528 U.S. 152, 120 S. Ct. 684, 145 L. Ed. 2d 597 (2000)
Martinez describes himself as a self-taught paralegal with 25 years’ experience at 12 different law firms.1 While employed as an office assistant at a firm in Santa Ana, California, Martinez was accused of converting $6,000 of a client’s money to his own use.2 He was charged in a two-count information with grand theft and the fraudulent appropriation of the property of another.3
Martinez chose to represent himself at trial before a jury, because he claimed there wasn’t an attorney on earth who’d believe him once he saw his past criminal record.4 The jury acquitted him on Count 1, grand theft, but convicted him on Count 2, embezzlement.5 The jury also found that he had three prior convictions; accordingly, under California’s three strikes law, the court imposed a mandatory sentence of 25-years-to-life in prison.6
Martinez filed a timely notice of appeal as well as a motion to represent himself and a waiver of counsel.7 The California Court of Appeal denied his motion, and the California Supreme Court denied his application for a writ of mandate.8 While the California Supreme Court did not issue an opinion in this case, the Court of Appeal previously had explained its view that there is no constitutional right to self-representation on the initial appeal as of right.9
The Supreme Court granted certiorari because Martinez has raised a question on which both state and federal courts have expressed conflicting views.10
Whether the constitutional right to self-representation at trial extends to the stage of direct appeal from a criminal conviction?11
The Sixth Amendment right to self-representation at trial recognized in Faretta v. California does not extend to direct appeals from criminal convictions because the Sixth Amendment applies to criminal prosecutions and trials, appeals are a creature of statute, historical evidence does not support such a right on appeal, and due process does not require it given the state's strong interest in the fair and efficient administration of justice.12
No. Martinez, a self-taught paralegal with 25 years’ experience at 12 different law firms, was employed as an office assistant at a firm in Santa Ana, California, when he was accused of converting $6,000 of a client’s money to his own use.13 Charged with grand theft and embezzlement, he elected to represent himself at trial, citing distrust of any attorney who might learn of his criminal record.14 The jury acquitted him of grand theft but convicted him of embezzlement, and the court imposed a 25-years-to-life sentence under California’s three-strikes law after finding three prior convictions.15
Martinez filed a timely notice of appeal together with a motion to represent himself and a waiver of counsel.16 The California Court of Appeal denied the motion, and the California Supreme Court denied mandamus relief.17 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve conflicting lower-court decisions on whether the Faretta right extends to direct appeals.18
The Sixth Amendment right to self-representation at trial does not extend to direct appeals from criminal convictions.19 The Amendment’s text confines its protections to rights available in preparation for trial and at the trial itself, with no mention of appeal.20 Historical evidence supporting self-representation at trial arose when lawyers were scarce and often distrusted, yet no comparable tradition exists for appeals, which were nonexistent as of right in federal courts for the Nation’s first century and rare at common law.21 After conviction the presumption of innocence no longer applies, and the state’s overriding interest in the fair and efficient administration of appellate justice outweighs any remaining autonomy interest an appellant may assert in self-representation.22
The constitutional right to self-representation recognized in Faretta does not extend to the direct appeal from a criminal conviction.23
Related opinions on this issue
To resolve this case it is unnecessary to cast doubt upon the rationale of Faretta v. California.24 Faretta can be accepted as quite sound, yet it does not follow that a convicted person has a similar right of self-representation on appeal.25 Different considerations apply in the appellate system, and the Court explains why this is so.26
With these observations, Justice Kennedy joined the opinion of the Court.27
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment while defending the correctness of Faretta.28 He does not share the apparent skepticism of today’s opinion concerning the judgment of the Court in Faretta v. California.29 While he might have rested the decision upon the Due Process Clause rather than the Sixth Amendment, he believes it was correct.30
The Framers of our Constitution, who were suspicious enough of governmental power—including judicial power—that they insisted upon a citizen’s right to be judged by an independent jury of private citizens, would not have found acceptable the compulsory assignment of counsel by the government to plead a criminal defendant’s case. Because there is no constitutional right to appeal, a State may structure review as a nonadversarial reexamination of convictions by a panel of government experts.31 Adversarial review with counsel appointed by the State is even less questionable than that.32
Justice Breyer joined the opinion of the Court.33 Because Justice Scalia writes separately to underscore the continuing constitutional validity of Faretta v. California, Justice Breyer notes that judges closer to the firing line have sometimes expressed dismay about the practical consequences of that holding.34 He has found no empirical research that might help determine whether the right to represent oneself furthers or inhibits the Constitution’s basic guarantee of fairness.35
Without some strong factual basis for believing that Faretta’s holding has proved counterproductive in practice, there is no basis to reconsider the constitutional assumptions that underlie that case.36