cautioned, however, that a prisoner's freedom is severely limited, and his entire life remains subject to government control.51 Such an environment is not conducive to shaking off any residual coercive effects of his prior custody.52
In his view, a long passage of time, rather than any fixed interval, is what ultimately reduces the risk that a suspect will feel his earlier request for counsel has been ignored, as neither a break in custody nor the passage of time has an inherent curative power.53