482 U.S. 730, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 96 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1987)
Sergio Stincer was indicted in the Circuit Court of Christian County, Kentucky, and charged with committing first-degree sodomy with T. G., an 8-year-old girl, N. G., a 7-year-old girl, and B. H., a 5-year-old boy, in violation of Ky. Rev. Stat. § 510.070 (1985).1 Prior to the competency hearing the prosecutor moved to dismiss the charge involving B. H. because the prosecution did not believe the boy was competent to testify, and the court granted the motion after Stincer raised no objection.2
After a jury was sworn but before the presentation of evidence, the trial court conducted an in-chambers hearing to determine whether T. G. and N. G. were competent to testify.3 Over Stincer's objection the court excluded him from the hearing while permitting his counsel to remain and participate in questioning the children. The judge, the prosecutor, and defense counsel questioned each girl separately about her age, date of birth, school, Sunday school, and ability to distinguish truth from falsehood and to keep a promise to tell the truth, after which the court ruled that both girls were competent to testify and defense counsel did not object to those rulings.
At trial the prosecutor repeated some of the background questions on direct examination before each girl described the alleged incidents, with T. G. testifying that Stincer had placed a sock over her eyes, given her chocolate pudding, and committed the charged act while N. G. gave a similar account.4 Defense counsel cross-examined both girls with questions that overlapped those asked at the competency hearing concerning memory and truth-telling, yet after the testimony concluded counsel did not move for reconsideration of the competency rulings. The jury convicted Stincer of first-degree sodomy and fixed his sentence at twenty years' imprisonment.5
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, Stincer argued that his exclusion from the competency hearing violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment and the Kentucky Constitution, and the Kentucky Supreme Court by a divided vote reversed the conviction on the ground that the hearing was a crucial phase of the trial. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the federal constitutional questions.6
Whether the exclusion of a defendant from a hearing held to determine the competency of two child witnesses to testify violates the defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment?7
The Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause guarantees a criminal defendant the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. This protection extends to state proceedings and centers on ensuring an opportunity for effective cross-examination to test witness credibility and promote reliability in the factfinding process.8
No. The competency hearing in this case did not interfere with Sergio Stincer's opportunity for effective cross-examination of T. G. and N. G.
Both girls appeared and testified at trial in his presence after the jury was sworn. Defense counsel conducted full cross-examination that repeated questions about their backgrounds, memory, and ability to distinguish truth from falsehood.9 Stincer remained available throughout the trial testimony to assist his counsel. Kentucky law permitted counsel to move for reconsideration of the competency rulings after direct and cross-examination if new information emerged.10
The questions posed at the in-chambers hearing were limited to basic matters such as age, school, and moral obligation to tell the truth under the Moore v. Commonwealth standard. Counsel could and did replicate those matters at trial without any state rule or court order restricting the scope of examination.11
The exclusion of Stincer from the competency hearing did not violate his rights under the Confrontation Clause.12
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Marshall dissented on the ground that the Confrontation Clause secures more than a later opportunity for cross-examination. It instead guarantees the defendant's physical presence at any testimonial proceeding such as the competency hearing. Under Kentucky law the judge was required to assess the witnesses' capacity to observe, recollect, and truthfully narrate facts.13
He emphasized that the defendant often possesses unique knowledge about the children that counsel lacks. This knowledge allows immediate correction of inaccuracies before the witnesses receive the court's imprimatur of competency and testify before the jury.14 Marshall further noted that the exclusion undermined the symbolic goals of fairness.
It created the appearance that key prosecution witnesses conferred privately with the judge and prosecutor. He warned that the ruling forces defendants into an untenable choice between exercising the right to counsel and appearing pro se to attend such hearings.15
Whether the exclusion of a defendant from a hearing held to determine the competency of two child witnesses to testify violates the defendant's rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?16
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure. Presence is not required when it would be useless or the benefit merely a shadow.17
No. Stincer's presence at the competency hearing would not have contributed to the fairness of the proceeding or produced a more reliable competency determination. The hearing involved no questions about the substance of the girls' upcoming trial testimony. Instead it focused solely on their ability to recollect facts, distinguish truth from falsehood, and understand the moral obligation to tell the truth.18 Stincer offered no indication or evidence that his relationship with the children or knowledge of their backgrounds could have assisted counsel or the judge in formulating better questions.
The record shows he could have done nothing additional had he attended.19
The exclusion of Stincer from the competency hearing did not violate his rights under the Due Process Clause.20
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Marshall would have held that due process independently requires the defendant's presence at every critical stage of trial, including the competency hearing. The hearing bore a reasonably substantial relation to the defense by determining whether key witnesses would testify at all.21 He argued that evaluating the exclusion only after reviewing what occurred in the defendant's absence improperly converts the question into harmless-error analysis.
It wrongly shifts the burden to the excluded defendant to prove harm. This approach is contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment's protection against presuming that involuntary exclusion from a critical stage is harmless.22