477 U.S. 365 (1986)
Respondent Neil Morrison was convicted by the State of New Jersey of raping a 15-year-old girl.1 The case presented by the State at respondent's bench trial consisted of scientific evidence and of the testimony of the victim, her mother, and the police officers who handled the victim's complaint.2
The victim testified that Morrison, who was her employer, had taken her to his apartment, where he forced her onto his bed and raped her.3 Upon returning home, the girl related the incident to her mother, who, after first summoning Morrison and asking for his account of events, phoned the police.4 The police came to the victim's home and transported her to the hospital, where she was examined and tested for indicia of a sexual assault.5
Detective Dolores Most testified that she accompanied the victim to Morrison's apartment building a few hours after the rape.6 Morrison was not at home, but another tenant in the building let them into respondent's one-room apartment.7 While there, Most stated, she seized a sheet from respondent's bed.8 At trial, when the State sought to introduce the sheet, defense counsel objected on the ground that it had been seized without a search warrant, but the trial judge ruled the motion late under New Jersey Court Rules requiring suppression motions within 30 days of indictment.9
Defense counsel explained that he had not heard of the seizure until the day before trial and that his client could not have known of it because the police had not left a receipt for the sheet.10 The prosecutor responded that defense counsel had never asked for any discovery.11 One month before trial the prosecutor had sent defense counsel a copy of the laboratory report concerning the tests conducted on stains and hairs found on the sheets.12 The judge found counsel remiss for failing to conduct discovery and refused to entertain the motion to suppress in the middle of the trial.13
The State called expert witnesses who testified that the bedsheet had been stained with semen from a man with type O blood, that the defendant had type O blood, and that hairs recovered from the sheet were morphologically similar to head hair of both Morrison and the victim.14 The defense called four friends and acquaintances of the defendant, and the defendant himself, in an attempt to establish that the girl and her mother fabricated the rape to punish respondent for being delinquent with the girl's wages.15
After trial, respondent dismissed his attorney and retained new counsel for his appeal.16 On appeal, respondent alleged ineffective assistance of counsel and error in the trial court's refusal to entertain the suppression motion during trial, but the appeals court affirmed the conviction.17 Respondent then sought postconviction relief, which was denied, and subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Federal District Court.18 The District Court found the ineffective-assistance claim meritorious and issued a conditional writ.19 The Court of Appeals addressed the relationship to Stone v. Powell and remanded for further consideration of prejudice under Strickland v. Washington.20 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.21
Whether the restrictions on federal habeas review of Fourth Amendment claims announced in Stone v. Powell should be extended to Sixth Amendment claims of ineffective assistance of counsel where the principal allegation of inadequate representation is counsel's failure to file a timely suppression motion?22
Stone v. Powell restricts federal habeas review of Fourth Amendment claims where the state provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation because the exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy with limited utility on collateral review.23 In contrast the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel is a fundamental personal right that ensures the fairness of the trial.24 Claims of ineffective assistance are distinct from underlying Fourth Amendment claims.25
No. The established facts show that Morrison's claim is that his counsel failed to conduct discovery and file a timely suppression motion.26 This is a Sixth Amendment claim requiring proof of deficient performance and prejudice under Strickland.27 The facts establish that the claim is not merely an attempt to litigate the Fourth Amendment claim but a distinct allegation of counsel's incompetence that deprived him of effective representation.28
The restrictions announced in Stone v. Powell should not be extended to such Sixth Amendment claims.29
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Joined by The Chief Justice And Justice Rehnquist
Justice Powell concurred in the judgment.30 He agreed that Stone does not bar the ineffective assistance claim because the right to effective counsel is personal and tied to a fair trial.31 The claim must be judged under Strickland standards and not as a Fourth Amendment claim.32
Powell raised the question whether admission of reliable but illegally seized evidence can ever constitute prejudice under Strickland.33 He suggested it may not because such admission does not render the trial fundamentally unfair.34 Powell left the issue for another day since it was not raised by the parties.35
Whether respondent satisfied the performance prong of the test for ineffective assistance of counsel?36
Under Strickland v. Washington to establish ineffective assistance the defendant must show that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.37 There is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.38 Counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.39
Yes. The established facts demonstrate that Morrison's trial counsel failed to conduct any pretrial discovery.40 Counsel was unaware of the seizure of the bedsheet until the day before trial.41 Counsel offered implausible justifications such as believing the State was obligated to turn over evidence without a request.42 This complete lack of investigation was not strategic but based on mistaken beliefs about discovery obligations.43 The performance fell below the standard of reasonable professional assistance.44
Respondent satisfied the performance prong by showing that counsel's representation was constitutionally deficient.45
Whether respondent satisfied the prejudice prong of the test for ineffective assistance of counsel?46
No. The established facts indicate that no evidentiary hearing has been held on the merits of the Fourth Amendment claim.50 The State has not conceded the illegality of the search.51 The record is incomplete with respect to whether there is a reasonable probability that the trial judge would have had a reasonable doubt as to guilt absent the bedsheet evidence.52 The trial judge's comments at the bail hearing do not constitute a finding that the sheet was not outcome-determinative.53
Respondent has not yet satisfied the prejudice prong on the current record and the case was properly remanded for further consideration.54
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by The Chief Justice And Justice Rehnquist
Justice Powell noted that there is a strong argument that the admission of illegally seized but reliable evidence cannot constitute prejudice under Strickland.55 Such admission does not affect the fundamental fairness of the trial because the exclusionary rule is not about reliability but deterrence.56 He suggested that the harm is the absence of a windfall rather than an unjust verdict.57
Powell concurred in the judgment without resolving the issue since it was not presented by the parties.58