283 Mass. 189, 186 N.E. 86
Helen A. Sullivan, a single woman approximately sixty-four years old who had worked as a school teacher, executed her will about ten days before her death.1 She always maintained her own home but her relations with her aunt who was her sole heir and with several first cousins were cordial and friendly.2 In the will, Sullivan gave general legacies in considerable sums to two of her first cousins.3 The residuary clause directed that the rest and residue of her estate go to her heirs at law living at the time of her decease, to be divided equally among them, with a proviso regarding the sale of real property.4
Approximately ten days before her death, Sullivan sent for an attorney while she was ill.5 She provided instructions for general pecuniary legacies and, when asked whom she wanted to leave the rest of her property to and who her nearest relations were, she replied that she had about twenty-five first cousins and wanted them to share it equally.6 The attorney drafted the will accordingly, read it to her, and she executed it.7 The will was duly proved and allowed on October 8, 1931, with letters testamentary issued.8
At the time of her death, Sullivan's sole heir at law was her maternal aunt, Frances Hawkes Greene, who was named in the petition for probate.9 The first cousins filed a petition in probate court seeking distribution of the legacy under the residuary clause to them.10 The probate court denied the petition.11 The trial judge reported material facts, including that statements by the testatrix were admissible only to show circumstances surrounding execution, and ruled there was no latent ambiguity permitting introduction of her statements to prove intent.12 The first cousins appealed from the decree dismissing their petition.13
Whether statements of the testatrix to her attorney are admissible to prove her testamentary intention when the will contains no latent ambiguity or equivocation?14
Oral testimony as to the meaning and purpose of a testator in using language must be rigidly excluded when the will has been proved and allowed.15 This exclusion applies unless the testamentary language is not clear in its application to facts.16 Where no doubt exists as to the identity of the beneficiary there is no room for extrinsic evidence.17 The will must stand as written.18
No. The words heirs at law living at the time of my decease as used in the residuary clause clearly refer alone to the aunt of the testatrix and do not include her cousins.19 This is so even though the plural heirs was employed and the clause directed equal division share and share alike.20 The trial judge correctly determined that the will itself contained no latent ambiguity or equivocation that would permit introduction of the testatrix's statements to the attorney about her twenty-five first cousins to prove a different testamentary intention.21
The statements of the testatrix to her attorney are not admissible to prove her testamentary intention to benefit her first cousins under the residuary clause.22
Whether a will duly executed and allowed may be reformed or altered to conform to the testatrix's oral instructions to the draftsman or to correct a mistake by the attorney who prepared it?23
A will duly executed and allowed by the court must under the statute of wills be accepted as the final expression of the intent of the person executing it.24 The fact that it was not in conformity to the instructions given to the draftsman who prepared it or that he made a mistake does not authorize a court to reform or alter it or remould it by amendments.25 The will must be construed as it came from the hands of the testatrix.26
No. The will was duly proved and allowed on October 8, 1931, with letters testamentary issued.27 The attorney drafted the residuary clause after receiving instructions that the first cousins should share the residue equally.28 Nevertheless, the executed will must be construed as it came from the hands of the testatrix without reformation to match those oral instructions or to correct any drafting mistake.29
A will duly executed and allowed may not be reformed or altered to conform to the testatrix's oral instructions to the draftsman or to correct a mistake by the attorney who prepared it.30