386 U.S. 213 (1967)
Petitioner Peter Klopfer, a professor of zoology at Duke University, was indicted by the grand jury of Orange County on February 24, 1964, for criminal trespass.1 The bill charged that on January 3, 1964, he entered a restaurant and, after being ordered to leave the premises, wilfully and unlawfully refused to do so.2 The misdemeanor was punishable by fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court.3 Prosecution on the indictment began with admirable promptness during the March 1964 Special Criminal Session of the Superior Court of Orange County.
When the jury failed to reach a verdict, the trial judge declared a mistrial and ordered the case continued for the term.4 Several weeks prior to the April 1965 Criminal Session of the Superior Court, the State's solicitor informed petitioner of his intention to have a nolle prosequi with leave entered in the case.5 During the session, petitioner through his attorney opposed the entry of such an order in open court, contending that the trespass charge was abated by the Civil Rights Act of 1964.6 In spite of petitioner's opposition, the court indicated that it would approve entry if requested, but the solicitor declined and instead filed a motion to continue the case for yet another term, which was granted.7
The calendar for the August 1965 Criminal Session did not list Klopfer's case for trial.8 To ascertain the status, petitioner filed a motion expressing his desire to have the charge pending against him permanently concluded as soon as reasonably possible.9 Noting that some 18 months had elapsed since the indictment, petitioner contended that the pendency greatly interfered with his professional activities and with his travel here and abroad.10 In response, on Monday, August 9, 1965, the trial judge considered the status in open court, at which time the solicitor moved that the State be permitted to take a nolle prosequi with leave, and the court granted the motion even though no justification was offered and despite petitioner's objection.11
On appeal to the Supreme Court of North Carolina, petitioner contended that the entry deprived him of his right to a speedy trial.12 The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the order.13
Whether a State may indefinitely postpone prosecution on an indictment without stated justification over the objection of an accused who has been discharged from custody?14
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to a speedy trial, a fundamental protection with deep roots in English common law and colonial American practice that applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.15 This right prohibits a state from indefinitely postponing prosecution on an indictment without stated justification when the accused objects and remains subject to the cloud of the unresolved charge.16
Yes. Petitioner Klopfer, a professor of zoology at Duke University, was indicted on February 24, 1964, for criminal trespass after entering a restaurant on January 3, 1964, and refusing to leave when ordered.17 Prosecution began promptly at the March 1964 term, but a mistrial led to continuation.18
After the solicitor announced plans for a nolle prosequi with leave and Klopfer objected on Civil Rights Act grounds at the April 1965 session, the court granted a further continuance instead.19 At the August 1965 session, with no justification offered and over Klopfer's renewed objection that the pending charge interfered with his professional activities and travel, the trial court entered the nolle prosequi with leave.20 This left the indictment active indefinitely, exposing Klopfer to public scorn, employment risks, and curtailment of speech and associations without any mechanism for dismissal or forced trial.21 The procedure therefore denied the speedy trial right secured by the Sixth Amendment.22
The judgment of the Supreme Court of North Carolina must be reversed because the nolle prosequi with leave procedure violated Klopfer's right to a speedy trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.23
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stewart concurred in the result.24 Although he did not elaborate on his reasoning, this concurrence supports the reversal of the North Carolina Supreme Court's judgment affirming the procedure.25 The concurrence is consistent with the view that the procedure used in the case was invalid.26
Justice Stewart joined the Court in its decision regarding the petitioner's right to a speedy trial under the circumstances presented.27
Justice Harlan concurred in the result.28 He was unable to subscribe to the constitutional premises upon which that result is based.29 He rejected the viewpoint that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates or absorbs as such all or some of the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights.30
Harlan did not believe that this is sound constitutional doctrine.31 He would rest decision of this case not on the speedy trial provision of the Sixth Amendment.32 Instead, he grounded the decision on the ground that this unusual North Carolina procedure violates the requirement of fundamental fairness assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.33
To support that conclusion he referred only to the traditional concepts of due process set forth in the opinion of the Chief Justice.34