133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013)
Petitioners were residents of Ogoniland, an area of 250 square miles located in the Niger delta area of Nigeria and populated by roughly half a million people.1
In the early 1990s, residents of Ogoniland began protesting the environmental effects of oil exploration and production by Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, Ltd.2 Nigerian military and police forces attacked Ogoni villages, beating, raping, killing, and arresting residents while destroying or looting property.3 Petitioners allege that respondents Royal Dutch Petroleum Company, a Dutch holding company, Shell Transport and Trading Company, a British holding company, and their Nigerian subsidiary aided and abetted these acts by providing food, transportation, compensation, and allowing the military to use respondents' property as a staging ground for the attacks.4
Following the alleged atrocities, petitioners moved to the United States where they have been granted political asylum and now reside as legal residents.5 They filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against the corporate respondents under the Alien Tort Statute, alleging that the corporations aided and abetted the Nigerian government in committing extrajudicial killings, crimes against humanity, torture and cruel treatment, arbitrary arrest and detention, violations of the rights to life, liberty, security, and association, forced exile, and property destruction.6
The District Court dismissed the claims for extrajudicial killings, violations of the rights to life, liberty, security, and association, forced exile, and property destruction, but denied dismissal of the remaining claims and certified its order for interlocutory appeal.7 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed the entire complaint on the ground that the law of nations does not recognize corporate liability.8 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, directed the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing whether and under what circumstances the Alien Tort Statute allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States, heard reargument, and affirmed the judgment below.9
Whether the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the Alien Tort Statute?10
The presumption against extraterritoriality governs claims under the Alien Tort Statute because the statute provides no clear indication of extraterritorial reach and serves to protect against unintended clashes between U.S. laws and those of other nations.11
Yes. The Court applied the presumption against extraterritoriality to the Alien Tort Statute in this case because nothing in the statute's text rebuts the presumption.12 The claims arose entirely from conduct within Nigeria, where Nigerian military and police forces attacked Ogoni villages with alleged corporate aid from the Dutch, British, and Nigerian respondents, and the statute's jurisdictional grant does not clearly indicate that it reaches such foreign conduct.13
The presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the Alien Tort Statute.14
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Justice Kennedy agreed with the disposition but noted that the Court's opinion leaves open significant questions regarding the reach and interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute.15 In his view, many serious concerns with respect to human rights abuses committed abroad have been addressed by Congress in statutes such as the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991.16 Other cases may arise with allegations of serious violations of international law principles protecting persons.17
Those cases are covered neither by the TVPA nor by the reasoning and holding of this case.18 In those disputes, the proper implementation of the presumption against extraterritorial application may require some further elaboration and explanation.19
Whether the text, history, or purposes of the Alien Tort Statute rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality?20
Nothing in the text, history, or purposes of the Alien Tort Statute rebuts the presumption against extraterritoriality because generic terms like any civil action do not indicate extraterritorial reach and historical examples involved conduct within the United States.21
No. The statute's text reaches any civil action, but generic terms such as any do not rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality.2223 Historical examples of violations of safe conducts and ambassador rights occurred within the United States.24 The offense of piracy on the high seas does not impose the sovereign will of the United States within the territory of another sovereign nation.25
The text, history, or purposes of the Alien Tort Statute do not rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality.26
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Joined by Justice Thomas
Justice Alito concurred in the judgment and joined the opinion of the Court as far as it goes.27 He agreed that when Alien Tort Statute claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.28 In his view, the presumption against extraterritorial application would be a craven watchdog indeed if it retreated to its kennel whenever some domestic activity is involved in the case.29
A putative ATS cause of action will fall within the scope of the presumption against extraterritoriality.30 It will therefore be barred unless the domestic conduct is sufficient to violate an international law norm that satisfies Sosa's requirements of definiteness and acceptance among civilized nations.31
Whether claims under the Alien Tort Statute for violations of the law of nations occurring abroad must touch and concern the territory of the United States with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality?32
Even where claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application, and mere corporate presence does not suffice because corporations are often present in many countries.33
Yes. Petitioners' claims do not displace the presumption against extraterritorial application because all relevant conduct occurred outside the United States in Nigeria.34 The foreign corporate respondents' minimal New York office maintained for investor relations provides an insufficient connection to the United States.35 It would reach too far to conclude that mere corporate presence suffices to displace the presumption.36
Claims under the Alien Tort Statute for violations occurring abroad must touch and concern the United States with sufficient force to displace the presumption.37
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Joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, And Kagan
Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment but not in the Court's reasoning that invoked the presumption against extraterritoriality.38 In his view, the statute permits the exercise of jurisdiction where the alleged tort occurs on American soil, the defendant is an American national, or the defendant's conduct substantially and adversely affects an important American national interest, and that includes a distinct interest in preventing the United States from becoming a safe harbor for a torturer or other common enemy of mankind.39 The parties and relevant conduct in this case lack sufficient ties to the United States for the ATS to provide jurisdiction.40
The defendants are foreign corporations whose only presence consists of an office in New York City that helps explain their business to potential investors.41 The plaintiffs are not United States nationals.42 The conduct at issue took place abroad.43
The plaintiffs allege that the defendants helped others who are not American nationals to commit the acts.44