519 U.S. 102 (1996)
In June 1992, after a marriage that endured nearly eight years, M. L. B. and S. L. J. were divorced in Mississippi, and their two children—a boy born in April 1985 and a girl born in February 1987—remained in the father’s custody pursuant to their agreement at the time of the divorce.1
S. L. J. married J. P. J. in September 1992.2 In November 1993, S. L. J. and J. P. J. filed suit in the Chancery Court of Rankin County seeking to terminate M. L. B.’s parental rights and to gain court approval for adoption of the children by their stepmother, with the complaint alleging that M. L. B. had not maintained reasonable visitation and was in arrears on child support payments.3 M. L. B. counterclaimed for primary custody of both children, contending that S. L. J. had not permitted her reasonable visitation despite a provision in the divorce decree.4
After taking evidence on August 18, November 2, and December 12, 1994, the Chancellor issued a decree on December 14, 1994, that terminated all parental rights of the natural mother, approved the adoption, and ordered that J. P. J. be shown as the mother of the children on their birth certificates.5 The decree twice recited the governing Mississippi statute and declared that there had been a substantial erosion of the relationship between the natural mother and the minor children caused at least in part by M. L. B.’s serious neglect, abuse, prolonged and unreasonable absence or unreasonable failure to visit or communicate.6 The Chancellor stated without elaboration that the natural father and his second wife had met their burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence, though nothing in the order described the evidence or revealed precisely why M. L. B. was decreed a stranger to her children.7
In January 1995, M. L. B. filed a timely appeal and paid the $100 filing fee.8 Several days later the Clerk of the Chancery Court estimated the costs for preparing and transmitting the record at $2,352.36, consisting of $1,900 for the transcript of 950 pages at $2 per page, $438 for other documents comprising 219 pages at $2 per page, $4.36 for binders, and $10 for mailing.9 Mississippi grants civil litigants a right to appeal but conditions that right on prepayment of costs.10 Relevant portions of a transcript must be ordered and its preparation costs advanced by the appellant if the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by the evidence or is contrary to the evidence.11
Unable to pay the estimated costs, M. L. B. sought leave to appeal in forma pauperis.12 The Supreme Court of Mississippi denied her application in August 1995, stating under its precedent that the right to proceed in forma pauperis in civil cases exists only at the trial level.13 M. L. B. then sought review in the United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.14
Whether a State may, consistent with the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, condition appeals from trial court decrees terminating parental rights on the affected parent’s ability to pay record preparation fees?15
Under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, once a State provides a right to appellate review, it may not condition that right on an indigent parent's ability to prepay record preparation fees in parental termination cases.16 These proceedings implicate a fundamental parent-child interest of commanding importance and carry a quasi-criminal character that triggers the Griffin principle, as applied in Mayer, because the State initiates the action, appears as a party, and seeks an irrevocable severance of family bonds that is among the most severe forms of official action.17
No. The rule from Griffin and Mayer prohibits conditioning appellate access on ability to pay when fundamental interests are at stake in quasi-criminal proceedings, and that rule governs M.L.B.'s appeal from the Chancery Court termination decree.18 After the Chancellor found a substantial erosion of the parent-child relationship caused at least in part by M.L.B.'s serious neglect, abuse, prolonged absence, and unreasonable failure to visit or communicate, and declared the proof clear and convincing without describing the evidence, M.L.B. timely filed her appeal and paid the $100 filing fee.19
The Chancery Court Clerk then estimated record preparation costs at $2,352.36, consisting of $1,900 for the 950-page transcript, $438 for other documents, and minor additional charges.20 Because M.L.B. could not advance those costs, the Mississippi Supreme Court dismissed the appeal under its precedent limiting in forma pauperis relief in civil cases to the trial level.21 The parent-child relationship is an associational interest of basic importance that the Fourteenth Amendment shelters against unwarranted state intrusion, and termination works a unique, irrevocable deprivation far more precious than any property right.22
The State’s fiscal interest in reducing its record preparation costs does not justify the discriminatory burden placed on indigent parents. Nor does the State’s interest in encouraging prompt resolution of termination proceedings justify the fee requirement.23 The classification created by the prepayment requirement is both outrageously discriminatory and invidious.24 It fences out would-be appellants solely on the basis of inability to pay core costs in a proceeding where the State wields its awesome authority to destroy permanently all legal recognition of the parental relationship.25
Equal protection and due process concerns converge here. The equal protection strand addresses the legitimacy of excluding appellants on poverty grounds alone. The due process strand focuses on the essential fairness of proceedings that precede such severe state action.26 Because parental termination decrees are final and irreversible, and because the risk of error is considerable when the Chancellor provides no elaboration of the evidence, a transcript of sufficient completeness is necessary to permit proper appellate consideration.27 The State's fiscal interest, though legitimate in the mine run of civil cases, is unimpressive when measured against the stakes for an indigent parent facing permanent severance of family bonds.28
Mississippi may not condition M.L.B.'s appeal from the parental termination decree on prepayment of record preparation fees, because that requirement violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.29
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Kennedy concurs in the judgment on due process grounds alone.30 He observes that the cases most on point address procedures involving rights and privileges inherent in family and personal relations, citing Boddie, Lassiter, and Santosky, all resting exclusively on the Due Process Clause.31 Although the Constitution does not require an appeal even in criminal cases, given Mississippi's existing appellate structure, the realities of the litigation process, and the fundamental interests at stake in this proceeding, the State may not erect a bar in the form of transcript and filing costs beyond the petitioner's means.32
The fundamental interests the petitioner has in ensuring that the order terminating all her parental ties was based upon a fair assessment of the facts and the law supply a sufficient basis for the holding.33
Joined by Justice Scalia And, Except As To Part Ii, Chief Justice Rehnquist
Justice Thomas dissents, joined by Justice Scalia and, except as to Part II, by the Chief Justice.34 He contends that the majority extends the questionable Griffin line of cases too far into civil litigation.35 Due process does not require any appeal, and M.L.B. received all hearing-level protections required by Lassiter and Santosky, including notice, a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, representation by counsel, confrontation of evidence, and a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard.36
Under equal protection, Washington v. Davis requires purposeful discrimination rather than mere disparate impact on the poor. The transcript fee is a facially neutral rule that reasonably obliges appellants to bear the costs of a service the State is not constitutionally required to provide.37 The distinction between criminal and civil cases should be preserved, and extending Griffin to parental termination opens the door to free transcripts in custody, divorce, paternity, zoning, and foreclosure actions.38