308 U.S. 433 (1940)
In March 1933 mortgagees began foreclosure proceedings on appellants' farm in the Walworth County Court in Wisconsin.1 Judgment of foreclosure was entered April 21, 1933.2 On July 20, 1935 the sheriff sold the property under the judgment.3
On October 2, 1934 appellant Ernest Newton Kalb filed a petition for composition and extension of time to pay debts under section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act in the bankruptcy court, and the petition was approved.4 The petition was dismissed June 27, 1935 but reinstated September 6, 1935 pursuant to the second Frazier-Lemke Act.5 On September 16, 1935 while the petition remained pending the Walworth County Court granted the mortgagees' motion for confirmation of the sheriff's sale.6 No stay of the foreclosure or of the subsequent action to enforce it was ever sought or granted in the state or bankruptcy court.7
On December 16, 1935 the mortgagees who had purchased at the sheriff's sale obtained a writ of assistance from the state court.8 On March 12, 1936 the sheriff executed the writ by ejecting appellants and their family from the mortgaged farm.9
After ejection appellants brought an action in equity in the Circuit Court of Walworth County against the mortgagees for restoration of possession, cancellation of the sheriff's deed and removal of the mortgagees from the farm.10 Demurrer was sustained for failure to state a cause of action and the complaint was dismissed; the Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed.11 Appellant Ernest Newton Kalb also filed a suit at law in the state court against the mortgagees, the sheriff and the County Court judge seeking damages for conspiracy to deprive him of possession, for assault and battery and for false imprisonment.12 Demurrer was sustained, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed, and the appeals reached the Supreme Court of the United States.13
Whether the Wisconsin County Court had jurisdiction, while the petition under the Frazier-Lemke Act was pending in the bankruptcy court, to confirm the sheriff's sale and order appellants dispossessed?14
Congress, exercising its plenary power over bankruptcy, may by specific legislation such as the Frazier-Lemke Act deprive state courts of all jurisdiction over a petitioning farmer-debtor and the debtor's property, rendering any state-court actions taken without bankruptcy-court consent nullities.15
No. On September 16, 1935, while appellant Ernest Newton Kalb's petition remained pending in the bankruptcy court after its reinstatement on September 6, 1935, the Walworth County Court granted confirmation of the sheriff's sale.16 The Act's subsections (n), (o), and (p) expressly subject the farmer and all property to the exclusive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court from the moment of filing and prohibit any court from maintaining foreclosure proceedings, confirming a sale, or issuing a writ of assistance without prior consent after hearing.17
The Wisconsin County Court lacked jurisdiction to confirm the sheriff's sale and order appellants dispossessed while the bankruptcy petition was pending.18
Whether its action in the absence of direct appeal is subject to collateral attack?19
When Congress exercises its supreme power over bankruptcy to oust state-court jurisdiction, actions taken by the state court are void from the outset and remain subject to collateral attack even though no direct appeal was taken.20
Yes. Because the federal Act automatically deprived the Walworth County Court of power to proceed, its confirmation of the sale, issuance of the writ of assistance, and resulting ejection were nullities that appellants could challenge collaterally in their subsequent equity suit for restoration of possession and law suit for damages.21
The state court's actions are subject to collateral attack even in the absence of a direct appeal.22