369 U.S. 95 (1962)
The petitioner, Local 174 of the Teamsters union, and the respondent, Lucas Flour Company, entered into a collective bargaining contract that reserved to the employer the right to discharge employees whose work was unsatisfactory and that established two arbitration procedures for resolving differences.1
One arbitration clause covered differences as to the true interpretation of the agreement and required submission to a board of arbitration with a provision that there shall be no suspension of work during such arbitration.2 The second clause covered any difference arising between the employer and the employee and required submission to arbitration with a decision that would be final and binding.3
In May 1958 the employer discharged employee Welsch after he damaged a new fork-lift truck by running it off a loading platform and onto railroad tracks.4 A union business agent protested the discharge, was told that Welsch's work had been unsatisfactory, and the union then called a strike that lasted eight days.5
After the strike ended the discharge dispute was submitted to arbitration.6 Five months later the arbitration board ruled that Welsch's work had been unsatisfactory, that this was the reason for his discharge, and that he was not entitled to reinstatement.7
The employer filed suit against the union in the Superior Court of King County, Washington, seeking damages for business losses caused by the strike.8 After trial that court entered judgment for the employer in the amount of $6,501.60.9 Department One of the Supreme Court of Washington affirmed the judgment.10 The union did not file a petition for rehearing en banc.11 The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.12
Whether the judgment rendered by Department One of the Supreme Court of Washington is a final decision of the highest state court reviewable by the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257?13
Yes. The union could have filed a petition for rehearing en banc but did not do so.16 Washington law treats the department decision as final absent such a petition within thirty days.17 This system differs from the Missouri procedure that required rehearing as of right in federal question cases.18 The judgment rendered by Department One is therefore the final decision of the state's highest court and is reviewable under 28 U.S.C. § 1257.19
The judgment is properly before the Supreme Court for review.20
Whether section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 deprives state courts of jurisdiction over suits alleging breach of collective bargaining agreements?21
No. The employer's suit against the union for damages caused by the strike in breach of the collective bargaining contract falls squarely within the purview of section 301(a).2425 The pre-emption doctrine based on exclusive National Labor Relations Board jurisdiction therefore does not apply.26 The Washington court correctly exercised jurisdiction over the controversy.27
Section 301 does not deprive state courts of jurisdiction.28
Whether a state court may apply principles of local contract law rather than federal law when resolving a suit for breach of a collective bargaining agreement subject to section 301?29
No. The Washington court held that section 301 did not limit the substantive law to be applied and disposed of the litigation exclusively under local contract law.3233 The dimensions of section 301 require that issues in such suits be decided according to federal labor policy.34 Separate systems of substantive law would exert a disruptive influence on the negotiation and administration of collective agreements and strike at the core of federal labor policy promoting industrial peace through voluntary collective bargaining.35
A state court may not apply local contract law in such cases.36
Whether a strike called to protest an employee discharge constitutes a violation of a collective bargaining agreement that requires final and binding arbitration of the underlying dispute?37
A strike to settle a dispute which a collective bargaining agreement provides shall be settled exclusively and finally by compulsory arbitration constitutes a violation of the agreement.38 Holding otherwise would do violence to accepted principles of contract law and run counter to the basic policy of national labor legislation promoting arbitration as a substitute for economic warfare.39
Yes. The collective bargaining contract expressly imposed upon both parties the duty of submitting the dispute over Welsch's discharge to final and binding arbitration under the clause covering differences between the employer and the employee.40 The union called the strike to force the employer to rehire Welsch, thereby attempting to settle an arbitrable dispute through economic pressure rather than the agreed arbitration process.41 The subsequent arbitration confirmed that the discharge was for unsatisfactory work.42
A strike to settle a dispute which the agreement provides shall be settled exclusively by compulsory arbitration therefore constitutes a violation of the agreement.43
The strike constitutes a violation of the collective bargaining agreement.44
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Black dissented, arguing that the Court was rewriting the contract by implying a no-strike clause where none existed for this type of dispute.45 He noted that the contract contained an explicit no-suspension-of-work clause only for disputes over the true interpretation of the agreement, but deliberately omitted such a clause from the provision covering differences between employer and employee.46 The parties knew how to draft a no-strike promise and chose not to include one for employee grievances, and the record contains no evidence supporting an implied promise not to strike.47
Black contended that the decision imposes compulsory arbitration and undercuts the legislatively recognized right to strike, contrary to the Taft-Hartley Act's emphasis on voluntary agreements rather than court-imposed terms.48 He would reverse the judgment and relegate the controversy to the collective bargaining table.49