452 U.S. 1 (1981)
On May 21, 1975, appellee Gloria Streater gave birth to a daughter while unmarried.1 As a requirement stemming from her child's receipt of public assistance, she identified appellant Walter Little as the child's father to the Connecticut Department of Social Services.2 The Department then provided an attorney for Streater to bring a paternity suit against Little in the Court of Common Pleas at New Haven to establish his liability for the child's support.3
At the time the paternity action was commenced, Little was incarcerated in the Connecticut Correctional Institution at Enfield.4 Through counsel provided by a legal aid organization, Little moved the trial court to order blood grouping tests on Streater and the child.5 Little asserted that he was indigent, as shown by a financial affidavit listing weekly income of five dollars, expenses of five dollars, and no assets, and asked that the State be ordered to pay for the tests.6
The trial court granted the motion for blood grouping tests but denied the request that they be furnished at the State's expense.7 For financial reasons, no blood grouping tests were performed.8 The paternity action was tried to the court on September 28, 1978, where both Streater and Little testified.9
After listening to the testimony, the court found that Little was the child's father.10 Following a subsequent hearing on damages, the court entered judgment against Little in the amount of $6,974.48, which included lying-in expenses, accrued maintenance through October 31, 1978, costs of suit, and reasonable attorney's fees, and ordered him to pay child support at the rate of two dollars per month.11 The Appellate Session of the Connecticut Superior Court affirmed the trial court's judgment in a per curiam opinion.12 Little's petition for certification was denied by the Connecticut Supreme Court, and the U.S. Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.13
Whether a Connecticut statute, which provides that in paternity actions the cost of blood grouping tests is to be borne by the party requesting them, violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment when applied to deny such tests to indigent defendants?14
Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.15 Identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: first, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.16
Yes. The private interests implicated are substantial.17 Little faced both a substantial support obligation of $6,974.48 plus ongoing monthly payments and the creation of a parent-child relationship.18 The risk of erroneous deprivation was high.19 This stemmed from the absence of blood grouping tests, the mother's constancy in accusation creating a prima facie case that Little's testimony alone could not overcome, and Little's indigency and incarceration preventing him from obtaining the tests.20 The value of blood grouping tests as a safeguard is clear.21 They provide a high probability of excluding falsely accused men and are difficult to refute when properly conducted.22
The state's interest in avoiding the expense of the tests is not overriding.23 Federal reimbursement covers seventy-five percent of such costs under approved child support plans.24 Other states advance the costs to be taxed later.25
The application of the Connecticut statute to deny blood grouping tests to the indigent defendant violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.26