141 S. Ct. 2011 (2021)
This case began when petitioner Arthur Lange drove past a California Highway Patrol officer while playing loud music and repeatedly honking his horn.1 The officer followed Lange, activated his overhead lights to signal Lange to pull over, and Lange—about 100 feet from his home—drove into his driveway and into an attached garage.2 The officer followed into the garage, questioned Lange, observed signs of intoxication, administered field sobriety tests, and later a blood test showed Lange's blood-alcohol content was more than three times the legal limit.3
The State charged Lange with misdemeanor driving under the influence and a noise infraction.4 Lange moved to suppress the evidence obtained after the officer entered his garage.5
The Superior Court denied the motion and an intermediate appellate division affirmed.6 The California Court of Appeal also affirmed.7 The California Supreme Court denied review.8
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split among courts over whether pursuit of fleeing misdemeanants always permits warrantless home entry.9 Because California abandoned the categorical rule below, the Court appointed an amicus to defend the Court of Appeal's judgment.10
Whether the pursuit of a fleeing misdemeanor suspect always—or categorically—qualifies as an exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless entry into a home?11
The Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires that police officers obtain a warrant before entering a home without permission, but an officer may make a warrantless entry when the exigencies of the situation create a compelling law-enforcement need.12 The question presented is whether the pursuit of a fleeing misdemeanor suspect always—or categorically—qualifies as such an exigency.13 The Court holds that it does not: whether a misdemeanor pursuit justifies a warrantless home entry depends on the particular facts of the case.14
No. The established facts show that Lange was charged only with misdemeanors and that the officer's entry occurred during pursuit after Lange failed to stop his vehicle.15 The lower courts applied a categorical rule permitting warrantless entry whenever a misdemeanant flees.16 Fourth Amendment precedent requires a case-by-case assessment of the totality of the circumstances to determine whether an emergency justifies dispensing with a warrant.17
The pursuit of a fleeing misdemeanor suspect does not always—or categorically—qualify as an exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless entry into a home.18
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Kavanaugh joined the Court's opinion.19 He also joined Part II of Justice Thomas's concurrence regarding how the exclusionary rule should apply to hot-pursuit cases.20 He wrote separately to underscore that in practice there will be little difference between the Court's approach and the Chief Justice's opinion concurring in the judgment.21
In most cases of pursuit of a fleeing misdemeanant, recognized exigencies such as risk of escape, destruction of evidence, or harm to others will be present and will continue to permit warrantless entry.22 The Court's opinion also does not disturb the long-settled rule that pursuit of a fleeing felon is itself an exigency justifying warrantless entry into a home.23
Joined by Justice Kavanaugh
Justice Thomas joined the majority opinion except for Part II-A.24 He wrote separately to note two points.25 History suggests several categorical exceptions to the general case-by-case rule the Court announces.26
For example, at common law warrantless entry was categorically allowed when a person who had been arrested escaped and sheltered himself in a house, and authorities also allowed warrantless entry for pursuits involving affrays or certain pre-felonious conduct.27 Even if a state court on remand concludes the officer's entry here was unlawful, the federal exclusionary rule does not necessarily require suppression of evidence.28 The exclusionary rule is a judicially created prudential doctrine with substantial costs, and in cases involving fleeing suspects, exclusion would often produce bad incentives and high costs.29
Joined by Justice Alito
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Alito, concurred in the judgment.30 He agreed that the California Court of Appeal's categorical rule must be rejected.31 However, he disagreed with the Court's categorical holding that flight alone can never justify warrantless entry into a home.32
Hot pursuit has long been treated as an exigency, and precedent has repeatedly recognized that police may enter premises without a warrant when they are in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect.33 The majority's rule requires an officer to stop and assess whether the underlying offense was a misdemeanor or felony and to tally other exigencies before completing an arrest.34 This approach can be dangerous and unworkable in practice.35
He would vacate and remand to allow the state courts to determine whether the circumstances at issue here fall within the kinds of pursuit-based exceptions that have long been recognized.36