534 U.S. 407 (2002)
In 1993 Michael Crane committed two sexual offenses on the same day.1 In the first he exposed himself to a tanning salon attendant.2 In the second, thirty minutes later, he entered a video store, waited until he was the only customer present, and then exposed himself to the clerk.3 He grabbed her by the neck, demanded she perform oral sex on him, and threatened to rape her before running out of the store.4
Following his conviction for lewd and lascivious behavior and guilty plea to aggravated sexual battery, the State of Kansas filed a petition in state district court.5 The petition sought to have Crane evaluated and adjudicated a sexual predator under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act.6
Several psychologists examined Crane and determined that he suffers from exhibitionism and antisocial personality disorder.7 One psychologist concluded that the combination of these conditions placed Crane within the range of disorders covered by the Act.8 That expert cited the increasing frequency and intensity of incidents, his increasing disregard for the rights of others, and his increasing daring and aggressiveness.9 Another psychologist testified that Crane's behavior was marked by impulsivity or failure to plan ahead.10 That testimony indicated his unlawfulness was a combination of willful and uncontrollable behavior.11 The State's experts agreed, however, that Crane's mental disorder does not impair his volitional control to the degree that he cannot control his dangerous behavior.12
After a jury trial the Kansas District Court ordered Crane's civil commitment.13 The Kansas Supreme Court reversed that order.14 In the Kansas Supreme Court's view, the Federal Constitution requires a finding that the defendant cannot control his dangerous behavior, even if problems of emotional capacity rather than volitional capacity prove the source of the bad behavior warranting commitment.15 The trial court had made no such finding.16
Whether the Kansas Supreme Court misinterpreted the decision in Kansas v. Hendricks by requiring a finding that a dangerous sexual offender is completely unable to control his behavior before civil commitment?17
Hendricks held that a mental abnormality or personality disorder satisfies substantive due process when it makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behavior, without demanding proof of total or absolute lack of control.18
Yes. The Kansas Supreme Court read Hendricks to require a finding that the defendant cannot control his dangerous behavior even when emotional rather than volitional impairment is the source of the conduct warranting commitment.19 The established facts show that psychologists diagnosed Crane with exhibitionism and antisocial personality disorder. One expert cited increasing frequency, intensity, disregard for others, and aggressiveness. Another noted impulsivity indicating a mix of willful and uncontrollable behavior. Yet all agreed the disorder does not impair volitional control to the degree that Crane cannot control his dangerous behavior. The trial court ordered commitment under the statutory criteria after a jury trial. The Kansas Supreme Court reversed solely for lack of an absolute-control finding. This interpretation is erroneous because the Hendricks opinion used the word difficult to signal that the required lack of control is not absolute.20 Insistence on complete inability would bar commitment of severely mentally abnormal but still dangerous persons.21
The established facts further demonstrate that the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Crane met the Act's definition of a sexual predator based on his mental abnormality or personality disorder making repeat sexual violence likely.22 Applying the correct Hendricks standard, these facts support commitment because they establish serious difficulty in controlling behavior when viewed alongside the nature of the psychiatric diagnoses and the severity of the abnormality.23
The Kansas Supreme Court misinterpreted Hendricks by imposing a requirement of complete inability to control behavior.24
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Thomas
Justice Scalia dissented and would have reversed the Kansas Supreme Court outright.25 He maintained that Hendricks already held the statutory finding of a mental abnormality or personality disorder causing likelihood of recidivism itself establishes the requisite difficulty if not impossibility of control.26 Any separate lack-of-control determination is therefore unnecessary.27
In his view the SVPA as written distinguishes civilly committable offenders from ordinary recidivists because their mental condition, not mere choice, produces the likelihood of reoffense.28 The jury's finding that Crane suffered from exhibitionism combined with antisocial personality disorder satisfied all constitutional demands.29
Whether the Constitution requires proof of a serious lack of ability to control behavior before a dangerous sexual offender may be civilly committed under a statute like the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act?30
The Constitution requires proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior, considered in light of the psychiatric diagnosis and the severity of the mental abnormality, sufficient to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender subject to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist dealt with through criminal proceedings.31
Yes. The established facts establish that Crane was previously convicted of lewd and lascivious behavior and aggravated sexual battery after committing two offenses on the same day in 1993.32 Psychologists found exhibitionism and antisocial personality disorder with increasing daring and aggressiveness.33 The jury determined beyond a reasonable doubt he was a sexual predator under the Act.34 These facts, when combined with the nature of the diagnoses, supply the serious difficulty in controlling behavior required by due process.35 The distinction from ordinary recidivists is maintained because the mental abnormality is what produces the likelihood of future offenses rather than simple choice amenable to deterrence.36
Without such proof the civil commitment scheme would risk becoming a mechanism for retribution or general deterrence.37 Those functions belong exclusively to the criminal law.38 The facts here satisfy the constitutional minimum because the experts' testimony regarding impulsivity, increasing intensity, and the combination of disorders demonstrates serious difficulty when assessed against the severity of the abnormality.39
The Constitution requires proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior for such civil commitments.40
Whether the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act may constitutionally be applied to commit an individual whose mental abnormality involves emotional impairment rather than volitional impairment?41
Hendricks did not draw a clear distinction between emotional and volitional impairments for constitutional purposes, and civil commitment statutes have not ordinarily been required to differentiate among volitional, emotional, and cognitive impairments.42
No. The Court concluded it had no occasion to decide whether confinement based solely on emotional abnormality would be constitutional because the present case, like Hendricks, did not require resolution of that question.43 The established facts show Crane was diagnosed with both exhibitionism and antisocial personality disorder.44 Those conditions may involve overlap between emotional and volitional elements.45 The jury found the statutory criteria satisfied without any separate volitional finding.46 Hendricks itself repeatedly recognized that the Act reaches personality disorders.47 It quoted the definition embracing both emotional and volitional impairments.48 Yet the Court upheld the statute without according legal significance to the distinction.49
The established facts therefore permit application of the Act on the basis of the jury's finding that the disorders made repeat acts of sexual violence likely.50 No proof of a purely volitional impairment is required.51
The Court did not resolve whether the Act may be applied solely on the basis of emotional impairment.52
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Thomas
Justice Scalia argued that the question was already closed by Hendricks.53 He noted that the jury in Hendricks had been instructed in the language of the statute covering emotional as well as volitional impairments.54 The Court had explicitly recognized the Act reaches personality disorders.55
The narrowest holding of Hendricks affirmed the constitutionality of commitment on the basis of the statutory charge without any volitional requirement.56 In his view there is no sound constitutional basis for distinguishing among types of impairments.57 A person with a will of steel but delusional beliefs about sexual invitations remains a dangerous sexual predator unfit for release.58